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MODERN IRAN

By the Same Author

COLLOQUIAL PERSIAN



MOUNT DEMAVEND

MODERN IRAN

By

L. P. ELWELL-SUTTON

Illustrated

LONDON

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INTRODUCTION

THE events of the past few months have been bringing Iran more and more into the limelight. In these days history is being made so rapidly that prophecies are liable to be upset before they appear in print, and it is impossible to make any definite statements even about the present situation. In the last chapter, however, an attempt will be made to assess the political and strategic position of Iran and to indicate the general lines along which developments may be expected. But there are two factors which emerge from a study of Iran's long history, and which must be continually borne in mind. In the first place, in spite of constant invasion and conquest, she has always survived intact—a solid and indigestible block. Secondly, she has shown herself capable of appreciating and absorbing new ideas and new influences without impairing her own basic culture.

Both these factors are the result, it would appear, of Iran's vital position as the dividing line between the East and the West. On the one side are the truly "Oriental" peoples of India and the Far East, with their introspective, individual attitude towards life and their capacity for passive resistance. On the other are the Semitic and European races (for the Arabs have far more in common with the West than with the East); their characteristics seem to be restlessness, aggressiveness, an urge to expand and to dominate their neighbours. Iran has drawn from and contributed to both these cultures, without in any way losing her own individuality; no doubt it has been this cultural influence rather than any political strength that has enabled her to

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survive. This feeling of continuity was symbolised in 1935 by the insistence on the use abroad of the name *Iran* (which the country has borne since its earliest history) rather than the incorrect and comparatively new-fangled version *Persia*.

The present book is an attempt to show the progress and achievements of present-day Iran in the setting of her ancient history and her strategic position in the world today. The bulk of it had already been written when the recent crisis came to a head, but there was little that needed alteration ; whatever future developments there may be can only be understood in the light of Reza Shah's work. It is hoped that the book may not only remove some of the old-established romantic misconceptions of the country and people (symbolised by the name of Persia), but may also bring home the fact that the new Iran has an important part to play, not only in the war situation, but also in the re-ordering of the world after the defeat and destruction of Nazism. It is addressed primarily to the well-read man in the street, but specialists on Near Eastern affairs should also find something of interest. Much of the information is taken from sources not available in English or in any language other than Persian, and the author is also able to draw on the experiences of a three years' residence in the country.

Once again my special thanks are due to my wife, who did so much, under somewhat trying circumstances, to prepare the manuscript for the press.

KINGHAM,

September, 1941.

NOTE TO SECOND EDITION

SINCE the first edition of this book was written, Iran has been much in the news. Superficially there have been great changes—a powerful ruler has fallen, a totalitarian regime has gone, and Iran has ranged herself, albeit reluctantly, on the side of the Democratic Powers. But one must beware of supposing that these changes have gone very deep. The whole history of Iran shows that the outlook of her people has survived intact the major upheavals of civilisation, and every new attack on it from outside will merely serve to strengthen it. In this sense Reza Shah's regime is seen to be a natural expression of the Iranian character, and while no doubt there were some—politicians, reactionaries, minorities—who were pleased at its passing, the majority saw it fall with regret and even dismay. For it is probably too strong even to say that the Iranian people are only now beginning to appreciate Reza's work ; it is much truer to say that fundamentally they never disapproved of it.

The immediate danger still is that the absence of a strong central government may result in administrative collapse and internal disintegration ; indeed, for a considerable period after the Anglo-Russian occupation it seemed as though this was inevitable. The situation appears to have improved, but Britain and Russia still have a heavy responsibility in the matter, and if they fail, the consequences may well be serious. In the last chapter it is suggested that we can best assist Iran by enabling her to modernise herself and to develop her resources to the full ; we should regard such assistance at the earliest opportunity as no more than

NOTE TO SECOND EDITION

fair reparation for the damage, physical and psychological, that we have done.

Circumstances would in any case have prevented the inclusion in this new edition of any account of events in Iran since last August ; the book may stand, nevertheless, as a record of the achievements of a man who, whatever his faults, has left a lasting impression on the history of his country, and may therefore be reckoned among the great rulers of history.

CHAPTER I

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

THE traveller from Europe to Iran can approach it from several directions. If he has come by the Taurus Express he may alight at Mosul, and take the famous road through the Rowanduz Gorge to Tabriz; or he may go on to Baghdad, and travel thence by car to Kermanshah. Coming from Turkey, he might also use the Turkish road from Trabzon to Tabriz. If his interests are in the south, he will take the Iraqi railway to Basra, cross the Shatt-el-Arab by launch, and take a taxi to the port and frontier town of Khorramshahr. Whichever of these routes he chooses, however, he will be impressed, as soon as he begins to penetrate into the interior, by the vast barrier of mountains over which he must cross before he can reach the country itself.

The great range known to the ancients as the Zagros sweeps from the Caucasus in an almost unbroken curve following roughly the line of the Turkish frontier and the Persian Gulf, until it dies away in the barren plains on the Beluchistan border—a distance of over 1,400 miles. At the north-western extremity the peaks, some of which rise to 12,000 or 13,000 feet, are grouped round the great salt lake of Reza'iyè, whose area varies from 1,700 to 2,300 square miles at various times of the year. This lake is the centre of a drainage area of some 20,000 square miles, and as the rainfall is comparatively high (averaging 20 inches annually) it is not surprising that this is one of the most fertile parts of Iran. Silk, cotton, tobacco, rice and other

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cereals, melons, grapes and fruit of all kinds, are grown here, and the mineral wealth includes gold, copper, lead, iron and oil (the latter not yet fully exploited). The chief cities are Tabriz, with nearly 250,000 inhabitants, and the second largest city in Iran, and Reza'iyè, of some 50,000 inhabitants. Both these towns lie at an elevation of about 5,000 feet, and the climate is in consequence mild; even in summer, the thermometer rarely rises above 90° F, while in winter there are seldom more than 10 degrees of frost. Owing to its comparatively high fertility, the countryside gives an impression of being more thickly clothed in vegetation than other parts of the country (with the exception of the shores of the Caspian Sea). This district (part of the ancient country of Azarbaijan) as well as that farther south (*Kordestan proper*) is the home of the once unruly Kordish tribes, who with their compatriots across the border in Iraq and Turkey, have for many years been a source of anxiety to stable governments. Like all hillmen, the Kord is independent and intolerant of imposed authority, and it is to the credit of the Iranian Government that it is now able to look upon them as peaceful members of society. The Kords speak a language of their own, distinct from, though closely related to Persian.

Farthersouth, the appearance of the land begins to change. Instead of the wooded slopes of Azarbaijan and Kordestan, we find bare and rugged mountain scenery; the prevailing colour is grey, the grey of huge outcrops of slate, forming part of a tangled mass of rock apparently little worn by the weather. At first the elevation is not great, averaging 5,000 or 6,000 feet; on this plateau are found several important cities—Hamadan, a favourite summer resort, Kermanshah, centre of the oil industry in the north, Erak and Borujerd. Even here, however, the snows of winter

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and the floods of spring present problems to transport authorities, and roads over the passes are frequently blocked or washed away. To the west, the hills slope away towards the plains of Iraq, where on both sides of the border are important oil deposits, supplying Northern Iran on the one hand, and Iraq and the oil port of Haifa in Palestine on the other. However, after crossing the valley of the Ab-e-dez river (which flows into the Karun River, and so ultimately joins the waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates before they empty themselves into the Persian Gulf) we find ourselves on the roof of Iran. The huge snow-capped *Zardè Kuh* ("Yellow Mountains") of Lorestan (some of them reach 14,000 feet, and there are many of 11,000) attract few but the hardy Lori tribesmen, who somehow manage to wrest a living and so preserve their tradition of independence; attempts have been made to drive a road through this barrier, but so far without success. The superficial structure of this landscape is almost unbelievable in its brokenness and jaggedness; every kind of geological formation seems to have been thrown up by some gigantic upheaval and exposed to view, and the fact that weathering has had very little effect on the rock formations makes the impression even more vivid. The characteristic colour of the rocks varies from slate-grey in the north through white to the reddish yellow of the *gach* or sandstone of the southern hills. Permanent vegetation is almost unknown, and in the rainless summer the rocks are hot and lifeless; but the first rains in November cover them with a faint green film, which by the spring has become a mass of luxuriant grass speckled with scarlet wild poppies and hundreds of other flowers. Yet already in April they are drying up, and by the end of May the rocks are exposed again. By July radiation and the absence of water have

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combined to produce a temperature of nearly 120° F. in the shade. In spite of this, it seems to be possible for both animals and men to live here, albeit on a bare level of existence. Mountain sheep, wolves, jackals, hyenas, and even an occasional bear or leopard, are found there, to say nothing of the skinny cattle and sheep of the hill tribesmen. The tribes, of the two great Lori and Bakhtiyari groups, are remarkable for their fine physique ; their independent life and the hard nature of their existence has bred in them a contempt for the luxuries of the towns, a carelessness of human life and a lovable sense of humour. In the past they were largely nomadic and a menace to travellers ; but of recent years the efforts of the present regime to settle them have proved successful, and for the majority agriculture has proved more profitable than raiding. They speak dialects which are full of interest to linguists, but as yet comparatively little studied ; farther south there are several tribes of Turkish origin, an intriguing backwash of the main stream of Turkish invasions which swept across into Asia Minor in the Middle Ages.

Before we go farther east, we must look for a moment at the triangle of territory cut off by the edge of the mountains, the Iraqi frontier and the Persian Gulf. This flat alluvial plain (towards the Gulf the level scarcely varies more than a foot or so) is geologically of comparatively recent origin ; even in historical times we read of the shores of the sea being some fifty or a hundred miles farther north. This fact is brought out vividly by the formation of the land ; after a series of parallel ranges progressively less in altitude, the mountains come to a sudden stop (the elevation drops from 2,000 to less than 500 feet in a few miles), and from there onwards the straight horizon is hardly broken. This plain is watered by the Karun River,

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the only navigable river in Iran. Gazelle and game birds of all kinds flourish. The whole of this area (including the Bakhtiyari Mountains) was once the centre of the Persian Empire, a fact to which ruined palaces and derelict irrigation trenches still testify; subsequent neglect and decay rapidly turned it into a desert. Its inhabitants are mainly Arab, for geographically it is part of the "fertile crescent" formed by Iraq and Syria. They are all poverty-stricken, live in mud villages, and exist by ploughing up small areas round their homes, and getting some sort of a crop of barley and wheat. The discovery of oil in the mountains at the beginning of this century and the establishment of a great refinery at Abadan near the Gulf have done something to bring back its former importance; while the coming of the railway has raised the town of Ahwaz once more to the dignity of a trade centre. But the land is still poorly irrigated and therefore unfertile, and the tracks that do duty for roads still turn into a morass after the first rain. Moreover, the melting of the mountain snows in the spring regularly causes the Karun to overflow its banks and flood the desert, with loss of life and property. The climate is unpleasant, the summer temperature frequently exceeding 120° F. in the shade; and when these extremes of heat are combined with the moisture-bearing south wind from the Gulf, conditions of life are hard even for the Arab villagers who spend their lives there. This part of the country has been neglected in comparison with the rest, but it is to be hoped that the presence of oil and the new port at Bandar Shahpur will bring it back into the eye of the Government.

The plain carries on in a narrow strip along the coast of the Persian Gulf, but inland the mountains still rise to 12,000 or 13,000 feet. Along the seashore the climate is

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generally damp and sticky, and in the high temperatures of summer is unhealthy and productive of malaria. It is nearer the tropics, and such exotic products as dates, pearls, sugar-cane and opium are the staple trade. The population is thin, except in the fertile valleys, and the only towns of any size are the now neglected port of Bushire and, further inland, Shiraz. Through these two towns runs the first road to the interior after that running along the Ab-e-dez valley. The south-eastern extremity of Iran is barren and populated only by still unruly Beluchi tribes. The elevation is low, seldom rising above 5,000 feet, and parts of it are swampy ; the rainfall is the lowest in the country.

The eastern slopes of the "Zagros" Range are far less abrupt and form part of a great plateau extending as far as the Afghan frontier. The strip nearest the mountains (linking up with Azarbaijan) is one of the more fertile parts of Iran, and in it are to be found some of the cities whose names are most familiar to Western ears. Kashan, Isfahan and Kerman will be recognised by carpet-fanciers, Qum and Yezd are holy cities ; these in the past were characteristic of the old "Persia", and the appearance in them of modern factories is significant of the new Iran. The roads leading from Tehran, the capital, and Qum to Isfahan and Shiraz, and to Kashan, Yezd and Kerman, are two of the great highways of the country, and it is here that the Shah's modernising ambitions have been concentrated.

The main natural products of this plain are cotton, opium and tobacco ; copper, lead and silver are found in some quantity. Isfahan, the old capital, is now a city of some 100,000 inhabitants ; its gardens are famous, and the fruit grown there is transported all over Iran. Yezd and Kerman lie farther to the south-east, and therefore in less fertile country.



PART OF THE CENTRAL RANGE



THE KHUZISTAN DESERT DURING FLOODS

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Tehran, capital of Iran for the last 150 years, lies on this plain near the junction of the two main ranges of Iran—the “Zagros” (which we have described) and the Elborz, which forms a wall along the low-lying coast of the Caspian Sea.

The southern slopes of these mountains have much in common with those of the central ranges; they are rocky, barren and rainless. But after crossing over one of the passes, some of them 9,000 or 10,000 feet up, we find ourselves in an entirely different type of country. The rainfall is very high (anything from 30 to 50 inches annually), and the fertility of the earth is correspondingly high. Travelling through this country, one is at times almost reminded of an English countryside—green fields, woods thick with undergrowth, little muddy lanes, even the familiar bramble—until suddenly one comes upon a hillside of terraced rice-fields. At the edge of the Caspian itself is a low plain, some feet lower, in fact, than the normal sea-level; the favourite summer resorts of the Tehranis are all along this coast—one consequence of the mild climate. Most of the timber used throughout Iran comes from the great forests of the Elborz, in the depths of which are found bears, wolves, leopards, and even an occasional tiger; the commonest trees are the oak, elm, willow, ash, beech, box and cypress. Some of the mountains are of great height—the conical Mt. Demavend, symbolical of Iran, rises to 18,700 feet, the highest peak in the whole country. Here and farther to the east we see for the first time the slit eyes of the Mongol—stragglers from the great Turkman tribes of Central Asia. Even the village houses are different; instead of the dried mud of the rest of the country, they are built of wood or stone, the roofs often tiled with wooden tiles.

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The Elborz Range straggles on through the fertile plains of Khorasan, forming a wall overlooking the low-lying Turkman basin, and finally links up with Afghanistan and the Hindu Kush. In between these two arms lies the vast *Dasht-e-kavir*, the Great Desert of Iran, a barren area of about 150,000 square miles, nearly a quarter of the total area of Iran. This seems at one time to have been the bed of a sea linking up the Caspian with the Persian Gulf, and large parts of it are salt to this day. It has an average elevation of 2,000 feet, and extends right to the Afghanistan border ; date palms are grown in a few oases, but otherwise it is almost completely barren. Such little water as there is drains into salt swamps, generally dry in summer. In the north-east corner, in the fertile strip lying along the edge of the desert, is the holy city of Meshhed ; though it is the third largest town of Iran, its isolated position has allowed it to remain one of the centres of the reactionary movement, and even in recent years there were mutterings of revolt against the forward policy of H.I.M. the Shah's government (though they never became more than mutterings).

We have now made a brief survey of the whole of Iran, as it is today—an area of 630,000 square miles, more than five times the size of the British Isles. In former times its boundaries often included much of Afghanistan, Beluchistan, Turkestan, Caucasia and Iraq, but these have now been finally separated and fall outside the scope of our study. In our survey we have found huge barren areas with which probably little can be done, though their mineral possibilities have yet to be fully explored. But there are also important agricultural districts, which, properly developed, could feed the population at a much higher standard than is possible now. Iran has also one great asset—its oil—and it is

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evident that its mineral wealth is considerable. There is no reason why this wealth, used and exploited for the benefit of the country itself, should not enable it to support a larger population than it has at present, and at a higher standard of living. Much depends, of course, on their being left in peace to work along these lines, and this will only be possible so long as Iran, like so many other small and progressive countries, does not fall a victim to the greed of powers whose false philosophies blind them to the real needs of the individual, wherever he may be. But of Iran's strategic position we shall have to speak again.

The people who live in this country come of a very ancient stock. Their language seems to group them with all those races who speak the Indo-Aryan languages, and on this account Nazi theorists have even tried to group them with the Nordic German—though the fact of their darker colouring has proved somewhat of a stumbling-block. Not that they can be described as a dark race—the townsman is scarcely more sallow than the average Southern European, and the swarthy appearance of the peasant is due to weathering rather than to pigment. The typical Iranian is black-haired, has bold features with a large nose and small chin; the tribesmen, used to an open-air life, have preserved the fine physique which is characteristic of the race, though less common in the towns. Their normal occupation until recently has been that of agriculture, and they have shown little inclination or aptitude for the life of the sea, which they have left to Arabs and Armenians. In character they are hardly comparable to the thick-headed Prussian; they are, normally, a peaceable, humorous and imaginative people, with a love of art and poetry. Their art is indeed of a slightly superficial nature, delicate and whimsical, but lacking in substance;

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and they have a tendency to think more of the outside appearance of things than of their internal durability. They are talkative and eloquent, and their great delight is to sit together in their tea-houses drinking endless little glasses of sweetened tea and talking of this and that ; for this reason many have thought them to be lazy and inefficient. But these characteristics are liable to be misleading. It is to be expected that a race brought up under the hard conditions imposed on them by Nature should be admirers of the more heroic qualities, fighting men, lovers of sport, and these qualities are part of the Iranian make-up. In the earliest Iranian writings we read that every child was expected to be versed in riding, polo, shooting, throwing the javelin and swimming ; polo in-fact originated in Iran, and was brought thence to India by English travellers. The young Iranian of today is likewise an enthusiast for sport, and though it now takes the form of football, baseball, volleyball and the like, the spirit is the same. As to their fighting qualities, it is a fact that whenever the Iranian nation has seemed most depressed, most unlikely to rise again, she has invariably awoken and thrown off the oppressor—a point over which her more aggressive neighbours have sometimes made serious miscalculations. Generally these occasions have been accompanied by the appearance of a great leader, another manifestation of the hero-worshipping tendencies of the Iranian. Great loyalty to a leader, to the nation, to a religious creed, has often produced amazing feats of self-sacrifice. They have a great love of knowledge, and a remarkable aptitude for picking up new methods and new ideas ; their history has shown this, and all those who have had any experience of teaching or training Iranians will be able to confirm it. But at the same time these outside influences have never been

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able to absorb and swamp the deeply rooted ideas and outlook of Iran ; there is something indigestible in the Iranian nature which enables it to survive everything, and even in the end to swallow its conqueror. In the words of Count Gobineau, " Iran is like a great rock fallen from the side of a mountain into the midst of a torrent, which may erode it, and even lift it for a moment ; but the rock rolls firmly back into place."

The population of Iran is at present in the neighbourhood of 15,000,000 ; of these about one and a half millions live in the large cities, and there are still some two million semi-nomadic peoples, though this number is steadily decreasing. The remainder live in small towns and villages ; the densest population is along the Caspian shore (80-100 to the square mile) and in Azarbaijan (40-50), as compared with an average of 25 over the whole country. For the most part the old Iranian stock is fairly pure, but there is some admixture with Arabs (in the south-west), Turkmen (in the north-east), Kords, Armenians and Turks in the west. The Armenians and Kords have also maintained themselves as distinct minorities, numbering some 50,000 and 800,000 respectively ; other minorities are formed by the 25,000 Assyrians (on the western frontier), and the Arabs of the south-western desert. The Armenians are divided between Azarbaijan and the neighbourhood of Isfahan ; for the most part they are engaged in commercial and financial occupations, and so hold rather the same place in Iranian society as the Jews in Europe—and have attracted to themselves some of the same unpopularity. The Jews themselves are comparatively few in number, and have almost entirely assimilated with the native population.

CHAPTER II

THE CLASSICAL AGE

THE origins of the Iranian nation are wrapped in some mystery. The earliest inhabitants of which we have any knowledge are the Elamites, who were almost certainly not of the same race. They seem to have been of Turanian stock, that is, related to the Turks of Central Asia; they lived in the valley of the Karun River, and had their capital at Susa, not far from the modern town of Dezful. From 4000 to 1000 B.C. they were constantly at war or otherwise in contact with the Semitic peoples of Akkad, Babylon and Assyria, and with that great mother of civilisation, Sumer, and were no doubt responsible for the introduction into Iran of many of their ideas. It seems to have been during the third millennium B.C. that the country was first occupied by the true Iranians. They were part of a wave of Aryan (for want of a better word) invasions which took place at this time; pouring out of Central Asia, one stream settled down on the north-western plateau and became known to Europe as the Medes, a second (the Persians) swept over eastern and southern Iran, while a third (the Hindus) went down the Indus valley into India. Wherever they went, they took with them the characteristic Aryan philosophy, the worship of the forces of Nature, the idea of the conflict between the powers of good and evil which we find later fully developed in the religion of Zoroaster.

The average well-read Englishman may perhaps be bewildered by the different contexts in which he finds the

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Iranians mentioned. He first hears of the Medes and Persians in his Bible studies ; later, if he reads Greek and Latin, he will hear of the Persian campaigns against the city-states of Greece, and of the Parthian wars with Rome. None of these seem to have much connection with each other or with the Magi who came to Bethlehem, Morier's Haji Baba, Persian carpets, Omar Khayyam, or oilfields. Yet in reality there is a continuous thread of history running through the whole. We hear of the Medes first because they are the first to make contact with the Western world. They had their capital at Ecbatana (the modern Hamadan), and spoke a language which we may assume to have been the earliest form of Persian, though no written traces of it remain. They came into prominence about 700 B.C. (roughly contemporary with Babylon under Nebuchadnezzar) chiefly through their wars with Assyria, culminating in the sack of Nineveh in 600 B.C. But for the purposes of our study it is more important to know that it was under their rule that the prophet Zoroaster first saw the light. The legend has it that he was expelled from Media, and, fleeing to Khorasan in the east, was given protection by a Persian king, Gushtasp. However this may be, it is certain that the doctrines attributed to him are typical of an Aryan or Iranian philosophy. At first there was only the one Supreme God—Ahura Mazda, the Principle of Light ; later the influence of Assyrian Semitic and polytheistic ideas brought the introduction of other gods, who finally resolved into Ahriman—the Principle of Darkness. Between these two principles—Good and Evil—there was held to be perpetual warfare, and the state of mankind and the world depended on which of these two had the upper hand. Man's duty was to help the task of Ahura Mazda by preserving himself from corruption, his body, his sur-

roundings, the very earth which he touched ; the four elements were pure, and must be kept so. Agriculture was considered the highest occupation, because it brought health and fertility to the earth ; the bodies of the dead were not to be buried, but exposed to the sun and the air until they were re-absorbed. Strict rules were observed in the bringing up of their children ; sports which improved the body and knowledge which improved the mind were alike encouraged. It is curious that the worship of fire, often supposed to be a fundamental principle of Zoroastrianism, was actually a later addition, probably of Turanian origin ; presumably it was inspired by the natural oil fires which are a feature of the mountain districts of Western Iran. The idea of resurrection, on the other hand, which we also find in Judaism, is probably of Aryan origin. The religion of Zoroaster is worth careful study, for the religious and philosophical ideas which it taught are to be found recurring again and again in the history of Iran. Zoroaster's teachings are preserved in the *Avesta*, parts of which are certainly contemporary with him, and are therefore the earliest writings in Persian. The priesthood which was formed to preserve them, the Magi, seem originally to have been a Turanian tribe, who thus occupied the place that the Levites occupied in the Judaic scheme.

The Median supremacy was comparatively short-lived, for during the sixth century B.C. the other branch of the Aryan invaders began to come into prominence and to thrust out in either direction. The Persians, so called by their Western neighbours because they had their capital in the province of Pars or Persis (now Fars), are regarded as the real ancestors of the modern Iranians. There is a strong element of romanticism in this view, for it was under the Persian Achæmenid kings that Iran first became a

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great nation. The Achæmenids were the royal tribe of Pasargadæ, whose ruins may still be seen some 60 miles from Shiraz, and they took their name from their ancestor, Achæmenes. It is hardly necessary for us to go into the intricacies of the succession of these kings; the names of Cyrus, Cambyses and Darius will no doubt be familiar. In 550 B.C. Cyrus the Great completed the conquest of Media, and then set out upon a series of campaigns to the east and the west. The latter resulted in the conquest of Babylon and Lydia, the kingdom of the fabulously wealthy Croesus in Asia Minor. His son and successor, Cambyses, followed this up with the subjection of Egypt, and by the time that Darius came to the throne towards the end of the sixth century, he found himself ruler of an empire which extended from the Panjab in Northern India to Macedonia on the Danube. Darius was the great administrator of his line, and it fell to his lot to organise this empire in a way that might have seemed to his contemporaries destined to last for ever; roads were constructed, caravanserais built, coinage issued, science and industry encouraged. Yet this very system was in itself a weakness. Like all totalitarian dictatorships, great store was set by the severity of its laws; the law of the Medes and Persians has become a proverb in our own language. The king held an all-powerful position, and the virility of his subjects was directed to one purpose only, the defence and glorification of his empire. Women held a subordinate position, and polygamy and seclusion, which later spread to many other races, possibly originated here; it is fitting that Iran should have been one of the first Oriental nations to abandon these practices. Yet the achievements of the Achæmenids were by no means negligible; the wonderful ruins at Bisitun, at Pasargadæ and Persepolis, and at Susa.

pay tribute to their sense of grandeur and their capacity for thinking on a vast scale.

But their contemporary importance may well have been far less than the influence of their tradition on Iranian thought and history, particularly in modern times. This tradition is hardly historical at all, but forms an element of a National Epic which plays a far greater part in the background of ideas of the average Iranian than do the stories of King Arthur and his Knights or King Alfred and the cakes for the average Englishman. Most of this legend is contained in the books of the *Avesta* ; according to these, the first man was Kayumars, founder of the Pishdadi Dynasty. His great-great-grandson, Jamshid, is popularly identified with Solomon (as a Moslem hero), and has thus acquired many of the characteristics and stories attached to the latter in Semitic mythology. In particular they have been held responsible for many of the Achæmenid monuments ; for instance, Persepolis is known as the Throne of Jamshid, and Pasargadæ as the Throne of Solomon. When Iran came under Moslem sway, the Zoroastrians no doubt encouraged this identification, for it enabled them to obtain official recognition as " People of the Book ", and on a par with Jews and Christians, whose prophets were recognised by Islam ; similarly Zoroaster was identified with Abraham. Another of Kayumars' descendants was Feridun, whose three sons, Iraj, Salm and Tur are the Iranian opposite numbers of Shem, Ham and Japhet ; Iraj was the ancestor of the Iranians and Tur of the Turanians.

Wars between Iran and Turan are characteristic of the legends of the next dynasty to appear—the Kayanis, who are the legendary equivalent of the Achæmenids ; these mythical wars presumably are to be traced back to the actual

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Aryan invasions of the third millennium B.C. Gushtasp, patron of Zoroaster, is said to have been of this line, and the epic of Sohrab and Rustam, immortalised for English readers by Matthew Arnold, belongs to this period. Towards the end of this story we come to Bahman, who was slain by Rustam, and has been identified with Artaxerxes Longimanus, who ruled about 450 B.C. ; he may be said therefore to be the first historical figure. The epic however continues, and it is only with the coming of Islam in the seventh century A.D. that legend is finally abandoned for fact. By that time, however, national feeling was to find its outlet in religious rather than heroic mythology.

For the moment we must return to our historical survey. The conquest of Asia Minor brought the might of Persia for the first time into contact with the civilisation of Greece. The ancient world was now to witness one of those great struggles which take place from time to time in history—between an order of society devoted to the glorification of its rulers, based on discipline and unquestioning obedience, and a loose confederation of individuals and small groups, independent, self-seeking, at times even at loggerheads with one another. It seems as though the great and powerful organisation must be victorious ; yet experience has shown that willing devotion to an ideal, provided it is accompanied by inspired leadership, will prove superior to the onslaught of unthinking masses. So at any rate it turned out in the Persian wars with the Greek city-states ; for in little more than twenty years the Greek victories of Marathon, Thermopylæ, Salamis and Platæa had sufficed to drive the great armies of Xerxes out of Europe back into Asia Minor. These defeats mark the beginning of the Persian Empire's decline. Much of the next years is occupied by internal feuds ; Xenophon's famous journey

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through Asia Minor was an episode in one of these. At the same time the Greek city-states, torn by their own petty feuds and squabbles, and without great leaders, were in danger of disappearing in chaos and confusion ; but the infusion of a new element into their lives was the means not only of preserving their learning and philosophy for the world, but also of converting it into a force which was to influence the development of the Middle East and indirectly of Europe to a remarkable extent. This force was Hellenism, and the new element was the new blood and new vigour of Macedon.

The Macedonians did not themselves contribute to the culture of the Greeks whom they absorbed ; but they possessed those necessary qualities of aggressiveness and drive without which it might have been diffused and lost. As it was, the system of ideas which came into being probably affected the history of the world more than any other movement before or since. The characteristic of Hellenism was that it did not displace or destroy the ideas with which it came into contact ; on the contrary it drew from them. It was tolerant and democratic, and so naturally commercial and imperialistic. It linked up on the one hand with the Aryan philosophies of Iran and India, and on the other with the Teutonic fairy-tales of Europe. As a conscious movement it did not last more than a few centuries ; but its influence on science, philosophy and religion—particularly that of the East—was enormous. In both Europe and Asia the standard works on scientific subjects were for years those of the Greeks ; and when Europe began to widen her studies, it was to the Arab commentaries on the Greek philosophers that she turned.

Symbolical of this is the place which Alexander the Great holds in Eastern legend, for this may well be due as much to

the fact that he carried the civilising force of Hellenism with him as to his prowess as a conqueror. Certainly something more than mere military genius must be postulated to explain the extraordinary rapidity with which his conquests were carried out. No doubt the Persian Empire was weak and divided, and the new ideas troubling the world must have had an unsettling effect. At any rate, less than ten years sufficed to break the Persian resistance, end the Achæmenid line, and complete the conquest of Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Iran, Bactria (Turkestan) and Northern India. Alexander's personal triumph was short-lived, for he died a few years later (in 323 B.C.), but his fame lived on. He is mentioned in the Koran, and the Iranian National Epic even claims him as a member of the Achæmenid line—a good example of its agility in attributing to Iranian genius all the more creditable episodes in its story. Alexander's empire was maintained for a time by his general, Seleucus, and this short period sufficed for the Greeks and Macedonians, with their colonising genius, to establish themselves firmly. A close fusion took place between the Macedonian and Iranian aristocracies; Greek colonies established themselves everywhere, notably in Bactria, the modern Turkestan, where to this day they may be traced in the fair hair and features of some of the inhabitants. But like all great empires, it soon began to break up into independent components. The descendants of Seleucus maintained themselves for another hundred years or so in the Near East, while a new dynasty, the Ptolemies, was founded in Egypt; Macedon remained isolated for a time, and then was one of the first to fall victim to the growing power of Rome in the west. In the meantime, a new ruling house arose in Iran, which soon became strong enough to challenge the waning might of the Seleucids.

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The Parthians are for some reason almost completely ignored in the National Epic ; not only that, but a gap of nearly 500 years is closed up, so that it appears that the Sasanids of the third century A.D. followed immediately on the Achæmenids of the fourth century B.C. Possibly this was due to the fact that the Arsacids—the ruling dynasty—were not of Iranian, but of Turanian origin. Nevertheless they occupied quite an important place in this stage of Iranian history, even if their influence was not very lasting. Parthia broke away from the Seleucid Empire about 250 B.C., and it was not long before she came into conflict with her one-time masters. For a time the Seleucids more than held their own against their new rival, and in 206 B.C. Antioch the Great actually penetrated as far as India. But the successors of Alexander were already on the decline ; and when their Macedonian neighbours to the westward were absorbed by the growing ambitions of the new republic of Rome, it was clearly only a matter of time before the Seleucids themselves would succumb. The Seleucids had fulfilled their function of establishing Hellenism, and they had to give place to a new world-conquering force. Sandwiched now between Rome and Parthia, their empire rapidly fell to pieces, two minor kingdoms of some importance arising out of the ruins. One of these was Pontus in Asia Minor ; the other was that of the Armenians, an Aryan tribe who came from the west and settled south of the Caucasus—and so started a tragic history which has not yet ended. These two buffer states were the subjects of the wars that first brought Rome and Parthia into contact with one another ; for a time they succeeded in maintaining their independence, even achieving considerable power, until finally in 60 B.C. Pompey conquered them both and brought the frontier of Rome up

to that of Parthia. But this was as far as they were to go ; in 53 B.C. the Romans met with a crushing defeat at Carrhæ (the modern Harran, just inside the present Syrian frontier of Turkey), and from this time onward they made no further serious progress to the east. Desultory wars continued for another two hundred years, the advantage passing from one to the other, until both sides fell victim to internal weaknesses.


The first to go were the Parthians ; but they had served their purpose, for they succeeded for over three hundred years in holding off a power which had swept all else before it, but had now passed the height of its strength. This was their only contribution to Iranian history, for culturally they were negligible. Their empire, which started in the north-east of Iran, and soon spread over the whole country, was a loose feudal system dominated by the royal house of the Arsacids and by the Magi as spiritual lords ; the basis of their power was a feudal army, organised on primitive lines and apparently without any knowledge of scientific warfare. The only contribution they ever made to the art of war was the tactic of the feint retreat, whence an expression we use ourselves today. Their religion was a corrupt form of Zoroastrianism, with an admixture of ancestor and sun and moon worship, Greek deities and Semitic superstitions. Women were secluded and wore the veil. A veneer of Hellenic culture overlaid everything ; Greek, Jewish and Christian religions were tolerated. Though their language was Parthian (later known as Pahlavi), their literature was purely Greek in inspiration. Contacts were also made with China, now becoming a world power and beginning to send out feelers westwards ; from about 150 B.C. attacks by Hun tribes were regular events on the eastern borders of Parthia. Among the

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architectural remains of the Arsacids may be mentioned the so-called " Temple of Solomon ", near the present centre of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's fields ; they are also known to have used vaulted halls and the arch.

In 226 A.D. Ardashir, son of Sasan, defeated the last king of the Parthians, drove eastwards as far as India, then, turning west, conquered Armenia and challenged the weakening Roman Empire. Thus came into being the dynasty of the Sasanids, who were destined to fill a place in the history of Iran second only to that of the Achæmenids ; so much so, indeed, that Iranian tradition has attempted to link them up directly with their famous predecessors, by making Ardashir a descendant of a brother of Bahman, whom we have already noted as the first historical figure in the National Epic. Actually he was almost certainly no more than a vassal king of the Parthians, but the Iranian sense of tradition is so strong that it has developed into a theory of the divine right of kings. We shall find the same idea cropping up again as an expression of Iranian nationalism under the Arabs.

The political history of the Sasanids is a long series of wars with the Roman and (after 370 A.D.) Byzantine Empires, varied from time to time with campaigns against Huns and Turks in the east. Various great figures appear—Shapur I, who in 260 A.D. actually captured and humiliated the Roman Emperor Valerian, Shapur the Great (309–79 A.D.), Bahram Gur (420–40 A.D.), the " mighty hunter " of Fitzgerald, and Noshirwan the Just (531–79 A.D.), in whose reign the empire was re-organised, laws codified, roads and bridges built, and irrigation schemes carried out. For it must be realised that the energies of the Sasanids were by no means expended exclusively in war activities. Their roads, bridges and irrigation works were of a very high



CORNER TOWER OF THE PARTHIAN TEMPLE AT MASJID-I SULAIMAN



MOUNTAIN SCENERY NEAR MASJID-I-SULAIMAN

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order ; remains of the latter are still to be seen, for instance, the Band-e-Qaysar at Shushtar and the Ab-e-Gorgor on the Khuzestan desert. The famous arch of Ctesiphon, near Baghdad, the palaces at Qasr-e-Shirin, Kazerun and Nishapur, and the so-called Naghsh-e-Rustam, the " Carvings of Rustam ", near Kermanshah, are all part of their work. They were fond of the nobler sports ; hunting and polo were their favourites, and the introduction of chess is attributed to them. Above all, they encouraged literature ; the legends of the National Epic were collected, and the various books of the *Avesta* were codified and linked together with a commentary.

A word may not be out of place here about the different languages of which we hear in studying Iranian literature. The earliest of which we have any knowledge is that of the *Avesta* ; it is possible that this Avestic was the same as that spoken by the Medes. Old Persian was the language used by the Achæmenids on their monuments, and Parthian, Pahlavi or Middle Persian that of the Parthians and the Sasanids. Modern Persian is the language as it developed under the influence of Arabic and the Arabic alphabet. The *Avesta* had a special script of its own, but that used by the Sasanids was a curious and elaborate affair, with traces of Assyrian and Aramaic elements. It was in this script that the Pahlavi interpretation of the *Avesta* (Zend) was originally written ; subsequent transcriptions were made into Avestic (Pazend) and Arabic characters (Parsi).

The Sasanids made great efforts to restore the true faith of Zoroastrianism to its former purity, for under the Parthians the Magi had become weak, and the religion corrupt ; old influences, of Aryan and of outside origin, had crept in. One of the most interesting of these was the cult of Mithraism. Introduced into the Roman Empire in the

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time of Pompey, it seemed to fill the need which many felt at that time for something deeper and more spiritual than the amorous adventures of the Greek and Roman gods and goddesses. For a time, indeed, it was a serious rival to Christianity, and probably its eventual failure was due to its materialistic leanings and its low moral standard. Of greater importance, however, in Iranian culture was its successor, Manichæanism. Mani flourished during the third century A.D., just at the time when the Sasanids were establishing their power. His teachings were eclectic in character, and sought to reconcile Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Buddhism and the Assyrian religions. Against the more comfortable and materialistic doctrines of Zoroastrianism he placed a strongly ascetic view of life ; whereas the former considered that the material as well as the spiritual elements were included in the Principle of Good, Mani held that the material universe was the result of the mixing of darkness with light, and must therefore be wholly evil. From this view it followed that its destruction was desirable, and that any action which tended to prolong its existence, for example, marriage, was evil. It is hardly surprising that, though he recognised Buddha, Zoroaster and Christ, his doctrines were felt to be antagonistic to all other religions, and his followers suffered continual persecution. In spite of this, Manichæanism spread widely ; it found a home in Tibet, and was the basis of the heresy of the Albigenses in Europe in the thirteenth century. The very subversiveness of its ideas must have appealed to the Iranian nature, for movements of this kind have been common in Iran. Another prophet arose in the sixth century, one Mazdak ; he too taught asceticism, and was accused of communism—but this was a charge levelled by the orthodox at any new philosophy.

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The policy of the Sasanids towards new ideas and doctrines seems generally to have been one of toleration and even of encouragement ; for example Neo-Platonism, which was introduced and studied at this time, took so firm a hold that it survived to influence the development of Islamic philosophy, and finally led to the Sufi movement of the Middle Ages. It was only when a new heresy threatened to upset the stability of the State that it was rigorously suppressed. Mazdakism was brutally crushed, and the history of Christianity under the Sasanids illustrates well how their policy was based purely on practical considerations. The adoption of Christianity by Constantine the Great in 323 A.D. as the official religion of the Roman Empire meant that the Christians in Iran were branded as "fifth columnists" supporting the traditional enemy ; so strong did this feeling become that in 424 A.D. the Eastern Christians declared their independence from the Western Church. But Sasanid political considerations were to play a further part in the splitting of the Christian Church into warring sects. About this time opinions became sharply divided over the heresy of Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople. These differences seem to us now to have been of a hair-splitting character, but it is clear that they were really political. Nestorius taught that Christ had two persons and two natures, whereas the Western Church held that He had one person and two natures, and the Byzantines that He had one person and one nature (the Monophysite doctrine). The Sasanid king saw his opportunity, and abandoning the attempt to Zoroastrianise the Christians under his rule, encouraged the Assyrians of Mesopotamia to adopt the Nestorian heresy and to break away from the Eastern Church of Byzantium. The Armenians held to the Monophysite doctrine, but compensated for this obstinacy

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by refusing to acknowledge Byzantium and forming themselves into a separate Church. Both these Churches have lasted to this day. The Nestorians were especially Iranian in character ; their missionary activities extended to India, China and elsewhere, and it is even said that St. Ives was an Iranian bishop of the sixth century. Under the later Sasanids their influence was particularly strong, and the wife of Khosro Parviz, last but one of the line, was a Christian.

CHAPTER III

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF ISLAM

UP to this time we have been studying an Iran which has rarely been under alien domination ; foreign invaders and world-conquerors there have been, but they have never made any deep impression on the " solid block " of Iran. It seems almost to have been chance that enabled the next world-conquering power to dominate it to such effect that it permanently changed the whole character of its society. When the Arabs began their spectacular sweep out of Arabia, they were faced with two empires, the Roman and the Iranian, both of whom had been weakened by years of warfare and by internal divisions, and both of whom had outlived the normal span of empires. The former they forced back into Asia Minor, and the latter came completely under their sway.

This was not the first contact that the Iranians had had with the Arabs. For some time there had been small Arab kingdoms around the Syrian desert—at Hira in Iraq and Ghassan in Syria—who had offered allegiance to Iran or Byzantium as circumstances suited them ; and in the south of Arabia was the flourishing kingdom of the Himyarites in the Yemen. These last came under Iranian sway in 576 A.D. when a Sasanid army drove out invaders from Abyssinia, on the opposite shore of the Red Sea. Another significant incident took place in 610 A.D., when an Arab army from Hira defeated the Iranians at Zu Qar. But it was not from any of these places that the destruction of the Sasanids was to come.

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The Arabs appear as minor characters from time to time in the early history of the Near East. But their primitive organisation prevented them from ever reaching a position of any importance ; a loose system of tribes, dependent for their existence on raids upon one another, could never have united into anything strong unless driven by some abnormal inspiration. So also their religious and social life was of a very simple character. At first it was pure animism ; spirits were worshipped in every tree, rock or spring. Gradually this developed, as each tribe claimed its own god ; then certain towns were dedicated to the cult of some particular deity, and pilgrimage made from all around. This development was doubtless economic in its origin, for these towns soon became centres of trade, and so of civilisation. Mecca and Medina, in the Hejaz and on the trade route to the incense country of the Yemen, were the leading cities, and here the religion of the Arabs developed considerably under outside influences. The strongest element seems to have been the Mandæan or Sabæan, of Babylonian origin ; the specific contribution of this faith was the belief in one God, which probably came in the first place from this source rather than from Judaism or Christianity, though these influences were also present. The Mandæan religion survives to-day in the Subbi sect of Iraq, whose engraving on silver (the so-called Amara work) is well known to all tourists in the Middle East ; from the fact that they practise baptism, they have sometimes been wrongly connected with John the Baptist. The Christian influences came from the kingdoms of Ghassan and Hira, where there was a strong Aramaic element ; while Jewish colonies existed in Mecca and Medina themselves, as well as in the Yemen. At Mecca was the famous black stone in the Ka'ba, which became a centre of pilgrimage

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for the whole of Arabia ; so it was that the leading tribe of Mecca, the Quraish, gathered to themselves a considerable degree of influence and prestige.

In about 570 A.D. a son was born to Abdullah, grandson of Hashim, one of the leading men of the tribe of Quraish. This son was called Mohammad ; he it was who, at the end of an uneventful life, was destined to ride and direct the storm of conquest and religious fervour which now surged up in Arabia. He seems at first to have been a typical representative of the good merchant class of Mecca ; serious and thoughtful, and not addicted to the more frivolous pleasures, he married a wealthy widow somewhat older than himself, and settled down to a humdrum existence. But his discussions with the Jews and Christians whom he met led him to be disgusted with the many gods and goddesses and the heathen practices of his co-religionists, and finally his religious experiences persuaded him that he had been appointed by God to convey a final revelation to the human race. His active propaganda of the messages given to him by the angel Gabriel brought him into bad odour with the other members of his family, and he was obliged to leave his native town of Mecca and take refuge in neighbouring Medina. This *Hijra* or emigration took place on September 20, 622 A.D., and it is regarded as having been so decisive a step that the date is used to mark the beginning of the Islamic era. In Medina Mohammad found more favourable ground for his teachings, the only opposition coming from the Jewish community (a fact which completed the split between Islam and Judaism). In 630 A.D. he returned in triumph to Mecca, the interval having been occupied by ventures successful and unsuccessful ; but from this time on the course of his movement was assured. Death two years later prevented him from seeing his religion

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spread beyond the confines of Arabia itself, but there is no doubt that he believed his mission to be a world-wide one, for in 628 A.D. he sent envoys to the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius, the Persian king Khosro Parviz, and the rulers of Egypt, the Yemen and Abyssinia. The work of conquest was carried on by his successors or *Caliphs*, Abu Bekr (632-4) and Omar (634-44) ; under the latter Egypt and Syria were conquered, and the Byzantine army defeated. In 636 came the final clash with the armies of the king of Iran ; they were utterly routed, Iran fell under Arab rule, and Yezdegerd III, the last Sasanid, died in captivity a few years later.

Before we trace any further the history of the rise of Islam, we must consider for a moment what relevance it has to our main theme—Iran. Even politically the Arab absorption of Iran was not complete ; from the very first Arab rulers modelled their administration on Iranian as well as Byzantine methods. But the effect on culture and religion must have been far less than is often supposed. Certainly the outward forms of Islam were adopted ; and the language was enriched by the addition of many Arabic words, sometimes almost to the exclusion of the original. But both these processes took time, and bore a peculiarly Iranian character. It was indeed unlikely that the fundamentally different natures of the democratic Arab and the autocratic Iranian would affect one another, or that Western Islam and Eastern “Aryanism” would mix easily ; and we shall see that the basic culture of Iran was to emerge almost unchanged.

The principles of Islam are contained in the *Qur'an*, the “readings” revealed to Mohammad by the angel Gabriel. There is every reason to suppose that the text we possess today corresponds closely with the actual words of Mohammad.

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Islam undoubtedly draws much from other religions, and in fact this is expressly stated. All the earlier prophets—Abraham, Moses, Zoroaster, Jesus—are recognised, the theory being that their revelations have been corrupted by their followers. Those who adhere to a revealed religion of this kind are known as “People of the Book,” and are given a special status. We have already seen how the opposition of the Jews of Medina brought about the split with Islam ; but Judaism continued to be tolerated, as also were Christianity and Zoroastrianism (there are still some 9,000 Zoroastrians in Iran, to say nothing of the large Parsee community in India). Mohammad, however, differs from the others in that he is claimed to be the last of the prophets after whom there will be no new revelation.

The word *Islam* defies literal translation ; it conveys the idea of resignation, of whole-hearted submission to the will of God. This does not, however, necessarily imply a doctrine of fatalism ; in fact this was one of the thorniest topics of discussion during the enlightened period of the Middle Ages. In the end the more rigid teaching won the day in the greater part of the Moslem world, though the idea of free will continued to be popular in Iran ; in fact the choice between the two was more closely connected with the Iranian, Arab and Turkish characters than with anything in the tenets of Islam.

Islam lays great emphasis on a strict monotheism ; the prophets, including Mohammad, may have been the specially favoured recipients of messages from God, but they were in no sense divine, and are not worshipped. Admittedly some of the later extreme sects, particularly in Iran, seem to apply terms almost of divinity to their leaders ; but these developments were not Islamic, and even these people did not dare to commit the heresy of attributing a “partner” to God. It

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is important also to notice that there has never been a priesthood in Islam in the strict sense of the word. There are religious teachers whose business it is to explain and interpret the holy word ; but these people have no special religious status, and the position is well symbolised by the fact that the leader of the prayers in the mosque looks in the same direction as the rest of the people—towards God (whereas the Christian priest, interceding with God, stands facing his congregation).

The other great principle of Islam is the belief in a future life. It is this perhaps more than anything else that links up Islam with the Western group of religions—Judaism and Christianity—as contrasted with the Eastern philosophies of Hinduism, Buddhism and the rest. Speaking to a primitive people used to a hard life, Mohammad naturally paints the delights of heaven and the terrors of hell in the most lurid colours ; the atmosphere is different, but the principle is the same as the harps and angels of traditional Christianity.

This doctrine provides the only link between the religious and the social ideas of Islam. Clearly, if there is to be a future life in heaven, there must be a way of earning it, and so comes into being a vast structure of religious law, ritual and custom. Five principal canonical duties are laid down to be observed by all Moslems—ritual cleanliness, prayer, fasting, the pilgrimage to Mecca and almsgiving—each sect having its own rules for their observance. Mohammad realised fully the value of ritual and ceremony as an element in the maintenance of unity among his followers—a view fully justified by the subsequent history of Islam. But around these ritual duties quickly grew up a mass of other regulations covering every aspect of daily life—food and drink, inheritance, marriage, etc. It must be remembered that Mohammad was concerned not only with the enunciation

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF ISLAM


of a new religious doctrine, but also with the organisation of his own rather primitive community. Hence there has been a tendency to preserve as the edicts of God various rules of life which were applicable to a semi-nomadic society, but not to a highly civilised modern state ; for example, the marriage laws, intended to restrict the immoral practices of the heathen Bedouin, were used in later times as an excuse for self-indulgence. It is significant that modern states like Iran and Turkey are using codes of law, based on European models, which are replacing the old religious laws.

As Islam spread over the Near and Middle East, the necessity arose of some kind of political organisation. Partly as a result of the rapid expansion of Arab power, and partly owing to the chaotic condition of that part of the world after years of Perso-Roman wars, there was no tendency to maintain or form national boundaries. The conquered peoples had the choice of embracing Islam and receiving equal status with their conquerors, or of retaining their old religions with a subordinate "client" position. But the whole area of conquest was regarded as *Dar-al-Islam*—the House of Islam—as opposed to *Dar-al-Harb*—the House of War. Within the *Dar-al-Islam* there were only Moslems and their clients—the People of the Book ; outside, the enemies of Islam. At the head of the *Dar-al-Islam* was the Caliph. As he was responsible for the administration of social as well as religious affairs, he was in no way comparable to the Pope in Christianity (a comparison which has sometimes misled our own foreign policy). Whereas a Roman Catholic can be loyal both to the Pope and to his temporal rulers, in Islam there can be no such division. When, with the centrifugal tendencies of Oriental states, the *Dar-al-Islam* began to break up, each independent ruler, if he did not claim for himself the title of Caliph, paid at least nominal

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allegiance to the Caliph in Baghdad. The feeling of unity (encouraged by the annual pilgrimage) was in any case so strong that for nearly a thousand years it was possible for a Moslem to travel throughout the Islamic world, even when the different parts of it were at war, and find himself welcomed everywhere not merely as a guest but as a fellow-citizen. It was not until the sixteenth century that the growth of nationalism, always noticeable in Iran, became strong enough to affect this feeling ; then the establishment of Iran as an independent nation imposed an effective block between the two halves of the *Dar-al-Islam*, and hastened the process of disintegration. But this is to anticipate.

The first two Caliphs were not closely related to Mohammad, and their election took place on strictly democratic lines. But with the election of the third Caliph, Othman, in 644, family and tribal disputes came into evidence. These disputes may seem at this time to be rather remote, but since they lie at the root of the subsequent divisions which were to split Islam from top to bottom, it is essential that we should study them at any rate in outline. The following genealogical table will help to make the position clear.



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Othman was a member of the Omayyad family, whose bitterest rivals were the Hashimites, the family to which Mohammad himself belonged. Omayyad hatred of Mohammad's family extended to his religious ideas, and on the death of Othman in 656, open strife broke out. The Hashimites were represented by Ali, Mohammad's cousin and son-in-law, while the Omayyad candidate was Mo'awiya. The conflict ended, for the time being, with the assassination of Ali in 661, and Mo'awiya pointed the change of outlook by transferring his capital to Damascus.

From this time dates the split in the unity of Islam. The Omayyads, as we have seen, represented the pagan reaction against the teachings of Mohammad and all that was associated with him. They established in Damascus a secular empire, modelled on the Iranian and Byzantine patterns, and thence embarked upon the great campaigns which in a few years were to spread Islam from Spain to India and the borders of China. But they soon lost their popularity; apart from the ultra-democratic Bedouin groups, who hardly enter into our story, they fell foul of the Hashimite partisans and of the non-Arab subject classes.

Hashimite activity centred at first round the persons of Ali and his son Husain. The *Shi'at Ali*—the Party of Ali—was at this stage a purely political and Arab movement, and there was no difference of religious doctrine; opinion was rallied in its favour by the pagan practices of the Omayyads, their desecration of the sacred places at Mecca and Medina, and by the martyrdom of Husain at the battle of Kerbela in 680—an event which is commemorated by Shi'ites to this day. They represented the aristocracy of Islam, and there was even some suggestion of the doctrine of "divine right"; Ali, as the nearest male descendant of Mohammad—whose only son had died as a child—was

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considered to have a natural right to succeed him. So they came to reject not only the Omayyad Caliphs, but also Abu Bekr, Omar and Othman.

The Iranians, as the chief non-Arab group, played little part in all this. They were, indeed, almost completely swamped by the Arabs, as we may see from the effect on their language. The majority clung to their old religion, though among the upper classes conversion was more usual, as a matter of convenience. Indeed, had the orthodox doctrine that all Moslems were equal been generally observed, it might have short-circuited any Iranian opposition to foreign rule. But though the Iranians were, naturally, ready enough to accept this belief, it found little favour with the Arabs, and so a sense of grievance was allowed to fan the fires of Iranian national feeling. Coupled with this was the Iranian tendency to look for a "Messiah", a tendency which is found in many of the rebellions which took place at this time in Eastern Iran.

At the beginning of the eighth century A.D. propaganda began to be carried on in Khorasan, in the east of Iran, on behalf of the Abbasid branch of the Hashimite family. This propaganda was very skilfully varied to appeal not only to the other Hashimites—the *Shi'at Ali*—but also to the restive Iranians; in fact this habit of propaganda is so characteristic of Iranian revolutionary movements that we may be sure there was a considerable Iranian element in this one. The Abbasids finally became strong enough to defeat the Omayyads (in 750), and established their capital in Iraq; their rule extended over the whole of the Omayyad dominions, with the exception of North Africa and Spain, whose history from this date runs a separate course. The foundation of the new city of Baghdad marked even more sharply the anti-Arab nature of their policy;

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from now on the illiterate and philistine leanings of the tribal Arab gave place, largely under Iranian influence, to the study and encouragement of literature and science. Greek works were translated, contacts made with Europe and China ; the Iranian arts of miniature painting, calligraphy, carpet and silk-weaving were given a new impetus. The upper classes, by now well absorbed into the faith of Islam, took part in government, and introduced the methods of administration used by the Sasanids (for example the Arabic word *wazir*—vizier—comes from a Middle Persian word). Under the famous Harun-ar-Rashid Baghdad became the intellectual centre of the civilised world. Poets, artists, scientists and philosophers vied with one another ; religions and heresies were freely tolerated, and many Jews and Christians held posts of importance. Some of this intellectual activity found expression in the rationalistic *Mu'tazila* movement. Its teachings of free will and tolerance owed much to the study of Greek philosophy ; passing later to Spain, it influenced Christian Scholasticism.

The *Shi'at Ali* in the meantime was undergoing a change. They had hoped for much from the Abbasids and had been disappointed. Their failure as a political party led them to pay more attention to religious ideas, and they became the chief opposition sect to the Sunnites—the followers of the *Sunna* or orthodox tradition. They did not entirely lose their political basis, for their support came mostly from the unprivileged classes ; this applied as much to the Iranians as to the Arabs, for whereas the wealthy Zoroastrians accepted orthodox Islam as a means of ensuring their position, many of their middle- and lower-class subjects joined the Shi'ite sect. Henceforth Shi'ism, which so far had been a purely political movement without any distinctive religious doctrine, was to

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become more and more a vehicle for the (to Islam) foreign ideas of Aryanism. Most characteristic of all was the theory of divine right. We have seen how Shi'ism had already leant in that direction ; it was an idea which made little appeal to the true Arabs, but it was entirely in accord with Iranian ideas. Under their influence there was even an attempt to link Husain with the Sasanids by a story that he had married Shahrbanu, daughter of Yezdegerd III ; but in any case his direct descent from the Prophet was enough to ensure his right. Ali, however, is the great figure in the Shi'ite canon ; he is often given greater importance than Mohammad, and some extreme sects have even deified him. His descendants through Husain, known as *Imams* (leaders), took for Shi'ites the place of the Sunni Caliphs, but with characteristic differences ; they held office by divine right, and the last of the line (orthodox Shi'ism recognises twelve) is held to have disappeared, and will reappear one day as a Messiah. Temporal rulers are in the meantime recognised—as “usurpers”. These doctrines of “disappearance” (*ghaiba*) and of the Messiah or *Mahdi*, together with ideas of incarnation and transmigration of souls, are found in all Iranian sects, both inside and outside Islam. For the time being, indeed, the more extreme Iranians remained outside, and took part in various revolutionary movements of the type of Mazdakism ; the ideological basis of these movements was not always purely Iranian, but borrowed elements from Judaism, Manichæanism, Christianity, etc.

During the ninth century the Abbasid Caliphs began to employ Turkish slaves in their entourage ; some of them held high positions, and gained considerable influence. The Turks were a Central Asian tribe who began to make their appearance in the west at this time. Most of them

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gravitated towards Asia Minor, but many settled in other parts, and Turkish tribes are found in south-western Iran to this day. Their bleak and fatalistic outlook won great popularity in Baghdad and led under the Caliph Muta-wakkil (A.D. 850) to a violent reaction against the free ideas of the earlier Abbasids. This change of outlook, which must bear some of the blame for the subsequent decay of Islamic culture, had also a decisive effect on the political structure of Islam. The jurisdiction of the Caliphs at Baghdad shrank almost to the city boundaries, whilst outside sprang up independent dynasties under whose patronage Mu'tazilite and Shi'ite ideas were able to find a hearing. The first Iranian dynasty under Islam, the Saffarids, was founded in Southern Iran in 871; another dynasty of the tenth century, the Buwayhids of Western Iran, adopted Shi'ism as its official religion. Shi'ism in fact carried on many of the ideas started by the Mu'tazilites, and one of its chief differences from Sunnism has been its readiness to admit individual interpretation of divine doctrines as against rigid adherence to the letter of the tradition. The Sunni-Shi'ite division also came more and more to coincide with the social-economic division; the Iranian revolutionaries, who had previously held apart from Islam, now joined the Shi'ites—though they retained the same ideas, as we may see from later heretical sects.

One of these sects, the Isma'ilis, it will be worth our while to look at a little more closely, for it illustrates not only the continuity of Iranian religious beliefs, but also their ability to absorb ideas from outside. The immediate origin of the sect was a family dispute between two sons of the sixth Imam; while orthodox Shi'ism recognised the descendants of one for another five generations, the Isma'ilis held that the Imamate ceased with the "disappearance"

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of the son of the other. But this personal dispute was merely the excuse for the formation of a secret society designed to unite the Islamic peoples in a revolutionary uprising against their Arab conquerors. In common with the earlier movements we have noticed, the business of propagating the new idea was entrusted to trained propagandists, who varied their appeal according to the group they were addressing—Iranians, Jews or Christians. Their aim was to attract the socially oppressed classes, particularly the artisans and labourers ; the movement was in fact far more social than religious. Old religious ideas certainly reappear in it, as they reappear yet again in the Babi and Behai movements of the nineteenth century—the incarnation of the truth, the disappearance and future return of the Messiah, the gradual initiation of the adherent ; but its fundamentally anti-religious nature is shown in the stages through which the initiate had to pass. We naturally know little of the higher ones, but we do know that there were nine degrees of initiation, each progressively anti-Islamic, the inner ones finally abandoning dogmatic religion altogether in favour of an eclectic philosophy. Its enemies levelled against it the charge of Communism, and though this was said of every heretical movement, yet the underground technique of propaganda had something in common with the Communist “cell” of today. Offshoots of this sect developed in widely different ways. The original movement transferred to South Arabia and North Africa, and eventually founded the Fatimid line of Caliphs in Egypt (909–1171) ; under their rule a liberalistic and intellectual society grew up, marred only occasionally by outbreaks of persecution and violence. The Druze sect in modern Syria is a relic of this branch. In Bahrain appeared the Carmathians, who terrified and shocked the Islamic

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world by their sacrilegious attacks on holy places ; another group had its headquarters in Iraq and Syria. In the eleventh century there appeared the "Brotherhood of Purity", who attempted to spread popular learning amongst the masses—again the appeal to the unprivileged classes is to be noticed. Yet another aspect of Isma'ilism is seen in the *Hashshashin* or "hemp smokers" of Alamut in the Elborz Mountains—a terrorist sect with again the features of grades of initiation, the lowest being the "terror squad" of the Fedawis, the "Ransomed". It was a branch of this group in Syria that gave the Crusaders so much trouble, and it is to them that we owe our word "assassin". Finally there is the highly respectable sect of the Bohras in India today, with their leader the Aga Khan, whose ancestor emigrated to Bombay in 1840. Here then we have a movement which appeared in many guises, yet had running through it all the time the idea of uniting all creeds and groups, particularly the unprivileged classes, in one enlightened philosophy and creed of life. Not always consciously subversive, it was nevertheless forced by its attack on the existing order to incur the hostility of rulers and governments.

It was inevitable that all this intellectual activity on the part of the heretical sects of Islam should produce a reaction in orthodox circles against the extreme dogmatism of the Sunni jurists. This took the form of the movement known as Sufism. There has been much speculation, both mediæval and modern, about the origins of this sect ; the only point that emerges clearly is that it was not a sect at all, but a philosophical and mystical attitude towards life. Sufis were not in fact members of any particular group, and followed no special system ; rather were they opposed to the more dogmatic movements, and preferred

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to follow each their own line of thought, borrowing freely from Manichæanism, Christianity and Greek philosophy. In these early stages piety, asceticism and unworldliness were the order of the day. Later, however, Iranian mystics began to take an interest in the new movement, and, as always, succeeded in very largely changing its character. The emphasis on unworldliness was carried to its logical extreme; the material world ceased to exist, and God alone remained. The aim of the Sufi was escape from earthly bonds and, by the contemplation of eternal beauty, complete self-absorption and annihilation in the Divine Truth. This produced the more extravagant forms of pantheism and even of self-identification with the Deity—for example, al-Hallaj in the tenth century exclaimed: "I am the Truth". Orthodoxy could not stomach these exaggerations, and after the philosopher al-Ghazali had succeeded in the eleventh century in effecting a compromise between Sunni and Sufi doctrines, extreme Sufism became a characteristically Iranian creed. As such, it had a very deep influence on Iranian poetry; from this time dates the wealth of metaphorical imagery, which, drawn frequently from such worldly subjects as the drinking of wine, is often misleading and always obscure.

We have so far said little about the historical events of this period. It will be realised from what has gone before that political divisions and complications had comparatively little relevance to the cultural growth of the various nations of the Near East; but from the eleventh century onwards certain developments took place which were to have more than a purely political effect. The chief feature of these was the ousting of the Arabs by a series of non-Arab (and non-Iranian) conquerors from Central Asia, who temporarily united the Islamic countries into empires which

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rapidly fell to pieces. The first of these were the Seljuq Turks, who appeared in about A.D. 1050, established themselves as serious rivals to the Byzantine Empire, and finally after about a hundred years of rule, broke into warring kingdoms. More catastrophic from the point of view of the civilised world were the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century. These barbarian tribes, masters only of the art of war, swept across the Near East in a gale of destruction, and poured through Russia into Europe as far as Silesia, Moravia and Hungary. Baghdad, the intellectual centre of the Islamic world, was captured and sacked ; in 1258 the last helpless Abbasid Caliph was put to death. Only Egypt and the Turks barred the invaders' further progress. Priceless libraries, repositories of centuries of learning, were consigned to the flames, and Islamic civilisation seemed in danger of total collapse. But Mongol devastation went beneath the cultural surface ; for their destruction of cultivation and of irrigation works accounted more than anything else for the slowness of Islam's recovery. What is remarkable, indeed, is not so much that recovery was slow, as that there was any recovery at all. The only good result that we can see from this disaster was that Mongol pressure on the Turks, and the latter's consequent pressure on the Byzantines, were the prime causes of the Renaissance in Europe. From this time dates the position of Asia Minor as the peculiar province of the Turks.

The peculiar system of inheritance of the Mongols (by which each son inherited an equal share of the property) led rapidly to the break up of their empire. The various rulers, finished with their career of destruction, settled down as beneficent despots, and absorbed and encouraged what was left of the culture of their subjects. In Iran in 1295 Ghazan Khan adopted Shi'ism, and encouraged

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literature, art and science ; indeed, he did much to atone for the crimes of his predecessors. But this state of affairs was not to last for long, for in 1350 another conqueror of the same order appeared. This was Tamerlane or Timur the Lame, whose campaigns at the head of his Turkish followers from Central Asia reached almost as far as those of the Mongols. But, like the Mongols, both he and his successors, when they had settled down, turned to the encouragement and patronage of the arts ; in fact, under the later Timurid monarchs, Iranian poetry and painting reached their greatest heights.

We may note in passing the continued westward thrust of the Turks, resulting in 1453 in the capture of Constantinople—an event which set the Renaissance firmly on its way, and fixed the dividing line between East and West at the Dardanelles ; and then we must turn to look for a moment at the literary developments which had been taking place in Iran during this period. At first, as we saw, Iranian culture and the Persian language was almost completely ousted by the conquering Arabs. Arabic was the language of religion and of administration, and the subject races were not in a position to concern themselves with much else. But we say “almost” advisedly, for when Persian literature did reappear, it was clear that it owed much to the traditions of pre-Islamic times. While Arabic was retained for historical, philosophical and scientific subjects—subjects which were Arab in inspiration and required the wide facilities of that language for technical expression, poetry could only find full scope in the native language of its authors. Iranian poetry has the characteristics which are found in other Oriental literature to a lesser degree. There is no distinct thread running through a poem, apart from the general one of unity of

theme ; each couplet is complete in itself not only grammatically but also logically. The Iranian listener will express his appreciation of single well-turned lines rather than of themes or sentiments ; a Persian poem is a string of pearls rather than a Koh-i-noor diamond. The same characteristic appears in their miniature painting, where the love of detail outweighs the conception of the whole.

The first Iranian Moslem poet was Rudagi of the tenth century, but he was overshadowed by his illustrious successor, Ferdosi. Ferdosi's fame outside his own country is so great that when the millenary of his birth was celebrated in Iran in 1934, literary representatives from all over the world attended the festivities. This fame rests exclusively on the great work of his old age, the *Shahname* or "Book of Kings". This work, which he started at the age of 60, took him over eleven years to finish ; and it has become the prototype of the Persian epic poem. In it Ferdosi crystallised the Iranian National Legend, which up to this time had had no permanent form, but had merely been handed down by word of mouth ; it is perhaps due as much to this fact as to the nobility of his epic style that he is today regarded in Iran almost as a national hero. One feature of the work which is especially admired today is his insistence on the use of words of Persian origin, an example which was not followed by later writers.

Ferdosi was the first of a long and illustrious line of poets, of whom we can only mention a few names here—the romantic poet Nezami of the eleventh century, the 800th anniversary of whose death is being celebrated this year (1941), the mystic Rumi from Khorasan and the lyric poet Sa'di from Shiraz, both of whom lived in the thirteenth century, Hafez of Shiraz (fourteenth century), whom many Iranians couple with Ferdosi as their two


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greatest poets, and Jami of Khorasan (fifteenth century), the second of the great mystics. There were other Iranian writers—philosophers, historians and scientists—who wrote mainly in Arabic, but nevertheless must be mentioned; the chief were the historian Tabari, the scientists Rhazes and Avicenna, the geographer Biruni and the philosopher and astronomer Omar Khayyam (who for some reason is best known to us for the light verse which he apparently wrote in his spare time).

It was during this period too that education in Iran began to settle down into the form which came to be characteristic of this section of Islam until the twentieth century. The guiding principle was that the child (or adult—for there was no distinction in the method of approach) should learn to fear God and understand the laws of Islam. After this he was required to practise good morals and manners in his dealings with others, his behaviour and way of speaking, eating, walking and so on. Finally, it was considered desirable that he should become master of some craft or branch of learning. In the early days of Islam religious teaching and precept had been given to gatherings in the mosques by the Caliph himself; later this duty was delegated to a special preacher, noted for his piety and learning, but not endowed with any special status. Then separate classes began to be held for children, at first in the mosques, then in the houses of the teachers; in this way the first primary schools came into being. To these the child would go at the age of five or six, and would remain until he was fourteen, when he was expected to enter some occupation. The methods of teaching were informal; the pupils sat on the floor round the teacher, who would often call upon the elder children to assist in instructing the younger. The basic subjects were the



A SCENE IN KERMAN



ENGRAVING ON THE DOOR OF THE MADRASAH-YE-CHAHAR BAGH, ISFAHAN

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alphabet (both reading and writing) and the Qur'an, which was learnt by heart, rarely explained and never criticised; the more advanced pupils might study the traditions of the Prophet, easy poems and stories, and the rudiments of Arabic grammar. Only after this did the Persian language come into the picture. But at no stage was there any attempt to instil a spirit of enquiry; instead, parrot-like repetition was enforced with the rod. Those students who could afford it paid small monthly fees; the rest of the teacher's income was derived from pious endowments and from the proceeds of letter-writing and similar clerical services for the illiterate.

Higher education did not appear as a distinct organisation till the eleventh century, though before that time informal classes in religious interpretation, the traditions and Islamic law were held in the mosques and elsewhere. The first colleges were established in Merv and Nishapur, and during the twelfth century a number were founded by the famous vizier, Nezam-al-Molk—for instance, the Nezamiyè College at Baghdad; these were the first schools to have a set curriculum. By the end of the thirteenth century there were thirty of these in Baghdad alone. The only qualification required for entrance was the elementary knowledge instilled by the Qur'an schools—reading and writing, the Qur'an and simple Arabic grammar; the course of study included Persian language and literature, interpretation of the Qur'an, Islamic law, philosophy and logic, and traditional science. A typical example of one of these colleges surviving today is the *Madrasè-ye-Chahar-Bagh* (the College of the Four Gardens) at Isfahan; it consists of a courtyard surrounded by rows of cells, in which the students used to live and work, paying a monthly fee. It also contained a library of manuscripts.

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The Mongol and Turkish invasions did not have an altogether fatal effect on the progress of Iranian literature. The disappearance of Baghdad as a cultural centre gave a new importance to Persian as the language of the cultured, and it now begins to replace Arabic not only in Iran but also among the other non-Arab Moslems, notably the Turks. Early Persian writing was comparatively simple in style, but under Mongol and Turkish patronage the florid forms which we are accustomed to associate with the East were developed. The initial rejuvenating effect of the invasions was deadened by the conservatism and admiration of the superficial which was characteristic of the less civilised peoples; and though there were many later achievements, yet we must take this period as marking the beginning of the decline of Islamic culture generally.

The empire of Tamerlane, like its predecessors, rapidly broke up into a collection of Turkish and Turkman kingdoms, from which emerged the Moghul dynasty of Northern India and the Ottomans of Asia Minor. With the former we shall be little concerned, for though they carried with them into India the language and art of Iran, and gave it there a new life of its own, yet there was practically no reciprocal influence; India belonged to a world of its own. The Ottomans, however, who gradually assumed sovereignty over the greater part of the Arab world, and even conquered the hitherto independent kingdom of Egypt, are of more importance, for they constituted the chief rival to the new power of Iran. In the latter country Iranian nationalism had at the beginning of the sixteenth century become so strong that it was able to establish and maintain in the face of Turkish opposition the powerful and prosperous dynasty of the Safavis, who ruled for over two hundred years.

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This event was decisive in the history not only of Iran but also of the whole of the Near East. The claim of Iran to be recognised as a distinct and separate nation ran counter to all the political ideas of Islam; whereas the Ottoman Turks were seeking to unite the whole of Islam once more (albeit, no doubt, with ulterior motives), Iran was splitting the *Dar-al-Islam* into two parts, with herself as a third part wedged between them. The difference was further marked by the adoption of Shi'ism as the State religion (the Safavis claimed to be descended from the Imams), so that both politically and doctrinally Iran found herself opposed to the Sunni Ottoman Empire. This conflict inevitably found expression in war, and Mesopotamia once more became a battle-ground, as it had been in the days of the wars between the Greeks and the Achæmenids, the Romans and the Sasanids. It is interesting to note here some of the earliest dabblings of Europe in the affairs of the East; the West, threatened by the growing power of the Turks, saw in Iran a means of distracting them from their westward advance, and by offers of alliances and other intrigues sought to draw the Safavi monarchs into the sphere of European politics. Not that the Safavis were easily drawn; their foreign policy was never aggressive, while in cultural matters there was constant interchange between Iran and Turkey—to the extent almost of an exchange of cultures. Iran, then as always, seems to have been more interested in her own internal development than in the expansion of her territory. Under the almost legendary Shah Abbas (1587-1629), contemporary of Elizabeth, Charles V of Spain and the Moghul Emperor Akbar, learning and the arts were encouraged in every way. The new capital, Isfahan, was embellished with the finest examples of Moslem

architecture ; new roads and bridges appeared all over the country. Arts and crafts flourished—miniature-painting, carpets, tapestries, calligraphy, metal-work ; even to this day an Iranian dealer will attribute anything over a hundred years old to the time of Shah Abbas. In religious matters the Safavis were tolerant—a state of mind usually, though not always, characteristic of Shi'ite outlook. Two interesting features may be noticed. The Armenian community was recognised, and established by Shah Abbas in Julfa, a special quarter of Isfahan, where they were allowed to build their own Cathedral and churches, and to practise their religion freely ; and the *ta'ziyehs* were introduced—religious plays commemorating the martyrdom of Husain, and performed annually—in some parts even to this day. The religious views of the Safavis were, indeed, governed far more by national considerations than anything else ; by making Meshed, Qum, Kerbela and Ali's tomb at Najaf the Shi'ite centres of pilgrimage, rather than Mecca, they did much to turn Iranian eyes inwards upon themselves instead of on the general trend of events around them. It may be that this later proved a weakness ; internal stability led to stagnation, most marked in religion. The Shi'ite doctrine of *ejtehad*, which allowed free interpretation of the word of God as revealed in the Qur'an, was so distorted as to produce precisely the opposite effect. The rulings of the *majtaheds* became even more dogmatic than the Qur'an itself, and their power became so great that they were able to influence the course of political events. It was internal stagnation of this kind that allowed Iran to fall victim first to another of the series of world-conquerors, and then to the ever-widening net of European imperialism.

¶ Nadir Shah, who arose out of the chaos following on the

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fall of the Safavis in 1722, was a conqueror in the tradition of Tamerlane, though the field open to him was not so wide. A native of Khorasan, he served for a time under various puppet Shahs, and defeated the Turks and Russians in a series of brilliant campaigns. In 1736, however (on the death of the infant Shah), he assumed the crown himself and began a career of conquest. His most famous campaign was the one in Northern India, when he captured and carried off the Peacock Throne from Delhi (a replica of which is still to be seen at Tehran). But as an administrator he was a failure, and after his assassination in 1747, there followed fifty years of chaos. It finally ended with the victory of the Qajars, a Turkish tribe from the north, who established their capital at Tehran in 1794. With the Qajar dynasty, Iran enters upon a new phase in her history, which requires a chapter to itself.

CHAPTER IV

IRAN UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE WEST

THE nineteenth century is for Iran the period of European infiltration. There had, of course, been many contacts with the West in the past. We have mentioned the Iranian bishop St. Ives, and in 722, it is said, one St. Willibald was the first Englishman to visit Iran. Charlemagne in the tenth century had diplomatic relations with Harun ar-Rashid, and at the end of the eleventh century the first of the series of Crusades began; their history suggests that they were little more than plundering expeditions, and they certainly reflected no credit on their Christian leaders. Iran played little part in these, for she was remote from the field of conflict; but in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Crusading powers initiated a series of fruitless negotiations with the Mongolian rulers, with the idea of persuading them to attack the Turks and Egypt from the rear. From this time dates the romantic legend of Prester John, possibly a Mongol chief who had been converted to Nestorianism. Serious relations with Europe began in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when traders from Venice appeared on the scene. For some time the Venetians had a monopoly of trade, but during the rule of the Safavis English merchants found their way through Russia into Iran. The adventures of the famous Sherley brothers are irrelevant here, but they are an illustration of the way in which European and especially English influence was beginning to creep in, in political matters as much as in commercial (for part of their mission was to

encourage the Safavis to attack the Turks). The century, however, that brought these attentions from West, also brought a decline in Iran's importance, as a trade route. The discovery of the Cape passage was followed by the slowing up of the Turkish advance in Europe; thus were removed both the economic and the political incentives to further activity on the land route to India. Moreover, the consolidation of the Ottoman Empire interposed an effective block to would-be traders.

These developments, which seriously affected the economic welfare of the rest of the Islamic world, were perhaps less critical for Iran. The Persian Gulf was easily accessible from India, and there was the attraction of a flourishing silk trade. The Portuguese were the first arrivals, followed quickly by the East India Company, who established a factory at Bandar Abbas. Rivalled at different stages by the Portuguese, Dutch and French, the British had by the end of the eighteenth century established themselves as the paramount power in the Gulf. Their interest in Iran, however, grew less from this than from the latter's position as a buffer state on the frontier of India, now in process of becoming an important part of the British Empire. (The greatest threat, they believed, came from France, who still held the field in the interior of Iran—more, it is true, as a cultural influence than anything else, though this was not fully realised by British statesmen of the day. The French menace was a real one in those days, and Napoleon's grandiose schemes for driving through Iran into India were taken seriously. Correspondingly, the defeat of Napoleon brought a lapse in Britain's solicitude for Iranian friendship.) It was not till later that they realised the much more dangerous threat that was approaching from the north.

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The first Russian embassy arrived in Iran in 1664. At that date the Russian frontier was still comfortably distant from that of Iran; but the move in a south-easterly direction had been going on for 150 years, and the embassy was a mark of its progress. During the Napoleonic wars both France and Russia were manœuvring—sometimes together, sometimes in opposition—for an opportunity of striking at India; but whereas France was taken away, Russia remained. The next few years saw an amazingly rapid advance on the part of Russia over the Caucasus and up to the Iranian frontier. The climax came with the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828. As a result of this treaty Iran ceased to be a fully independent nation, her foreign trade fell into the hands of Russia, and the first capitulations (not abolished till 1928) were introduced. Moreover, the approach of Britain on her eastern frontier meant her complete “encirclement”; and in fact she became merely an instrument for the furtherance of British or Russian designs in turn. The next years are a melancholy story of wars between Iran and Afghanistan, staged by the two great powers, Britain and Russia. Russia conquered the Turkman tribes to the east of the Caspian, and consolidated her advance by the construction of railways; Britain attempted to establish a frontier between Iran and Beluchistan, and extended her influence in the south. By 1880 the process was completed; only in the west was the frontier with Turkey still a matter for dispute. But in the meantime a new form of penetration was taking the place of territorial conquest.

The approach of Russian railways from the north, and still more important the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, had brought Iran with the rest of the Near East back on to the international stage. But by this time

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Western powers were abandoning the old form of imperialism, of colouring the map of the world a particular colour ; military rule was giving place to economic and financial domination. The new game of concession-hunting had begun. Iran, lying on the direct route between Europe and India, was an essential link in the new international chain of communications that was growing up ; and inevitably speculators turned their attention to telegraphs and railways first. In a few years the lines from Europe to Baghdad and Tiflis were linked through Tehran with the line running down the Persian Gulf to India ; although constructed by firms from various countries, their operation was until 1920 in the hands of British officials nominally under the control of the Iranian Government. Railway concessions on the other hand took the form of restrictions on construction ; the two rival powers of Great Britain and Russia, steadily tightening their hold on the country, distrusted its use as a channel for anything more tangible than words. So it was that until 1927 there were only four lengths of railway on Iranian territory, totalling less than 200 miles—and of these only the five-mile line from Tehran to the shrine of Shah Abdol Azim and the seven-mile line between Resht and Pir-e-Bazar could be said to be purely Iranian, the other two being the tail-ends of Indian and Russian lines.¹

For the rest, the history of the nineteenth century is a sordid one of the petty rivalries of two great nations, dominated by finance-capitalist ideas of imperialism—while the nominal rulers of the country played off one against the other, hoping to gain a little advantage, and in the end losing almost everything. At times nearly all the resources

¹ This does not include the 43-mile light railway constructed and operated by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

of the country were in foreign hands. In the world of finance proper Russia, with a geographical hold over the Government at Tehran, kept the leading place ; but as an offset to this the British founded the Imperial Bank of Persia in 1889. Small pickings fell from time to time to other nations—the Italians sent a military mission, and in 1898 the Belgians took over the management of the Customs. Foreign domination of Iran reached its climax in the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, under which spheres of influence (separated by a neutral zone) were allocated to the two powers. This was at the time a diplomatic triumph for Great Britain, even though Russia, on the surface, seemed to get the best share. It consolidated Britain's position in the south, and put a stop to further encroachment on the part of Russia, already weakened by her Japanese defeat. The effect, however, on British prestige was disastrous. Even *Punch* (more outspoken in those days) was shocked at the ruthless disregard of the agreement for the interests of Iran ; and Iranians, regarding it as the first stage of partition, have ever since been prone to add the name of Britain to that of Russia as the country's traditional enemies.

In the meantime, however, there were stirrings in the intellectual and cultural life of Iran, which perhaps were an indication that rock-bottom had been reached. The first symptom was the Babi movement of the forties, another in the line of extremist religious movements which have been a feature of Iranian history. The founder, Sayyed Ali Mohammad, proclaimed his mission on the thousandth anniversary of the traditional disappearance of the twelfth Imam, and declared that he was the *Bab* or Gateway to knowledge of God. His followers went still further, claiming divinity even for themselves, the *Bab* being a " Creator

of Gods". The movement, regarded by the Telian Government as a threat to established authority, came in for a full measure of persecution, and provided opportunities for displays of that astonishing courage in the face of martyrdom which Iranians are accustomed to show when their cherished beliefs are attacked. After the execution of the *Bab* in Tabriz in 1850, the leaders took refuge abroad. Out of their teachings came the Bahai movement, an eclectic and ethical faith preaching peace and goodwill, and claiming to supersede all other religions. Bahaism found its greatest following in America and Europe, but its importance in Iran even today is probably greater than appears on the surface, for open adherence to it is still forbidden. There is no doubt that Bahais supported, even if they did not initiate, the various reformist movements of the next few years.

The Shah at this time was an absolute monarch in the tradition of the Achæmenids, but with the important exception that he had been divested of his religious authority. This now rested with the *mojtaheds*, whose temporal as well as spiritual influence was very great, and was often enough to be decisive in political questions of major importance. In other respects too the absolutism of the monarch was more apparent than real. Wide powers were delegated to the Grand Viziers; and the system of farming out the provinces to governors greatly weakened the authority of the Central Government outside the capital. So it was that local chiefs like the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiyari Khans were to all intents and purposes independent, and even negotiated with Britain and Russia without reference to their own nominal government. It is not surprising that foreign observers believed that the country was breaking up, and that only

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full control by European powers could prevent its collapse into chaos.

The political situation, however, was not representative of the real outlook of the Iranian people. While the Qajar Shahs remained faithful to the older conception of government, the infiltration of Western ideas through European diplomats, telegraph and bank officials, missionaries and the like was having its effect on the younger generation. The first direct impact of the West on Iranian methods of education had come with the arrival of French and British military missions in the early part of the nineteenth century. In 1829 an Iranian mission was sent to Prince Metternich, with a request for information on the latest methods of warfare ; and already in 1810 and 1815 medical and other students had been sent to England. In 1840 the Lazarites started missionary schools at Urumia, Tabriz, Jolfa and Salmas, and in 1860 at Tehran. Other French boys' schools were founded in 1891 at Tehran and in 1916 at Isfahan, and girls' schools in 1865 at Urumia, Salmas, Tabriz and Isfahan, and at Tehran in 1875 and 1921. American missionaries started a boys' school in Tehran in 1872 and a girls' school in 1896, while the Church Missionary Society founded the Stewart Memorial College in Isfahan in 1904.

The first book to be printed in Iran was published by the Armenian Archbishop of Jolfa in 1640, but, though lithography of a kind was used under the Safavis, regular printing did not begin until 1812, when a press was erected in Tabriz—followed in 1823 by another in Tehran. After this the printing of books became widespread, and the first newspaper (a bulletin of Court activities) appeared in 1851. But the next year saw a far more important development in the infiltration of Western methods and ideas—the foundation of the *Dar-al-fonun*. This college, which accommodated 100

students, had European and Iranian teachers and included in its curriculum the study of infantry and cavalry tactics, artillery, engineering, medicine, chemistry, geology, French, English and Russian ; later painting and music were added. The college had its own printing press and published its own text-books ; altogether 1,100 students graduated during the next forty years. The buildings are still used as a centre for meetings and conferences. 1855 saw the formation of a Ministry of Education, and three years later 42 students were sent to Europe—in spite of the opposition of the then Shah, Naser-ad-din. The poet Qa'ani (1807-53) was one of the pioneers of the new way of thought ; and with the introduction of printing and lithography, the spread of knowledge and ideas through books and newspapers became possible. By 1890 the Constitutional movement was well under way. Support for it came from several different quarters. Only among the small intellectual class was there any understanding of the theoretical basis, and they went whole-heartedly for Modernism, Pan-Islamism, and so on ; but the greatest body of support came from all those who hoped to benefit from the Government's weakness—the *mojtaheds* and *mullas*, the tribal chiefs, and the oppressed masses generally. Inevitably Britain and Russia took a hand in the contest, and inevitably Britain took the side of the Constitutionalists—not so much out of love of democracy as because the Russians were backing the Shah. The agitation culminated in the " Revolution " of 1906, the setting up of a National Assembly (*Majles*), and the granting in December, 1906, of the Constitution which, with slight modifications, holds good to this day. But in the meantime it underwent many vicissitudes. A *coup d'état* by the Shah in 1908 (supported by the Russians) was followed the next year by a rising of the Bakhtiyaris, who forced the abdication of the Shah in favour

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of his son (a minor), and set up a "Democratic" government with the blessing of Britain. The ensuing period of anarchy was marked by the financial mission of W. Morgan Shuster in 1911, an abortive attempt on the part of American high finance to take advantage of the situation, and by a Russian invasion, justified on the now too familiar grounds of "internal disorder". In the south, Britain tried to maintain order by the formation of a corps of *gendarmérie* officered by Swedes—a move which had unpleasant effects a few years later.

Nevertheless, Iranian nationalism had on several occasions shown signs of the revival to come,¹ and it was indirectly strengthened by two new developments. The first was the discovery of oil in commercial quantities. The existence of oil in Iran had of course been known for centuries, and the practice of fire-worshipping certainly arose from the numerous seepages in the Bakhtiyari and Lori mountains. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the world began to take any interest in this mineral, and several of the concessions granted by the Qajar Shahs covered its exploitation. With the granting of a sweeping sixty-years concession in May, 1901, to the financier William Knox D'Arcy, exploration began in earnest under the auspices of the Burma Oil Company. For several years the prospectors had no success, and a cable had actually been received from the directors ordering work to stop, when, on May 26, 1908, oil was struck at a depth of 1,100 feet near the old Parthian temple of Masjid-i-Sulaiman. In 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was formed, and the construc-

¹ In 1891 a tobacco monopoly granted to a British Corporation was rendered void by the refusal of the people, led by the *mojtaheds*, to use tobacco. In December 1911 a party of Iranian women appeared in the National Assembly, and persuaded them to reject a Russian ultimatum.

tion of roads, buildings, a pipe-line, and refinery at Abadan on the Shatt-el-Arab (the joint channel into the Persian Gulf of the Tigris and the Euphrates) was put in hand. By August 1912 the 145 mile pipe-line had been completed, and 6,000,000 gallons were refined during the next two months. It was clear that Iran possessed one of the major oil-fields of the world ; the question remained whether such an asset would prove a source of strength or weakness to her. The British Government at any rate fully realised its importance, and in 1914 bought up a majority of the shares, a policy they have maintained ever since. The requirements of the Navy (which it had recently been decided should burn oil) could not be met from the very meagre resources of the Empire ; the Iranian oil-field filled this gap. This dependence of Britain on Iran's supplies on the one hand strengthened the latter's bargaining power (as appeared later in 1932), but it also made her a target for the ambitions of other great powers—the newest of which was just appearing on the scene.

Germany was the latest competitor for empire, but she was not slow in formulating her plans. Whilst Britain picked up her possessions all over the world in an almost haphazard manner, the Germans dreamt of a Teutonic or Nordic wedge stretching across Europe and the Near East to the Persian Gulf (a dream they have not yet given up). The kernel of this scheme was the Berlin-Baghdad railway, which was a more serious menace than British and Russian statesmen realised. In 1911 Russia and Germany even entered into a secret agreement to support one another in Iran and Turkey respectively ; but this did not deter German agents from carrying on propaganda in Tehran (where a German college was founded) and on the Gulf. They had some success among the reformist elements, who hoped to play off this new competitor against their old enemies. Like some

CHAPTER V

THE REGIME OF REZA SHAH PAHLAVI

IN 1920 the Iranian nation seemed to be at its lowest ebb. A foreign power was in control, which had the confidence neither of the people nor of the nominal government, itself unable to exercise any authority. Communist agents from Russia were active everywhere, the tribes were in revolt, and anarchy reigned. The Soviet Government, whose designs on India (as a stage towards world revolution) bore a remarkable resemblance to those of their predecessors, in May sent troops through the Caspian to occupy the port of Enzeli and the town of Resht. British support for Iran was half-hearted, weakened by unsympathetic public opinion at home. The only organised troops in the north of Iran, the Cossack Brigade, were driven back, and the whole country seemed at the mercy of the invader. It was just at this stage that the Iranian people were able to display their extraordinary power of recovery and their aptitude for throwing up leaders just when they are needed. The defeated Cossacks were re-organised and placed under the command of one of their most outstanding Iranian officers, Reza Khan. This officer, at the invitation of the Tehran Government, assembled a force of 3,000 men, and on February 21 marched on the capital and took control. Meanwhile the Government, faced with the choice between Britain and Russia, had chosen the latter, and had begun peace negotiations. These met with a favourable reception, for as the Communists themselves admitted, Iran was not yet sufficiently industrialised for Communism, and absorption into the Soviet system.

At all events, the Soviet forces withdrew, and on January 16, 1921, an agreement was reached (and signed on February 26) by which Russia revoked all the concessions which had been made to the Czars. All debts were cancelled, and the Russian bank, railways, roads and ports were handed back to Iran ; Russian rights under the Capitulations were also abolished. With this Russian backing, the Iranian Nationalists became bolder. On February 26, the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 was denounced. Britain, no longer the dominating power, found her aid rejected ; the British officers and advisers were dismissed and a few months later the South Persia Rifles were disbanded and absorbed into the new national army. The policy dictated by Reza Khan was in fact strongly nationalist and opposed to any form of foreign intervention ; but, whereas Britain was still the traditional enemy, it was hoped that the new Russia might prove a genuine friend. Russia too was on the look-out for friends, and was only too ready to welcome even the weaker ones and to make generous gestures—for the time being at any rate.

Reza Khan took the office of War Minister in April 1921, and, though he did not become Prime Minister till October, 1923, he was from this time the *de facto* ruler of Iran. Although no one can say what may be the fate of Reza Shah and his regime, yet it is worth while studying his origins and career, for he has left a lasting impression on Iranian history. He was born on March 15, 1878, at Alasht in Savad Kuh (a district of Mazanderan, one of the Caspian provinces—where the purest Iranian stock is said to be found). Certainly, as far as physique is concerned, Reza Shah is no unworthy representative, for he is over six feet tall and broad in proportion. He was born a soldier, for his father, Major Abbas Ali Khan (who died a few months after Reza's birth) was commanding officer of the

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Savad Kuh regiment, while his grandfather, Captain Morad Ali Khan, was killed at Herat in 1856. He himself joined the Cossack Brigade in 1900, and served with distinction under his uncle General Nasrollah Khan; his military ability and quick understanding were the subject of comment by several British officers. After he came to power in 1921, his strong personality soon asserted itself, and Ahmad Shah, the last of the Qajars, rapidly lost in authority what his War Minister gained. When Reza Khan became Prime Minister in 1923, the Shah left the country and settled in Europe—to spend the rest of his days there in comfort. The new Minister was now virtually dictator, and in 1924, fired by the example of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, even toyed with the idea of a Republic, with himself as President. However, the disestablishment of Islam in Turkey was too much for the more religiously-minded Iranians, and public opinion, stirred up by the *majlaheds*, forced the abandonment of this policy. Reza Khan's popularity, however, does not seem to have suffered, for in February of the following year he was officially granted dictatorial powers; on October 31 Ahmad Shah, still absent in Europe, was deposed, and on December 12 Reza Khan was appointed Shah in his place by a vote in the National Assembly of 115 to 5 (30 abstaining). On April 25, 1926, following honourable precedent, he crowned himself with due ceremony, and so became the first of the new dynasty of Pahlavi.

Reza Shah's ideas of government are democratic only in the sense that he wishes to give his people what he thinks is good for them (a tendency characteristic even of professed democrats); but once he has made up his mind, he is ruthless in seeing his decisions carried out. His punctuality and capacity for work are proverbial, and he has succeeded in

inspiring feelings almost of terror in his subordinates of every rank. His periodical tours of inspection are the cause of much perturbation among the easy-going Iranian officials, for nothing escapes his eye, and he is liable to be more than outspoken in his criticisms. While in many respects he is an admirer and follower of Kemal Ataturk (whom he visited in 1938), he has a much stronger belief in the value of founding progress on sound tradition. Whereas Ataturk tried to make a complete break with the past, Reza Shah encouraged the natural tendency of his countrymen to look to and receive inspiration from their great history. It was not, however, so much the Islamic past that he was thinking of—the glories of Shah Abbas or the poems of Hafez and Sa'di—as the ancient Iran of Cyrus and Darius. He seems to have studied this period from the first, and his admiration for it is brought out in his encouragement of archæological research and in the style of architecture favoured in Tehran and other cities. But it is all part of his fervent nationalism, his determination to establish the independence of his country once and for all, and to admit no influence which might warp or submerge the true Iranian “soul”. Iranian unity is cultivated, Communism, class antagonism and other disruptive ideas are suppressed, and Islam is only permitted in so far as it is a unifying force. At the same time, this does not imply the rejection of the advantages of Western material progress; on the contrary, they are exploited to the full, but the aim of the Shah is that they shall be absorbed into and become a part of Iranian national life, and shall not be imposed upon it from outside. It is this attitude that sometimes has given the impression that he despises and resents the technical knowledge and skill of foreigners; in reality, however, his object is to place in the hands of the Iranian people the economic and cultural tools to enable

them to meet any Western nation on equal terms. It is this principle that must be seen behind all the social changes, the educational and cultural reforms and the industrial expansion which have marked his reign and which we shall discuss in subsequent chapters.

He has brought up his family as a model of what he believes an Iranian family should be. The Crown Prince, Mohammad Shahpur, born on October 28, 1919, has been very carefully prepared by his father for the part he will have to play. He received his education in Switzerland, and takes a particular interest in athletics and the Boy Scout movement (which has its representatives in Iran). He has accompanied the Shah on most of his tours of the country, and has been enabled thereby to gain first-hand knowledge of the country he will have to rule. His marriage in 1939 to Fawzia, sister of King Faruq of Egypt (a daughter was born in October 1940) helped to strengthen relations between Iran and this leading Arab country. As yet he has had no opportunity to show his character or ability; he is perhaps not of the same forceful or constructive type as his father, but for that reason he may be better qualified to maintain the structure created by him. The Queen takes an active part in many social and cultural matters of interest to women, and she was one of the first leading Iranian women to appear unveiled at a public ceremony—in 1935; it was after this that the movement for the abolition of the veil began in earnest. Besides the Crown Prince, the Shah has five other sons and three daughters.

As to the opinion held of the Shah by his people, it is hard to form any judgement. Such views as are expressed would lead one to suppose that he was universally popular; he always receives a great ovation, and his photograph may be seen in every public building and office. But it must be

remembered that expression of opinion in public is strictly controlled. We must not imagine that the average Iranian has found the restriction of his liberty unduly irksome, for, as we have seen, it is this type of government that seems to appeal to him. Nevertheless, the tribesmen, used to controlling their own affairs, naturally resent the appearance of a horde of petty officials who, like petty officials everywhere, are fond of displaying their authority. Taxation and law and order are incompatible with true freedom, though only the wildest tribesman has ever known such a thing. The *intelligentsia*, too, can find plenty to criticise in an autocratic regime, even though it may be a beneficent one. But the great middle-class majority have on the whole benefited, in spite of taxation and the rising cost of living—though they may not have been fully persuaded that these things are for their ultimate good. At any rate they approve the policy of freedom from foreign support.

We have seen the condition of the country in 1921. Clearly the first essential was the re-establishment of law and order and the concentration of power in the hands of the central government. Reza Shah's first task therefore was the creation of a strong army. The nucleus of this already existed in the reorganised Cossack Brigade, and into this was absorbed the British force of the South Persia Rifles. In this way he was able to build up a force strong enough to cope with the unruly tribes, already stirred up by Communist propaganda. During 1921 and 1922 he was engaged in suppressing revolts in Mazanderan and the north generally; then his attention turned to the always thorny problem of the Bakhtiyari and Lori tribes of the south and south-west. A diversion was caused by the revolt of Sheikh Khaz'al of Mohammerah, who in 1924, relying too much on his British connection, saw fit to defy the centralising

policy of the government. He was defeated, arrested and taken to Tehran, where he died a few years ago. The nominal pacification of the tribes was completed in 1925, by the use of force combined with a genuine meeting of grievances (e.g. the dismissal of corrupt officials) and a policy of settlement. This latter was achieved by the construction of roads and the building of villages in the Bakhtiari, Khorramabad and Kordestan districts, in which the nomads were induced or compelled to live. This policy has met with some success, though outbreaks have occurred from time to time—as recently as 1937—and individual acts of brigandage are not unknown in the remoter parts.

The army's peace-time strength is about 40,000, consisting of nine divisions and five separate brigades, and its war-time strength is probably three or four times this figure. The main garrisons are at Tehran and Ahwaz. The strategic importance of Iran's mountain ranges as a factor in its defence have led to specialisation in this form of warfare, and mountain artillery forms a large part of its armament. In addition to other modern weapons, the Iranian army possesses about a hundred Skoda tanks. The small air force (attached to the army) numbers four squadrons totalling some two hundred aeroplanes; these planes are mainly either British-made or built in Iran to British designs, though some have recently been ordered from America. There are three flying schools at Ahwaz and Meshed. Though some Iranian army instructors have been trained in France and elsewhere, training is still largely in the hands of foreigners—and German influence is noticeable; but no one nation is predominant, and it is unlikely that their presence would have much political significance as long as they are given no other powers. While an army as small as this could hardly offer much resistance to a determined

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invader, yet if they once decided to fight the peculiar nature of the country would make an aggressor's task none too easy.

The regular army is supported by a fairly comprehensive system of conscription. Every Iranian reaching the age of 21 after 1920 is liable for a period of two years' compulsory military training ; University and secondary school students (who are granted deferment till the completion of their studies) are entitled to enter the Officers' Training College after the first twelve months. Certain concessions are also made to those with family responsibilities. Recruitment is carried out by boards set up annually in the various centres ; conscripts are often called up again periodically for a one month's "refresher course". Though at first many succeeded in slipping through the net, lately the regulations have been tightened up (a revised law was introduced in 1938), and it is impossible nowadays for any workman of military age to find employment unless he has a certificate of completion or exemption. The long period of training tends to interfere rather drastically with apprenticeships in industry, yet it is not on the whole unpopular, and the physical improvement of most conscripts would alone justify the system. Universal service have done much to remove the stigma which once attached to the soldier.

A few conscripts (mostly Arabs) are taken into the Navy. This small force consists of two gunboats¹ of 950 tons (armed with three 4-in. guns) and four sloops of 350 tons (armed with two 2-in. and two A.A. guns), all of them built in Italy in 1932 ; they have a speed of 15 knots, and (with various other small vessels) are probably sufficient to keep the Gulf coast free of pirates and smugglers (a task formerly carried out by the British Navy). It is stationed at present at

¹ Sunk on August 27, 1941.

Khorramshahr (formerly Mohammerah) and so has to pass through Iraqi territorial waters to reach the Gulf, but this will be remedied when the new port at Bandar Shahpur is completed.¹ The yacht *Homay*, which was presented many years ago by the British Government to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, is now used as a training ship ; some of the original officers and men were trained in Italy at the Naval Academy of Livorno, but there is no evidence that this experience has increased their liking for Italians.

A fourth branch of the armed forces is the *Amniyè* or Security Guards, whose purpose is to maintain law and order in the remoter districts. They wear a light blue uniform modelled rather on French lines, as contrasted with the khaki German-style uniform of the regular army. Being for the most part posted in isolated sections of half a dozen or so men, their discipline compares unfavourably with that of the regulars, and they are in consequence often despised ; nevertheless they have in the past borne with credit the brunt of tribal risings. The command of the armed forces is subdivided according to the provinces, the troops and *Amniyè* Guards of each being under one officer, usually a general.

The Constitution of 1906 still stands (with minor amendments—see text in Appendices I and II). By it was established a National Assembly, an elective body numbering at present 136 members ; of these two are elected by the Armenian community and one each by the Jews and Zoroastrians, the remainder representing constituencies throughout the country. This body remains in office for two years, and is not affected by changes of government ; the 12th Assembly expires on October 31, 1941, and elections are being held this year. All male citizens of 21 years of age and

¹ There are also several small vessels in the Caspian Sea.

over (with the exception of the armed forces and convicted criminals) are eligible to vote—by secret ballot. It might be added that, as there are no political parties, elections do not arouse very great interest, and candidates are judged mainly on their personal merits. Membership of the Assembly is limited to citizens between the ages of 30 and 70 who are not in Government service ; they are elected for two years in the first instance, though they may be re-elected—and they may not take up any Government employment until six months after they have ceased to be members. This rule emphasises the advisory nature of this body ; in principle all legislation is initiated by the Government departments, is next submitted to an appropriate committee of the Assembly, then to the Assembly as a whole, and finally sent to the Shah for signature. But in practice the deputies do little more than confirm the decisions of the Shah promulgated through his ministers ; it will be seen that in any case the executive functions are entirely separated from the legislature. The Assembly has perhaps some value as a means of publicising and explaining new legislation, for all its deliberations are reported in the Press.

The work of government is directed by the Shah through a Cabinet presided over by the Prime Minister (appointed by himself), and consisting of the Ministers and Under-Secretaries in charge of the various departments. These are the Ministries of War, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Labour and Industry, Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Finance, Education, Justice and Commerce,¹ and the Department of Agriculture.¹ These officials are all responsible nominally to the National Assembly, but, as we have seen, they are appointed by the Shah and act under his instructions. There is also a Ministry of Court, concerned with the

¹ Commerce and Agriculture are directed by Under-Secretaries.

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management of the households of His Majesty and the Crown Prince; this Minister is not a member of the Cabinet.

The Constitution also provides for an Upper House, to consist of thirty members appointed by the Shah and thirty elected by the voters. In practice this body has only met when for some reason the National Assembly could not be gathered together. It is a measure of Reza Shah's influence in the affairs of the country that there are few names associated with Iranian politics; and there are no political parties—any that raised their heads (for instance the Communists) were rigidly suppressed. Entrance to the various branches of the Civil Service is by competitive examination, holders of primary, secondary or higher school certificates competing for the first three grades. In all there are nine grades, with fixed salaries and terms of service, and no employee may be dismissed until his case has been investigated and a conviction recorded. Persons with special qualifications may be admitted without examination (though they do not get the concessions granted to the regular staff), and minor grades (typists, clerks and so on) are of course not expected to have reached the same initial standard.

The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for all internal administration, the provincial governors, the police, sanitary and medical services, census, registration and conscription. In 1938 the old provincial boundaries were abolished, and the country was redivided into ten Provinces (*Ostan*), each under a Governor-General. These are subdivided into a total of forty-nine Counties (*Shahrestan*), centred round some town of importance, with a Governor in each; further subdivisions are Municipalities (*Bakhsh*) and Rural Districts (*Dehestan*). There are eleven cities with a population of over 50,000, another twenty with over 10,000, and in addition

some 45,000 small towns and villages. Each unit is headed by a Mayor, Headman or similar official, advised by an elected municipal council. Side by side with this hierarchy is the Police Department ; nominally the police officers are subordinate to the local governor, but in practice they take their orders more often from their own superior officers. Both organisations are, in fact, highly centralised ; all the higher officials are appointed from Tehran, and, being Telranis, are inclined to despise the local inhabitants and to take little personal interest in them. This is particularly true in the rural districts. On the other hand, the system no doubt provides some safeguard against corruption, very necessary where so many officials—municipal, police, registration, conscription and so on, as well as those belonging to other Ministries and Departments—are involved. In the* sparsely populated districts, as we noted above, the police are replaced by the Security Guards, who are under military discipline ; but many of the regular police, who wear a grey uniform with a helmet not unlike our own, also carry arms—though they have less occasion to use them.

A large part of their work consists in the enforcement of the elaborate system of registration, which is extended to all inhabitants of the country, Iranian as well as foreign. According to the nationality law, Iranian subjects include all persons of whom at least one parent is Iranian or born in Iran, and all persons born in the country and resident there beyond the age of 18. Five years' residence is required for naturalisation. Every citizen must be in possession of an identity book giving his age and other particulars ; these books have to be produced on entering or leaving any town, when registering at a hotel, travelling by train, obtaining employment and so on. The chief purpose of all this, apart from the detection of criminals, is the enforce-

REGIME OF REZA SHAH PAHLAVI

ment of the conscription laws ; it will be seen that very little freedom of movement is possible to anyone wishing to evade his military service. Foreigners are provided on entering the country with a residence permit, which serves the same purpose as the identity book ; their movements are if possible even more restricted. These documents by no means complete the collection that may be accumulated, for licences are required for guns, wireless sets, cameras, drivers (for whom a test was instituted long before it was thought of in this country) and many other activities—though not, curiously enough, for dogs or motor-cars. Every taxi and public transport vehicle has to be provided with a certificate of road worthiness before setting out.

Under the Civil Laws of 1931-2 a census has to be held every ten years—a new one being due next year. The 1940 census of Tehran (taken in preparation for this) showed a population of 540,087 as compared with 310,139 at the last one and 106,482 at the first in 1883. The 1932 total population of 15,055,000 compares with a total of 50,000,000 in the early part of the nineteenth century, though it must be remembered that this figure included much of Caucasia, Turkestan and Beluchistan. With the improvement of health and social services, and the increased population policy which generally goes with nationalistic ideas, we may expect to see a rise in numbers in the course of the next few years.

The administration of the law comes, as we have seen, under a Government Department. Until the advent of Reza Shah, justice was administered according to the religious (*Shara'*) law, whose complexities left considerable power in the hands of its official interpreters, the *mullas*. Other codes existed on paper, but were rarely enforced. In 1927-8 two steps were taken, the radical nature of which

shows the extent, even at that time, of the Shah's influence both at home and abroad. In the first place the *Shara'* law was replaced by Civil and Criminal Codes based on French law. This was followed by an agitation against the Capitulations, under which foreigners were not subject to the Iranian courts. These had been in existence for most countries since the middle of the nineteenth century, but already in 1921 the U.S.S.R. had waived her rights under them. In 1928 Iran formally announced their abolition, and France and (somewhat reluctantly) Great Britain agreed. A new Penal Code, based on the Italian model, was introduced in September 1939.

The hierarchy of justice is built up on the Summary (*Bakhsh*) Courts; above these are the County (*Shahrestan*) Courts and the Appeal or Provincial (*Ostan*) Courts. Finally as the last authority there is the Supreme Court. Such shortcomings as are still to be found in Iranian methods of justice are due less to gaps in the system than to the inexperience and enthusiasm of the law officers; they have still a tendency to be influenced too much by wealth and position—an outlook rather encouraged by the curious system of allowing terms of imprisonment to be "paid off" at so much a day. In the wave of reaction against the Capitulations, there was a tendency to give foreigners somewhat less than their due—but it might be argued that this was only the nemesis to be expected after the excesses of the past. If it does nothing more than give foreigners in Iran a healthy respect for the laws of the country, it will not have gone too far.

CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS

“THE world needs our raw materials and farm products,” said H.I.M. the Shah on March 30, 1940, when opening an agricultural exhibition at Shiraz. Allowing for exaggeration, the remark gives some indication of the importance he attached to the establishment of a sound agriculture as a basis on which to build up the strength of the country. In this respect possibly more than any other, Iran has suffered in the past. Though admittedly only about one-third of the country’s area is cultivable, yet all too little use has been made of it, and until recently barely one-fifth even of that area has been under any kind of cultivation. The reasons for this are various. Foremost among them is the ubiquitous boggy of the Eastern farmer—lack of water. Attention to this problem brought Iran prosperity in the past, and neglect of it led to her decay. We know that under the Achæmenids and Sasanids there were great irrigation works—traces remaining to this day—and in modern times the vivid patches of green around a spring or along the banks of a river are a sure sign of the potential fertility of the soil. The system prevalent throughout the Middle Ages and up to the present day was that of *ghanats*—underground channels bringing water from the mountains to such farmers as were wealthy enough to afford their construction. On the Khuzestan desert the Arab peasant relies on the spring floods ; but only the hardest crops can overcome the desiccation of the ground during the long rainless summer. It is only fair to attribute the decay of

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the canals and reservoirs of the old days in part to erratic taxation and to the destructive raids of the Mongols, Huns and other barbarians, and there seems to be no reason why (provided there is no repetition of those invasions) Iran should not regain its reputation for fertility.

Closely linked with the water problem is that of trees and forests. Apart from the forests of the Caspian shores, trees are the exception—so much so that in places they are used as landmarks. It is probable that this was not always the case, and that too lavish use of timber, together with an absence of any planting policy, was the cause of their disappearance. At any rate, the serious lack of rain must be partly attributed to this ; and conversely planting of forests may have the reverse effect.

Primitive methods of cultivation have also contributed to the pooriness of crops. Many of the peasants still use wooden ploughs pushed by hand or at best dragged by a donkey, and naturally they can do little more than scratch the surface. On the desert each peasant has his little plot marked out—seldom more than a few hundred square feet, while in the mountains they plough up the deeper earth washed down into the little valleys and leave untouched the stonier ridge-tops ; the crops are thin and poor. Much of the best land was in the hands of the nomadic hill-tribes, who might have got a little from it, but never stayed long enough in one place to establish serious cultivation.

Nor were the various systems of land ownership and tenure helpful. Very few peasants could possess their own farms on account of the expense of irrigating and maintaining them ; landlords were often absentee, or the land was owned by the State, favoured courtiers or tribal chiefs, none of whom took any personal interest in it. The peasant tenant had to give most of his produce to his landlords, sometimes

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retaining only a fifth for himself. The tribal system was somewhat different and even less encouraging to individual enterprise. The whole tribal area was under the jurisdiction of the headman, who parcelled it out each year to the various families ; there was no guarantee that a family would receive the same plot two years running. This system still survives in some parts, though it is rapidly dying out.

The new Government is beginning to tackle this problem seriously. There was at first a tendency, by concentrating too much on improving the amenities of the towns, to draw the peasantry away from the land—a process only too liable to happen in industrialising countries ; and so far not much has been done to reverse this. However, a start has been made, as we have seen, with the settlement of the tribes, and, though the villages provided for them are not luxurious, they compare favourably with anything they have known in the past. At the same time, the old land ownership abuses have been modified. Many of the State lands have been broken up for settlement or otherwise disposed of ; in 1931 foreign-owned land was expropriated, and now no foreigner may own land or other immovable property except for residence or business purposes. A comprehensive scheme of land registration has been introduced. The general principle (rather contrasting with Iranian practice in other spheres) is that land is likely to become more productive in the hands of private enterprise. Thus much Crown property has been sold, and recently an Act was passed giving the Government powers to nationalise and sell land and irrigation works belonging to religious foundations—the proceeds to be devoted to schools, hospitals and the maintenance of historical buildings.

Something like 2,000,000 tons of wheat are produced annually, the area under cultivation being about 2,500,000

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acres, mostly in Azarbaijan, Khorasan, Isfahan, Khuzestan and Kermanshah ; 1,500,000 acres produce 750,000 tons of barley, used mainly as animal fodder. Rice is grown mainly on the slopes of the Elborz in Gilan and Mazanderan ; some 400,000 acres are devoted to it, and the annual crop reaches 500,000 tons. Other crops include maize, millet, peas, beans and lentils. Around Isfahan and in other places a considerable amount of fruit is grown—melons, lemons, oranges, pomegranates, and in the south-west dates. Opium is still quite important, though since 1931 its cultivation and export have been more strictly controlled in accordance with a decision of the League of Nations. No recent figures are available, but probably some 5,000 tons are produced, of which 2,000 are exported to Malaya, China, Germany and Japan. Dried fruits and nuts, gums and dyes, timber, fish and caviare from the Caspian and the Persian Gulf, are among other indigenous products. Two new industries are tobacco and tea ; the former is a Government monopoly, and production is rapidly increasing. Greek experts were employed at one time to improve the quality. The tea crop, it is hoped, will eventually replace imports from India, the Dutch East Indies, Japan and Ceylon ; about 600,000 Kg. are now produced annually. There are very large plantations at Lahijān, started by Chinese experts, and in 1936 a German firm erected a drying factory there. Cotton is also rapidly increasing in importance, for export as well as for home consumption, though the chief aim again is to eliminate imports. Attempts are also being made to encourage the growing of beet sugar, and to revive the old silk industry in Gilan. Iran has always been noted for its wines, and now the range is being greatly increased, mostly in imitation of European wines—vermouth, claret and so on ; there are also plants for the

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brewing of a tolerably good lager beer. Stock breeding has as yet attained minor importance, since there is comparatively little demand for meat—though wool has been exported in some quantities in the past.

Though there is still distress resulting from ineffective distribution of foodstuffs, the situation is gradually coming under control. Ambitious irrigation schemes have been put in hand, including the draining of the Khargerd marsh near Isfahan, and a £1,250,000 dam near Ahwaz, which it is intended will irrigate an area of about 400 square miles, and supply twenty new villages. To facilitate the storage of wheat, seven silos (at Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Meshhed, Kermanshah, Ahwaz and Shiraz) were planned in 1936; the first, at Tehran, was completed in July 1939, at a cost of £700,000. Last year (1940) new price regulations were introduced, the effect of which is to ensure that all wheat is sold in the region in which it is grown, and at the same time to encourage the growing of it near silos where it can be stored. Prices, moreover, are not fixed by the quality of the grain or the cost of production but vary according to the standard of living in the region concerned. An agricultural bank, under State control, was founded in 1930 to provide low-interest long-term credit for farmers.

A number of agricultural schools and experimental stations have been established during the past few years, notable among them being the tea plantation at Lahijan, the forestry school at Kharkun in Mazandaran, and the farm in the marshes at Shadegan in Khuzestan. Locust prevention is in the hands of officers stationed in various parts of the country, and plant diseases have recently been the subject of discussion with U.S.S.R. delegates. All these activities come under the control of the Department of Agriculture, which in the current year has a budget

of £1,500,000. An ambitious Five-Year Plan for agriculture was launched in 1940 ; it provides for an increase of 500,000 tons in the cereal crop, and 50-200 per cent increases in tea, sugar, beet, jute, and flax. Further projects include the erection of fertiliser plants, more irrigation schemes, the importation of merino sheep to be crossed with native breeds, and extensive afforestation. To impress public opinion with the value of the last, March 15 has for some years been kept as a tree festival.

But before there can be any real expansion of the industries of a country, it is essential to have a comprehensive system of transport communications ; and in this respect Iran was until 1921 very much behind. We have already seen how the intrigues of two great powers prevented the construction of anything in the nature of a railway network, and the road position was not much better. For the most part travellers and goods were carried by slow-moving camel or mule caravans, unable to cover more than 10 to 15 miles a day over rough tracks. There were a few roads capable of taking carriages—and even the tougher motor vehicles ; but all of them were liable to interruption by snow in winter and rains and floods in the spring. Thus the 740-mile journey from Tehran to Bushire used to take as much as two or three months (as compared with three or four days now), and the cost was proportionate.


The principal roads in 1920 were a Russian-built metalled road from Hamadan to Enzeli through Qazvin and another linking Hamadan with Kermanshah and Iraq, constructed by British troops. There were also fair unmetalled roads from Qazvin to Tabriz, and from the capital Tehran to Isfahan, Shiraz and Bushire, Meshed, Kerman, Qazvin and Soltanabad (now Erak). These made a total of about 2,000 miles of usable roads. Even these had been planned

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rather as a means of economic exploitation than to link up the country, some of them having been built during the 1914-18 war. Another road was intended to join Isfahan with Ahwaz, but this in fact has not yet been put in hand, though a Russian party were surveying the ground a few years ago. The new regime, however, began road repair and construction on a grand scale with national rather than international interests in mind, the general effect being to eliminate the Russian route from Iran's connections with Europe. Several roads now run from Tehran to points on the Caspian, including a spectacular one through the Chalus Pass, 9,384 feet above sea-level; tunnels are being constructed to prevent its blockage by snow in winter. The Tehran-Isfahan-Bushire route is now usable in all weathers, as also is that from Isfahan through Yazd and Kerman to Bandar Abbas, a port on the Persian Gulf. Other good roads link Erak with Ahwaz, Meshhed with Zahedan, the terminus of the Indian railway from Quetta, and Shiraz with Kerman, while Tabriz is now connected with Mosul in Iraq and Trabzon in Turkey. In addition there are numerous cross-country roads, totalling altogether over 15,000 miles. Many of these pass over very mountainous country, and about 5,000 bridges have been constructed on them; others run over the flat deserts, and often are not much more than smoothed-out tracks, impassable during wet weather, but hard and firm in summer. Construction is still going on steadily; in November 1939, the completion was announced of a 125-mile road, 26 feet wide, from Shahrud across the Elborz to Gorgan, linking the Caspian provinces with Khorasan. The aim is to build 1,000 miles of road annually; this work comes under the direction of the Ministry of Transport, which is also responsible for the railways and



TEA-HOUSE ON THE ROAD BETWEEN QIM AND ISHEAN



THE ROAD INTO THE MOUNTAINS NEAR HALL KUI

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ports. The major roads are marked by kilometre posts throughout their length, and are fully signposted.

The vehicle most commonly seen on the roads is the lorry. These vehicles, usually owned by private individuals or small companies, are hired out for the transport of goods of every kind, and it is normal for them to carry considerably more than the load for which they were designed. There are about 25,000 motor vehicles of all kinds. Passengers, of whom there are estimated to be 12,000,000 annually, travel sometimes in lorries, more often in buses, and, if they can afford it, in taxis. Comparative costs will give some indication; a whole taxi could in 1939 be hired for about Rls. $2\frac{1}{2}$ ($7\frac{1}{2}d.$) a mile, a seat in a taxi for Rls. $1-\frac{1}{2}$ ($3d.-1\frac{1}{2}d.$) a mile, in a lorry for Rls. $\frac{1}{3}$ ($1d.$), and in a bus for Rls. $\frac{1}{3}$ ($\frac{1}{2}d.$). Travel by any but the first method is not comfortable, though it is assisted by improving roads and by the existence of tea-houses at frequent intervals. All hired vehicles are required to have certificates of road-worthiness from the police before setting out on a journey, and there are very severe penalties for road accidents, even involving a death penalty in some cases. But the taxi and lorry drivers are in most cases highly skilled men, capable of picking their way across flooded deserts and guiding heavily laden vehicles along narrow and precipitous mountain roads; they must also be able to carry out emergency repairs of any kind on the road, for wayside garages are not yet a feature of the Iranian horizon.

Hotel accommodation is still primitive in most places, though the best in Tehran, Isfahan, and towns of similar standing is very good. The average hotel consists of a number of (often windowless) rooms grouped round a central courtyard—in the manner of the typical Iranian house—with very elementary arrangements for sanitation.

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But hospitality is one of the more prized virtues, and a meal and a roof will be forthcoming even in the meanest village. There is in fact very little provision for the tourist; the *Iran Tur* organisation exists to provide facilities for visitors, runs a number of hotels and arranges tours, but it is never forced upon the attention of the traveller, and one is not assailed by the swarm of guides, souvenir-sellers and beggars, who are so characteristic of other Oriental countries. Generally speaking, traders have not yet learnt the art of exploiting the visitor from abroad.

Up to two or three years ago rail travel was not a factor in the prospective traveller's plans; now it has already displaced some of the roads whose construction was a feature of the new regime's activities. True, even before 1914, plans, so long delayed by international intrigue, were seriously being considered; but the war interrupted them, and in 1921 the only lines in Iran were a 75-mile broad-gauge track from Julfa on the Russian frontier to Tabriz, with a 25-mile branch to Sharifkhanè on Lake Reza'iye, 52 miles of standard-gauge extension of the Indian North-Western Railway from Nok-kundi to Zahedan (over which no trains have run since 1931), and three local lines—Tehran to the shrine of Shah Abdol Azim (5½ miles), Resht to Pir-e-bazar (7 miles), and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's narrow-gauge line from Dar-e-Khazinè to Masjid-i-Sulaiman (43 miles). The principal plans were to link up the Russian and Indian systems by lines from Baku via Tehran to Karachi and from Tiflis via Tabriz and Tehran to Meshhed (both these were proposed by the Russians), and the Trans-European, Iraqi and Iranian systems by a continuation of the Baghdad railway to Tehran (this was originally planned by Germany and later favoured by Britain). It must therefore have come as rather a disap-

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pointment to the great powers when the Shah decided to plan his railway with purely national ends in view ; indeed the storm of criticism from abroad had not died down even when the Transiranian Railway was completed some 15 years later. In point of fact, it follows very closely a route suggested twenty years earlier and actually surveyed in part by British engineers. The chief difference is that it starts in the south, not from Khorramshahr, which has the disadvantage of being nearly 40 miles from the Gulf, but from the newly created port of Bandar Shahpur, which lies at the head of a deep channel, navigable by the largest vessels. Thence the line (a single track, standard gauge—like that of Turkey, as opposed to the broad gauges of India and the U.S.S.R. and the narrow gauge of Iraq) runs across the flat Khuzestan desert on an embankment some 15 feet high (raising it above the floods) as far as Ahwaz. Here it crosses the River Karun over a new 3,400-foot steel bridge, and makes its way through low foothills to Andimeshk (formerly Salehabad), stopping on the way at the small station of Shush, a pathetic reminder of former glories. From this point (about 500 feet above sea-level) it begins to climb rapidly, and after twisting in spectacular fashion for less than 100 miles reaches its highest point in a pass over 7,200 feet up ; in this section alone there are 127 tunnels, one over $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles long. The route does not pass through Khorramabad, Borujerd and Hamadan, which are somewhat off the direct route, but goes straight to Erak (the old Soltanabad). By this time it is crossing a high but fairly level plain, whence it descends slowly through Qum into Tehran (4,167 feet above sea-level and 607 miles from Bandar Shahpur by rail). The northern section takes first a south-easterly direction, then sweeps round to the north-east over the northern edge of

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the salt desert, and climbs steadily into the mountains. It reaches its peak (7,000 feet) at Firuzkuh, 122 miles from Tehrân, and then begins a descent which must be amongst the most spectacular in the world. In many places it is possible to see three levels of track one above the other on the side of the same slope ; this zigzag method of construction was necessary to avoid exceeding the maximum gradient of 28/1,000. Moreover, at each bend of the zigzag a circular tunnel with a radius of not less than 720 feet had to be made through the solid rock. The sketch gives a rough idea of the method of construction. In all there are in this section 88 tunnels (one of 9,450 feet) and 108 bridges ; the train drops 4,500 feet in a distance as the crow flies of less than 20 miles (though the track distance is nearly 40), and in neither direction can it exceed a speed of 20 miles an hour. After passing Pol-e-safid (176 miles from Tehran) it follows the gentle slope of the Talar valley, and so down on to the coastal plain. From Shahi it keeps to the plain all the way to the terminus of Bandar Shah at the end of the 285-mile journey from the capital—of 13 hours' duration. There are stations at intervals of about 10 miles, and a very fine one has been built in Tehran, which will be able to cope with far more traffic than there is at present.

The first practical steps were taken in May 1925, when it was decided to finance the whole project from the proceeds of taxes on tea and sugar—thus dispensing with foreign aid (to the discomfiture of international finance). The plans were approved by the Assembly in March 1926, and on October 17, 1927, work began at each end. The work at this stage was in the hands of American engineers and a German expert, in the service of the Government, but in April 1928 it was entrusted to a syndicate composed

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
of the American Ulen & Co., and the German firms Philip Holtzmann, Julius Berger and Siemens Bau. The Germans in the north completed the Bandar Shah-Sari sector (80 miles) in November 1929, while at the same time the Americans opened the Bandar Shahpur-Dezful sector (156 miles). After this, however, work was held up for some time, and in 1931 construction was taken over directly by the Government again. In 1933 an arrangement was made with a Scandinavian syndicate, the "Consortium Kampsax" (since engaged in bridge and road construction); they in their turn let out the work in lots to various European companies. One of the most difficult sections fell to the British firm of Richard Costain, while the Italian firms of Angiolini-Balocca and Mottura-Zaccheo, and Belgian, Swedish, Czech and several other companies also took part. The cosmopolitan nature of the undertaking is further emphasised by the way in which orders for materials were distributed; the steel for the rails and some of the cement came from the U.S.S.R., the sleepers from Australia, the locomotives (which naturally run on oil) from Sweden, the other rolling stock and machinery from Belgium, Germany and the U.S.A., and further supplies of cement from Japan and Yugoslavia. The Tehran station was constructed by a Swiss company (Sofitec).

Work now proceeded rapidly, and on February 19, 1937, the first train left Bandar Shah for Tehran. In November of the same year Qum was linked with the capital, while on June 23, 1938, trains began to run as far as Erak. Finally, on August 24, 1938, H.I.M. the Shah laid the last rail linking the northern and southern sections in the mountains between Erak and Khorramabad. The first through train on the central section (Tehran-Ahwaz) left Tehran on December 23. So, after eleven years of work,

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and at a cost of £30,000,000, the great project was successfully completed, and, perhaps for the first time since the Middle Ages, a major undertaking was carried through in an Oriental country without leaving it indebted to the financiers of the West.

The railway has been criticised in Europe on various grounds, though one cannot help thinking that the criticism has not been always entirely disinterested. As a link in the international system of transport it is of course useless, though in the light of recent developments one cannot altogether blame the Iranians for their unwillingness to become a bridge for European expansion. The primary conception was strategic ; it would enable troops and supplies to be brought from Mazanderan and the capital to the south. The termini at Bandar Shah and Bandar Shahpur were less exposed to Russian and British influence than would be the more obvious ones of Pahlavi and Khorramshahr. On economic grounds, too, the link between the northern and southern provinces is valuable from a national point of view. The important products of Mazanderan will become available to the rest of the country, and in their turn the Caspian provinces will be less dependent on the U.S.S.R. for supplies and markets. It has been suggested that railways have been rendered out of date by road transport, and that in any case this particular railway can never pay. The first statement could not be made by anyone with knowledge of the terrain ; however greatly the roads may be improved, motor vehicles could never haul really heavy loads over the Elborz and "Zagros" mountains. As to "financial soundness", the condition of our own railways at the outbreak of war (the direct result of adherence to this out-of-date theory) should be a warning to these critics. Though the Iranian Government



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
has not yet shown any striking enlightenment on the subject of finance, it is at least basing its development schemes on fundamental physical facts, and not on numerical jugglery. Socially, the opening up of the country will help the settlement of the tribes, and enable a higher standard of living to be brought to the peasant population.

The main Transiranian line was only the preliminary to a network linking up the whole country. Branches are planned to link up Meshhed, Tabriz and Yezd, and construction began on the first in March 1938; the first sector (Garmsar to Semnan—70 miles) was completed in June 1939 at a cost of £925,000 under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Transport.¹ In January 1939, the Tabriz line was put in hand, and reached Zanzan in October 1940 (160 miles), passing through Karaj and Qazvin; incidentally there has been since February 1937 a through service between Tabriz and Erivan in the U.S.S.R., and Turkey is planning a branch line from Elaziz (near Diyarbekir) to the Iranian frontier. The Yezd branch will start from Qum and the section to Kashan is already in hand. The total road and rail Budget for 1941-2 is over £12,500,000. The services are still somewhat limited; in 1940 there was a bi-weekly service in both directions between Tehran and Bandar Shah and between Tehran and Karaj, and tri-weekly between Tehran and Semnan. On the central section trains ran three times a week as far as Ahwaz, though they were more frequent to Qum and Erak. There are four classes altogether, though they are not as a rule all available on the same train. First- and second-class are both good, the seats being upholstered, and fittings and amenities well up to European standards; the third-class has wooden seats (as


¹ It has since been extended as far as Shahrud.

in Germany and elsewhere), while the fourth—used by workmen—offers little more than a covered truck with wooden benches. The *Iran Tur* organisation is shortly to inaugurate a service of restaurant cars, but cooked meals have in the meantime been served in the compartments. First-class fares work out at $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ a mile, second-class at $1d.$, and third-class at $\frac{3}{4}d.$ There are also cheap fares for members of the armed forces and the police, students and children under 12 years of age.

Iran has two coastlines—the Caspian and the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean seaboard. The hinterland of the latter is, however, as we have seen, barren and thinly populated, and, whether on this account or because of something in the Iranian character, the people of Iran have never had much liking for the sea. In the south navigation was left to the Arabs, while on the Caspian the only sailors from Iran were Armenians. Nevertheless, until the coming of transcontinental railways and air-lines, the Gulf was Iran's only means of contact with the outside world, and the three ports of Khorramshahr (formerly Mohammerah), Bushire and Bandar Abbas assumed some importance. The efforts of the present government have rather been concentrated on the development of the new port of Bandar Shahpur, and in consequence the others have suffered. Khorramshahr is in any case not so easily accessible, the road inland from Bushire is difficult, while the harbour of Bandar Abbas cannot be entered by large vessels. Bandar Shahpur was opened in November 1932 ; it is built on a mud flat, and it is unlikely therefore that any large settlement will grow up. At present it consists of little more than a long railway jetty and a few administrative buildings ; but the fact that even the largest ships can tie up alongside and that it is the terminus of the railway



THREE LEVELS ON THE NORTHERN SECTION OF THE
TRANSIRANIAN RAILWAY



PART OF THE REFINERY AT ABADAN

[To face page 98]

(and therefore the most suitable for the shipment and unloading of heavy goods) will tell strongly in its favour. The oil-port of Abadan also has the advantage of a deep channel (10,000-ton tankers call there regularly), but its business is almost exclusively oil. The only regular service of passenger steamers in the Gulf are the Fast and Slow Mails of the British India Steam Navigation Company, a subsidiary of the P. & O. ; but before the war merchant vessels from Scandinavia, Japan, Germany, Italy and America were frequent visitors. On the Caspian the chief port is now Bandar Shah, the terminus of the railway, where there is a jetty nearly a mile long and a number of railway repair shops. Pablavi (the former Enzeli) is still, however, important for the trade with Russia, and there are other smaller ports at Bandar Gaz, Mashhadsar, Noshahr and Astara on the Irano-Russian frontier. Iran possesses a small merchant fleet, but most of the shipping is in the hands of the U.S.S.R. ; apart from the transportation of merchandise, there is the important fishing industry. As to other water transport a number of motor-boats and barges are maintained by the Railway Administration on Lake Reza'iyè for local purposes, while the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company runs several "stern-wheelers" on the Karun River, which is navigable both above and below the rapids of Ahwaz.

Aerial transport is the junior service. The first international air-line to touch at Iran was Imperial Airways, whose planes were allowed in 1928 to land at various ports along the Persian Gulf on their way to and from India. As the result of disputes with the Iranian Government their route was in 1932 transferred to the other side of the Gulf, but the Iranian coast continued to be served until the outbreak of war by the Dutch "K.L.M." and the

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French "Air France." In 1927 Junkers were granted a monopoly of postal and passenger air services, and in the following year began a series of services from Tehran to Meshhed, Resht, Baghdad and Bushire. These were continued until 1932, when the concession was cancelled. Three years later the Iranian Government itself decided to enter the field, ordered a number of planes from Europe and began regular passenger and freight services to Baghdad via Kermanshah and to Bushire; these are under the control of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs. There are numerous aerodromes dotted about the country, though few of them are in good repair; nearly every large town, in fact, has one, the most important being near Tehran, at Ghazian opposite Pahlavi, at Tabriz, Meshhed, Hamadan, Kermanshah, Isfahan, Bushire, Jask and Ahwaz. In addition, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has its own small fleet of planes, with good aerodromes at Abadan and in the main oilfields and subsidiary ones in its other centres. Interest in aviation has been stimulated by the foundation in August 1939 of the National Aero Club, under the patronage of H.I.M. the Shah, which at its first annual meeting in June 1940 already had nearly 250,000 members. There were then reported to be over 3,000 candidates for training as pilots, of whom forty-five had already started at the Club's own aerodrome 7 miles from Tehran (as well as at Ahwaz and Meshhed). Particular pride was taken in the fact that several of these were women.

Postal services (under the auspices of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs) are reasonably rapid and safe, though weather conditions must remain a factor as long as the majority are carried by road. The actual operation of the postal vehicles is in most cases entrusted to con-

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tractors, who also undertake the transport of passengers. As all philatelists know, stamps have been used since 1870, and Iran has been a member of the International Postal Union since 1877—though her present postal rates to countries abroad do not seem to be very closely related to those laid down by that body. The telephone and telegraph services are adequate, though not extensive (about 17,000 miles of line); they were built up on those started by the British Indo-European Telegraph Company, whose concern was rather to link up India with the West than to provide a complete internal network. The lines are limited in most places to single wires carried on rather flimsy wooden poles that collapse only too easily in heavy rain or storms; but it is perhaps a feat worthy of admiration to maintain a line at all over some parts of the country. Several cities have for some years had wireless stations for the transmission of commercial messages; mention must also be made of the A.I.O.C.'s private chain of radio stations linking up its various bases and isolated field parties. On April 23, 1940, the Crown Prince opened the Tehran Broadcasting Station, the first of a network to be distributed over the whole country. German, American and British apparatus has been used. The shortage of privately owned sets is made up for by the institution of loud-speakers in open spaces and market-places; but every newspaper is full of advertisements for the latest German, American and British sets, and the number of listeners must be rising steadily. The operation of the broadcasting system later came under the control of the Ministry of Education, and its activities can be more properly considered under that head.

As with agriculture, so with industry, the object has been the twofold one of making the country independent

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of foreign supplies and of establishing its position as an industrial centre of the Near East. Expansion therefore has taken the form not only of encouraging existing industries (by monopolies, protective tariffs, etc.); but also of introducing new ones, often wholly owned and directed by the Government. Indigenous industries are mainly of the handicraft class. Iranian carpets are of course famous throughout the world, and the old and well-tried methods of manufacture are still kept up. Child labour is, however, less common, and conditions have improved somewhat—though they are not up to the standard observed in more modern industries. At one time there was a tendency for methods and materials to deteriorate, but the Government has now realised the value of this asset abroad, and since 1937 carpet-making has been carried on under the direct supervision of a monopoly. An embargo is imposed on the export of carpets made with chemical dyes and other poor materials, and schools have been established to teach the best workmanship and designs. America is the chief market, and although the whole business is handled in Iran by Iranians, there are a number of American agents in the various centres. This almost exclusive catering for overseas markets has had some effect (not always happy) on designs; but the best are still said to come from Tabriz, Kerman and Kashan (the Bokhara rug proper is no longer made in Iran). Miniature painting, another traditional craft, still goes on, though with some lack of originality; the quality and value of a painting depend not on the subject or design, which are always copied from classical models, but on the fineness and detail of the work (which in the case of the masters of Isfahan is really amazing). Isfahan is the centre for most of the “arts and crafts”—metal work, embroidery, lacquer, wood-carving, *ghalamkars*

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(printing of designs on silk or other material with blocks) ; Shiraz is known for its wines, and Hamadan for its blue-glazed earthenware. Fabrics and textiles of all kinds are made in many places, though modern methods are displacing handicraft more and more.

The second group of industries to receive encouragement includes all those that make use of Iran's own agricultural products and raw materials, e.g. cotton, wool, silk, sugar, etc. The object in all these cases is to try and make Iran self-sufficient ; instead of exporting primary products and importing the finished article, the whole process will be completed at home. Iran does not seem to suffer from the delusion that it is necessary to export all one's wealth in order to become prosperous. The first sugar factory was built at Kahrizak, 10 miles south of Tehran, and in 1935-6 was producing 2,211 tons of loaf sugar annually. Others were built later, many of them with machinery from the Czech Skoda works ; the largest are at Karaj, Veramin and Marv-dasht near Shahi (all now on the railways), and there are smaller ones near Shiraz, at Shahabad near Kermanshah, at Miandoab near Lake Reza'iyè, at Erak and near Meshhed. Both cane and beet sugar are refined, there being large plantations of the latter near the refinery at Karaj ; 240,000 tons of beet were used in 1940, as compared with 170,000 in 1939. All these factories are expected to produce something like 30,000 to 40,000 tons, still only one-third of the country's needs. Another important development is the textile industry, which is gradually replacing the vast quantities of cloth imported from Russia and elsewhere. The largest cotton mill in the country is that at Shali with 12,000 spindles (which serves in particular the needs of the army) and others are at Yezd, Isfahan, Bandar Abbas, Semnan,

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Kerman, Tabriz and Tehran ; altogether there are some 40,000 spindles. Woollen goods are produced at Tabriz, Qazvin, Yezd and Isfahan, and silk at Resht and Chalus. The vast amount of new construction brought a demand for cement, and a factory was set up in 1932 at Kahrizak with a daily production of 100 tons ; a further larger factory was added in 1935, raising output to 300 tons, but even this is not yet large enough to meet all demands. Fruit is canned at Meshhed, jute mills are located at Resht and Shahi, and another of the many Tabriz factories makes leather goods. Vegetable oils are refined at Veramin, Babol, Tabriz, Isfahan, and elsewhere. The tobacco industry supplies the bulk of the country's needs from factories at Tehran (which, it is stated, produces 12,000,000 cigarettes a day), Isfahan and elsewhere. Gums, macaroni, dried fruits and preserves complete the list.

The third category—heavy and general industries—includes shipbuilding yards at Pahlavi (the first ship, a dredger, was launched in November 1940), iron foundries and blast furnaces in Mazanderan (a new iron-smelting plant will produce 300 tons a day), aircraft and munition factories, and repair shops for locomotives, machinery and motor vehicles. Coal mines are being worked at Zirab in the Elborz, iron at Semnan and copper at Abbasabad. In September, 1939, a new glass factory was completed near Tehran, where there are also paper and shoe factories. Matches are supplied by Tabriz and Hamadan. But the latest plan is to make Iran independent even for chemical supplies, hitherto all imported. At Kharkun in Mazanderan there is a plant for tar products, and a soap and glycerine factory has recently been opened near Kahrizak which will produce daily $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons of glycerine, 20–22 tons

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of soap of various kinds, 5,000 candles and 50 Kg. of stearine (this is the latest of a series of such factories distributed about the country). Further plans envisage creosote, rubber, carbon and soda and hydrochloric acid. There are now over 150 major factories in the country, all owned entirely or in part by the State.

But we have left to the last what is still the most important industry in Iran—though, as the Iranian Government have been allowed little share in its development, they have been somewhat reluctant to give it its due measure of recognition. The existence of oil in Iran had of course been known for thousands of years, but it was not until D'Arcy obtained his concession in 1901 that any attempt was made to exploit it seriously. The later stages in the history of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company must be left to another chapter; here we have to consider only the existing organisation for the production and disposal of petroleum. The main fields are near the old Parthian temple of Masjid-i-Sulaiman, though these are likely to be superseded eventually by newly started fields elsewhere. The earliest of these is at Haft Kel, some 60 miles to the south-west, and there are others at Agha Jari near Behbahan, at Gach Saran (70 miles farther south-west), and also to the north-east of Masjid-i-Sulaiman. In most of these oil is taken from a depth of 3,000 to 4,000 feet, though the latest wells have been drilled into a lower reservoir at a depth of more than 10,000 feet.¹ All these fields have been or will be con-

¹ Oil reservoirs are normally found in strata of some porous rock like limestone, with a "cap-rock" of a hard, non-permeable substance. In Iran these deposits are under varying pressures, with the result that, when a well is drilled through the cap-rock, the oil is forced up of its own accord (whereas in other countries it is often necessary to use pumps). The first reservoirs in Iran were struck at a depth of only a few hundred feet, but, when these were exhausted, drilling was continued to greater depths.

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nected by pipe-lines to the main refinery at Abadan, south of Khorramshahr, whence both crude and refined petroleum is shipped abroad. These lines are now for the most part 10-in. welded lines, though in the past 6-in. and 8-in. screwed pipe was used; pumping stations at Tembi, Kut Abdullah and Dorquaine maintain the pressure necessary over the main line of 120 miles. The wells themselves are all drilled in mountainous country, whereas the refinery lies on the desert; this fact has helped to solve some of the technical problems involved in the laying and maintenance of the line. The refinery at Abadan—one of the largest in the world—extends over a wide area, and includes plants for every stage of refining; in addition there is a large tank farm. About 10,000,000 tons were passing through this refinery annually before the war; comparatively little was retained for use in Iran, the bulk of it being shipped to Britain (20 per cent of whose oil came from Iran) and elsewhere by the fleet of a hundred-odd 10,000-ton tankers owned by the A.I.O.C.'s subsidiary, the British Tanker Company. Iranian needs are satisfied by the refinery at Kermanshah, set up under the terms of the revised Concession granted in 1933. This refinery serves the oilfields at Naft-e-Shah on the Iraqi frontier (and geographically part of the Khanaqin field); it is connected to them by a 3-in. pipe-line. From it petroleum products of all kinds are distributed throughout the country to depots in all the large towns; they are transported either in tank lorries or in the 4-gallon tins so familiar in the East. Most of these centres have grown up in places where no kind of settlement existed before, and the Company has therefore had to provide housing and other facilities, not only for its 3,500-odd foreign staff (mainly British and Indian), but also for the majority of its 20,000 Iranian employees,

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
who are slowly but steadily superseding the foreigners. Hospitals, clubs, playing fields, cinemas and shops—as well as houses—have sprung up in the empty desert or on the sides of barren mountains.

From a national point of view, the most important feature of the Company's activities is the training of Iranians in technical occupations. From the first, many of the Company's employees were drawn from the local tribal population, though others came from all over the country ; though none of them had any previous technical knowledge or experience, it was found that they showed a remarkable degree of adaptability, and as a result trained men became available not only for the Company's operations, but also for the new factories springing up all over Iran. For a time a large proportion of Indian and Iraqi labour was necessary, but the latter have now been entirely eliminated by agreement, and the numbers of the former are being steadily cut down. A special training school at Abadan takes boys immediately on leaving school, that is, at 14 years old, and puts them through a full apprentice course in the line which appears to suit them best. Many of these boys remain with the Company, but others go back to the north and swell the ranks of skilled labour required in the country's industrial centres. Many occupations are now filled exclusively by Iranian nationals—motor drivers, machine attendants, compositors and so on—and the range of skill is steadily increasing. In these trades unemployment is non-existent—even a partially trained man is sure of a job ; and in the lower grades seasonal and casual requirements are filled by peasants and tribesmen, who invariably return to their fields in late autumn and early summer. Conditions of labour have been much improved by the Factory Act of August 1936—the country's

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first labour legislation. As will be seen from the text given in Appendix III, its provisions are severely practical, and do not allow of much liberty of action. Trade unions are to all intents and purposes forbidden, and movements of labour are restricted. Strikes are illegal, but so are lockouts, and the Act throughout is as hard on employers as it is on employees. This is in keeping with the Iranian approach to these problems, and it is doubtful whether any other approach is possible in a country so inexperienced in industrial affairs.

Apart from the construction of factories, the Shah also initiated a policy of rebuilding towns and cities. Most of his efforts have been expended in Tehran. Here the treatment has been quite ruthless. A carefully planned scheme of wide streets has been driven through the conglomeration of narrow lanes and alleys that was characteristic of Tehran, as of most Oriental cities. Trees have been planted along each side of them, and a seemingly endless number of large and imposing buildings have been erected. Most of these are the offices of Government departments—the Police Headquarters, the National Bank, the Municipality, the War Office and so on ; a new palace was built for the Shah, and the latest new building—the Foreign Office—was completed in January 1939. It is rather characteristic of the Iranian mentality that building construction of this kind has gone somewhat ahead of other public works. Tehran is provided with electricity, but the supply is not infallible, and the domestic service has in any case to be cut off during the night ; but a new plant put into operation in September 1939 may improve the situation. There is no effective water supply, and the only drainage consists of open channels down the side of the streets. All these things will of course be provided in



3.—STREET PLAN OF TEHRAN

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. H.I.M. The Shah's Palace | 15. British Legation | 29. Women's College |
| 2. National Assembly | 16. Soviet Embassy | 30. Golestan Palace |
| 3. Municipal Offices | 17. German Legation | 31. Sepahsalar Mosque |
| 4. Police H.Q. | 18. American Legation | 32. Shah Mosque |
| 5. Post Office | 19. Municipal Hospital | |
| 6. Telegraphs Office | 20. American Hospital | A. Shah Square |
| 7. Foreign Office | 21. Russian Hospital | B. Army Square |
| 8. Min. of Interior | 22. Iran Club | C. Lalezar Street |
| 9. Min. of Transport | 23. Military Club | D. Shah Street |
| 10. Min. of Industry | 24. National Bank | E. Pahlavi Street |
| 11. Min. of Commerce | 25. Imperial Bank | F. Army Street |
| 12. Min. of Justice | 26. A.I.O.C. Office | G. Bazaar |
| 13. Min. of Finance | 27. Opera House | H. Cyrus Street |
| 14. Min. of War | 28. National Museum | I. Ferdosi Street |
| | | K. Shahpur Street |

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due course (provision for pipe-laying has been made in the 1941/2 budget), but it is perhaps a pity that enthusiasm for the outward appearance of the city should have been allowed to get ahead of the less spectacular necessities. In the provinces there has been similar activity, though on a far more limited scale and perhaps in a more practical direction. Very often, instead of attempting to clear away the old buildings, a new suburb is planned at a short distance from the original town—destined in time to become the main centre; noteworthy examples of this are to be seen at Ahwaz and Erak. Town planning is controlled by regulations which prohibit the erection of new buildings without a licence.

We saw how Iranian industry aims at making the country self-sufficient by producing all the goods it needs itself. Nevertheless Iran is still, and will be for some time, dependent on what she can import from abroad. At the end of the last war Russia ceased to be the chief supplier and market of Iran, and Britain took her place. Gradually, however, Russia began to regain her position, until she is now once more near the head of the list. Other important suppliers have been Great Britain, the U.S.A., Germany and Japan. Iran's chief requirements from abroad are textiles, foodstuffs, motor vehicles and parts, machinery and chemical products; in 1935 \$4,000,000 worth of machinery was imported from the U.S.A., but more recently the U.S.S.R. and Germany¹ have provided the majority. In return she is able to export petroleum—whose value represents about two-thirds of her total exports—carpets and other textile goods of the same kind, and various agricultural products—rice, gums, pistachio nuts, skins, opium and caviare. Her chief customers for oil were, before the war, Great Britain

¹ This of course was before the recent Anglo-Russian action.

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and the Empire, Egypt, India, France and Italy. Carpets went to the U.S.A., Turkey, Great Britain, India and Iraq. Iran has special commercial representatives in two countries only—the U.S.A. and Germany.

But the policy above all is to encourage the production and consumption of home goods. A permanent exhibition of Iranian goods has been established in Tehran, and recent regulations are an attempt to ensure that the quality and reliability of manufacturers' goods are maintained. Most of the army's supplies have for some time been drawn mainly from Iranian sources; and in March 1939 all officers and Government officials were required to limit their purchases to Iranian goods. More drastic is the monopoly system. Certain articles (tobacco, opium, textiles, sugar and tea, matches and motor vehicles) may only be sold to the public through Government monopoly organisations; no private dealings in any of them are permitted. In the 1939-40 budget the revenues from each of these were as follows:

	Rls.
Tobacco . . .	180,000,000
Opium . . .	85,000,000
Sugar and Tea . . .	160,000,000
Textiles . . .	82,000,000
Matches . . .	5,000,000
Motor Vehicles . . .	18,000,000

£1 = 80 Rls. (approx.)

In addition, the prices of many articles (e.g. petrol and textiles) are controlled by the Government. These monopolies come under the direction of the Ministry of Finance, whereas the Foreign Trade Monopoly, established by an Act of 1931, is run by the Ministry of Commerce. The object is twofold. On the one hand, the import of luxuries is severely restricted or even prohibited; such

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articles as wines and spirits, arms, musical instruments, textiles, earthenware, household goods, chemicals and medicine and many other things may only be imported under licence from the Ministry. At the same time, it is ensured that no goods may be imported without an equivalent quantity of exports. In outline the system is as follows: anyone wishing to export goods requires a licence and must deposit the foreign currency obtained from the sale in the National Bank; where he will be credited with the equivalent in Iranian currency. At the same time the licence is endorsed to the effect that such an amount of foreign currency has been deposited, and it serves as a certificate authorising the purchase from the Bank of *half* that amount as payment for imports. Thus only half the foreign currency obtained for exports is available for the private purchase (under licence) of foreign goods; the other half goes into a Government sterling fund, and covers such expenditure abroad as the sending of students to Europe, materials for the army, for railway construction, and so on. One of the main sources of this supply of foreign exchange is, of course, the A.I.O.C. oil royalties, which provide £3,000,000 to £3,500,000 a year.

Customs, formerly operated under a concession by Belgians, is now back in the hands of Iranians, and the change seems to have been in the direction of greater severity. Taxes are imposed both on imports of foreign origin and on Iranian exports, and the rates are fairly heavy. They apply as much to essentials as to luxuries, but it must be remembered that most essential goods are imported only through the monopolies, and their price can therefore be fixed according to market conditions; we have already seen an example of this in the fixing of wheat prices.

The value of Iranian currency fluctuated a great deal

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during the years after 1918; the *gran* varied between 34 and 103 to the pound sterling. From 1922 to 1925 an American adviser, Dr. Millspaugh, attempted reforms along orthodox lines, but found little response and sent in his resignation. In March 1932, however, the unit of currency became the *rial*, divided into 100 *dinars* (100 *rials* making one *pahlavi*); an attempt was made to base it on gold, though finally it remained on a silver standard (at 4.1400 grams to the *rial*). In March 1936 an arbitrary figure of Rls.80 to the pound was adopted, roughly equivalent to its purchasing power in Iran; at the same time private dealings in currency and exchange were prohibited. This value remained good up to December 1939, though in the "black" market a pound sterling would fetch 120 *rials* (and in Iraq as much as 160). In that month the *rial* was based once more on gold instead of sterling, and its present value is about 80.5; however, the exchange rate has been fixed at 60 per cent of its legal value, in order to encourage trade. It will be seen that Iran has no false sense of modesty in dealing with financial matters.

The bulk of the currency in circulation is in the form of notes, coins only being used for amounts less than five *rials* (about 1s. 3d.); these notes are accepted even in the remotest villages. Formerly issued by the Imperial Bank (a British concern), they were in 1927 transferred to the newly founded National Bank, a move which marked the beginning of autonomy in Iranian finances. The authorised note issue has recently been increased to Rls.2,000,000,000, though the actual circulation is somewhat less than this.

The objective of the country's financial policy has been to avoid the indebtedness and enslavement to foreign capital which was characteristic of the preceding century, and

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the whole scheme of reconstruction has been carried out without borrowing anything from abroad. Apart from this, however, there is nothing unorthodox about Iranian financial policy, and nothing has been done to eliminate the stresses and strains that orthodoxy has produced in the West. However, in a rapidly expanding economic system, the piling up of internal debt does not make itself felt at once, and no doubt when the time comes Iran will have the courage to break away from the web of outworn financial ideas, just as she broke away in the past from the web of political intrigue.

The financing of the railway and industry is operated by various banks under the direct control of the Ministry of Finance—the National Bank of Iran, the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, and the Loan Bank (founded in January 1939). The work of the second was considerably increased during the past year; out of a total of Rls.92,611,144 (a rise of nearly 150 per cent) loans to agriculture amounted to Rls.57,153,980, and to industry Rls.15,722,738. The bank has over forty branches and representatives throughout the country, and has recently financed irrigation works at Semnan, Kermanshah and Behbahan, and in Fars and Khorasan; its total credits to agriculture since its foundation in 1933 amount to Rls.150,000,000. The Loan Bank has provided credits for new buildings and housing in Tehran and many other cities. The former Russian Bank, though now under the Iranian Government, continues to function for the settlement of old claims. A national Insurance Company was also founded a few years ago.

Government expenditure has risen very considerably during the past fifteen years, and with it taxation and the cost of living. Whereas in the 1923-4 budget revenue was

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only £5,250,000 and expenditure £5,500,000, by the 1941-2 budget the figures had risen to £45,000,000 and £54,000,000 respectively. It will be noticed that Iran is now consciously budgeting for a deficit ; and the increase in expenditure is welcomed as a sign of progress, not deplored as a new burden. On the revenue side the largest items are the customs receipts, the proceeds of the monopolies and State-owned factories, the royalties from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and dividends from shares in the National and other banks, income tax and road tax. Income tax is spread very widely over the whole population. Only those with Rls.2,400 (£30) a year or less escape ; the remainder pay on a sliding scale rising to nearly 20 per cent of income. Thus a man with an annual income of Rls.12,000 (£150) would pay Rls.246 (£3 1s. 6d.). Road tax is payable on most goods imported into the country, and is calculated according to weight ; its ostensible purpose is to pay for road and rail wear and tear caused by the transport of the goods concerned—though in practice it is merged into the rest of the budget revenue. Other indirect taxes are the tax on petrol and oil, wines and spirits and so on, and there are stamp taxes on most legal transactions. The attitude towards taxation is changing somewhat, partly because of the Government's new outlook on the subject ; in the old days the Shah tended to regard the proceeds of taxes as pocket-money for his personal use, and similarly the taxpayer considered it fair to avoid payment as far as possible. Now strenuous propaganda is persuading the people that the money they pay is being used for purposes that will benefit themselves, and though this has not produced any noticeable eagerness to meet the tax-collector, it has at least made them resigned to his visits.

The biggest item of expenditure in recent years has

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been accounted for by roads and the railway—more than a third of the whole ; expenditure on industry comes next. In both the 1940/1 and 1941/2 budgets an extra £2,000,000 from the sterling fund was set aside for military expenses, in addition to a very considerable advance on previous estimates. The Ministries of the Interior and of Education also take an important share. The official National Debt is negligible ; foreign debts do not exist—in public, at any rate. In June 1939 a credit of £5,000,000 was accepted from the British Government for the purchase of industrial supplies, but on the outbreak of war it became impossible for Britain to meet it, and the Iranian Government subsequently withdrew its claim. The following table gives comparative figures of the 1940/1 and 1941/2 budgets in *rials* :

	1940/1.	1941/2.
	Rls.	Rls.
Ministry of Court	5,222,480	5,222,480
National Assembly	9,985,000	11,080,470
Prime Minister	10,080,000	11,007,000
Ministry of War	484,729,980	593,121,524
Dept. of Security Guards	35,678,400	35,678,400
Ministry of Interior	131,607,000	170,437,884
Ministry of Justice	64,046,000	78,610,000
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	33,400,000	30,700,000
Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs	71,000,000	90,000,000
Ministry of Education	138,800,000	194,920,080
Ministry of Commerce	5,200,000	5,700,000
Dept. of Agriculture	71,615,477	121,615,477
Ministry of Finance	145,698,378	265,785,700
Ministry of Industry	744,620,000	999,788,000
Ministry of Transport	999,136,800	1,092,138,002
Miscellaneous	267,153,512	627,106,659
	3,210,973,027	4,323,911,676

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Prices have shown the tendency towards inflation characteristic of expanding economic systems, but generally speaking the official rate of exchange is a fair standard of the purchasing power of the *rial*. Official figures published in November 1940 indicated that the wholesale price index had risen by 47 per cent (as compared with 1936-7), while the cost of living had risen by 54 per cent. Wages are still low ; an unskilled labourer earns Rls.4-5 (1s. to 1s. 3d.) a day in the south, though rather more in the north, where the cost of living is higher. A fully qualified artisan will not earn more in the south than Rls.35-40 a day, but Tehran rates would be about double that amount. In the clerical grade, a junior clerk or typist would start at Rls.300 a month, the average being in the neighbourhood of Rls.900-1,000. But the level of wages and salaries is continually being forced upwards, and the race between incomes and costs, so tragic a feature of our Western economic systems, has begun in Iran too. It remains to be seen whether Iranian financial experts will be able to sift the good from the bad in what they have learnt from Europe and so to solve these problems in the light of common sense.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROGRESS

THE face of Iran is changing more perhaps than its soul. Certainly the traveller in the country can see many superficial changes in the manner of life, quite apart from those we have dwelt on in the previous chapter. The degree of change is graduated from the village to the town. In the big towns like Tehran the houses and furniture of the wealthy are very much on Western lines, whereas in the provinces even the upper classes still live in the old ways—though they welcome such modern conveniences as electricity, telephones and radio sets. Partly, of course, the style of house is dictated by the climate ; in a temperature of 120° in the shade the “suntrap” school of architecture is not likely to be popular. Thus many even of the modern houses follow the traditional style—a rectangle of rooms all facing in towards a central courtyard, usually with a lake, the outside walls being windowless, and the inside windows screened by a deep veranda. Many of them, too, have *sardabs*—underground rooms ventilated by lattices at the ground level ; these remain cool even during the hottest weather, and most well-to-do Iranians live in them throughout the summer.


Life among the poorer classes is, of course, not on the same spacious lines. Most villagers and town labourers live in a single room with their entire family ; sanitation is communal or non-existent, and the only saving grace is that they are obliged to spend much of their time out of doors. In this respect one may regret the determined

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
efforts of the Government to settle the nomad tribes in villages, for their new state can rarely be better than their first. Nevertheless, the process is going steadily on (over 150,000 tribesmen have already been settled), and the longing of the average labourer to possess a house seems to indicate that it is meeting with approval and even success. But one must not assume that the Government is satisfied with the present standards of housing ; much of the accommodation being put up near the new factories, though still cramped according to our standards, is a great improvement hygienically. Bazaars and shops are not yet all that they should be, for the open front is still the general rule even for food stores ; glass is in fact a rarity everywhere outside Tehran.

For it is still true that, while Tehran is a cross-section of the modern movement in Iran and has therefore had every attention lavished upon it, the other cities and provinces of the country have been correspondingly neglected. For Tehran have been reserved most of the fine new buildings, the best shops, the pleasantest streets and parks ; and in Tehran congregate the most lively and cosmopolitan society—diplomats, merchants, engineers, cabaret dancers—and the cream of the Iranian upper classes, the officers, the courtiers, and so on. The atmosphere is rather that of a Ruritanian city—but with a background of such practical things as railways and factories.

But one change does seem to have penetrated throughout the whole country, and that is the change of dress. Following the modern Oriental craze for uniformity of costume, the Shah decreed in 1928 that European clothes were to be compulsory for men, and so they have remained ever since. The only official exceptions were the *mullas*, who were allowed to retain their traditional robes and turbans ; and



NEW HOUSE IN TRADITIONAL STYLE AT SERJAN, NEAR KERMÁN



MODERN HOUSES AT SHEMIRAN

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among the remoter tribes one may still see the baggy black trousers and stiff felt coat they have worn for centuries. But these things are rare, and the revolution (which caused riots in 1929) is now accepted by everyone. With European dress the official head-dress was at first the *pahlavi* cap—a low cylindrical affair with a flat peak, rather like a French *képi*. But this was only intended as an intermediate stage, and in 1935 the European hat became universal. The peasant who now wears his traditional round felt cap anywhere except in the privacy of his own home is liable to have it snatched from his head, and this applied equally to the *pahlavi*, which was reserved for the use of the Royal Family on State occasions. The usual court dress, if uniform is not worn, is evening dress with a silk hat. One is glad to see, however, that the old traditions and customs have not been blotted out entirely; Iranian folklore and sociology are among the subjects studied at the University of Tehran, where a special building is to house this faculty, together with a museum for the preservation of tribal costumes and relics.

A much more spectacular and possibly more fundamental change has been the emancipation of women. Outwardly, this has taken the form, as in the case of the men, of modernisation of dress. For centuries Iranian women had been shrouded in black and unbecoming veils, covering the body from head to foot even more thoroughly than in most Moslem countries; they were only permitted to leave their houses during certain hours, and in general were not regarded as active members of the community. But with the opening of the new era it was natural that this should be one of the first anachronisms to be attacked. In 1926 already there was some relaxation, but when Amanullah, king of the neighbouring State of Afghanistan,

lost his throne as a result of too eager efforts at reform, the new movement in Iran received a setback, and thereafter the Shah proceeded with caution. In 1930 European dress was the rule indoors among the upper classes (and it must also be remembered that Zoroastrian and Armenian women had always been free from restrictions) ; Government employees were also encouraged (in a semi-official way) to persuade their wives and daughters to follow the new fashion. By 1935 the movement was in full swing ; teachers and schoolgirls were not allowed to go veiled, and army officers could not be seen in the company of a veiled woman. Finally, on January 8, 1936, the great step was taken. On this day, decisive in the lives of the women of Iran, the Shah appeared at the Tehran High School to present the diplomas for the year ; he was accompanied by the Queen and his two eldest daughters, unveiled and in European dress. His speech (given here in full) is interesting both for the sentiments expressed and as a specimen of his blunt style. He said :

I am extremely pleased to see women who as the result of knowledge and study have come to know their true position and to understand their rights and privileges. As Mme. Tarbiat has pointed out, the women of our country, because of their exclusion from society, have been unable to display their talent and ability—indeed I might say that they have been unable to do their duty towards their beloved country and people or to show their service and devotion as they should ; but now, in addition to their distinctive privilege as mothers, they are going to enjoy the other advantages of society.

We must not imagine indefinitely that one-half of the community of our nation need not be taken into account, in other words, that one-half of the country's working power should be idle. A census of women has never been taken—as though women were a separate community and not to be reckoned as part of Iranian society.

It is most unfortunate that there has only been one case

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where a census of women was possible, and that was when there was a shortage of food ; then a census was held in order to ensure the supply of provisions.

I do not wish to appear affected, I do not want to give a survey of the progress that has been made, nor do I want to draw a distinction between today and former days. But you women must recognise this day as a great one and must make use of the opportunities you have for the advancement of your country. I believe that we must all work to the best of our ability for the prosperity and progress of this nation, just as we must strive along the road of education ; although education is making progress through the efforts of State employees, yet no one should be heedless of the fact that the nation needs work and energy, and everyone must labour harder and better for the prosperity and well-being of men.

You, my sisters and daughters, now that you have entered society, and have taken this step for the advancement of yourselves and your country—you must understand that your duty is to work for your country ; the happiness of the future is in your hands. You will have to educate the race of the future, you will be able to be good teachers and bring up good citizens.

I expect from you educated women, now that you are conscious of your rights and privileges and are going to perform your duty towards your country, that you will be contented in your lives, will work efficiently, practise economy in your daily life and abstain from luxury and extravagance

From this day women were regarded in law as being equal with men. The veil was strictly forbidden ; no shop could serve a veiled woman, none were admitted to public vehicles or even allowed to appear on the streets. A sum of £25,000 was voted to assist the poorer women to purchase new clothes. The first results were not always happy ; the upper classes could afford to dress in the latest Paris fashions, but the rest had to be content with what they could pick up in the bazaars, and the mixture of old and new was possibly worse than the dreary veil. But the move met with almost universal approval ; the young women welcomed with joy their new freedom, and only

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the more conservative of the older women registered their protest by refusing to appear out of doors. Nowhere was any disturbance reported—a tribute also perhaps to the efficacy of the propaganda with which the ground had been prepared. For months before and after the Press was full of articles extolling the emancipation of women and giving practical hints on etiquette, fashions, hair styles and so on ; photographs of women athletes, women students, women film stars and women aviators have been a regular feature ever since.

The new outlook is also reflected in the official attitude towards marriage. In Islamic law the rights and initiative are all with the husband, though if he has more than one wife he is bound to treat each of them equally well in all respects ; but whereas divorce for him is comparatively easy, for the wife it is impossible. Iranian views on the subject had admittedly never been fully in line with those of strict Islam ; in fact, they had erred rather on the side of laxity. The normal Islamic custom of polygamy was probably less common than the peculiarly Shi'ite one of the *mut'a* or temporary marriage, which might last for anything from a single night to a lifetime ; the writer knew of one man who had already had nineteen wives—though never more than one at a time. But both these practices were frowned on by the better classes, and the new legislation of 1931 and onwards was only following what was already accepted by a minority. Specific regulations required the registration of temporary marriages, and, although both this and polygamy were still recognised, the wife was given the right to sue for a divorce if her husband had failed to reveal the existence of other wives before the wedding or married again without her consent. A step so revolutionary (in that it gave the wife the initiative)

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was bound to meet with opposition, and various legal fictions were worked out to avoid the charge of breaking the fundamental laws of Islam—for example, that the wife was in such a case acting as her husband's attorney (if necessary without his consent) in order to get him a divorce from her ! Medical fitness on both sides is now necessary before a marriage may go forward, and the minimum age has been fixed for men at 18 and for women at 16 (though under certain circumstances and with the parents' consent as low as 15 and 13 may be permitted). But the growth of education and the change in public opinion (assiduously fostered by Government propaganda) is doing far more than any regulations ; and there is a general feeling among the more advanced classes—amounting almost to an official recommendation—that marriage should be monogamous and that early unions are a mistake.

An Iranian jurist has recently pointed out that women in Iran are now unequal in law to men only in five respects :

(1) A man may have more than one wife, whereas a woman is limited to one husband (though, as we have seen, there are certain safeguards).

(2) A man may divorce his wife when he pleases, while a woman may only do so on certain specific grounds.

(3) A woman's inheritance rights are less than those of a man (but on the other hand she is entitled to a dowry on marriage, and has complete control over her own property).

(4) The husband is regarded as head of the family, and has legal control over the children.

(5) Women may not vote or stand as candidates in elections to the National Assembly.

Inspired by their new legal freedom, Iranian women

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are entering more and more into the life of their country. At one time the only career open to women was teaching, and even then their salaries were only half those of men. Then medicine and nursing were added, and women students in the University took up law and journalism, and even went abroad to continue their studies. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was one of the first organisations to employ women typists and clerks, but other firms and Government departments soon followed suit, and women began to oust men in these occupations as they have in Europe. Many women have entered industry, and there are now even women pilots. In the entertainment world there has been less encroachment; there are a few female singers and entertainers, but the Islamic stigma on theatrical performances has remained in Iran more firmly than elsewhere. But there is no doubt that this restriction will go the way of the rest.

In 1928 women were admitted to cafés and cinemas, and since that time they have taken full part in the social world. It became quite common for them to dine out, and even to be seen dancing in public (though regulations on this point have fluctuated from time to time). In 1932 the Oriental Women's Congress was held in Tehran, and presided over by the Shah's eldest daughter, who two years later was made president of the first women's club, with fine premises of its own in Tehran. This was the first of many women's clubs and unions—including a special section of the Red Lion and Sun Association (the Iranian Red Cross); and no celebration would be complete nowadays without its display by schoolgirls and Girl Guides. Curiously enough, this "emancipation" has not led to the abandonment of the ideal of the woman as a wife and a mother, and indeed there is a little of the German *Kirche*,

Küche, Kinder influence to be noticed—though Iranian feminists might deny this.

The labour legislation of 1938, while it introduced many improvements in conditions, did not place any restrictions on the employment of women and children in factories. So far as the women are concerned, this is regarded with favour—as a sign of their new equality in all respects with men ; and as they are usually employed on light work—in textile, carpet or cigarette factories—there is no reason why the effects should be harmful. But the case of children is different. It is still quite common for boys and girls well under ten years of age to be employed in textile and carpet factories, apart of course from those working in the numerous small private concerns. The policy of the Government in this case (as in others) is one of gradual reform ; it is assumed, for instance, that the more effective enforcement of compulsory education will produce the desired result without any further legislation, and already firms are requested (though not compelled) not to employ children of school age.

The Factory Act also took an important step in the matter of public health by insisting on the medical examination of all workers before employment. The state of affairs revealed by this was by no means as bad as many had expected, though there is plenty of scope for improvement ; smallpox, tuberculosis and venereal disease are particularly prevalent. Two factors have contributed in the past to the prevalence of disease—economic backwardness and superstition ; both these the Government has been doing its best to eliminate. But Government intervention in such matters is largely a product of the Pahlavi regime ; before the last war it was left to the enterprise of European and American missionary organisations. The first hospitals were

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established in about 1830 by the British General Mission Board in Isfahan, Shiraz, Yezd and Kerman ; these still exist, and are run by the Church Missionary Society, whose headquarters are in Isfahan. The American Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions followed suit with four more in the north, while in 1835 the Congregational Church of America added another in Urumia (now Reza'iyè). There are at present American hospitals in Tehran, Resht, Kermanshah, Hamadan, Tabriz, Erak and Meshed. The first Iranian hospital was opened in 1877, and in the same year a medical council was formed to tackle the problem of smallpox. In more recent times the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's hospitals in Abadan and Masjid-i-Sulaiman have done very useful work and have been much appreciated ; the Company was, incidentally, the first to introduce compulsory medical examination—before it became obligatory by law. At first superstition and conservatism made these foreign hospitals suspect ; but results had their effect, and it was found that the poorer classes were almost too ready to seek the benefits of good medicine and treatment.

The new Government began to take a hand in 1925. Their early efforts were modelled on French methods, though the existing British and American institutions were naturally studied ; later German doctors and specialists began to make their appearance. The Reza Shahi hospital in Meshed, which has beds for 150 patients and departments for pathology, dermatology, gynæcology and bacteriology, was run by two German doctors, and uses German apparatus. There is now a fully equipped hospital in every town of importance (several with 500 beds), and in addition numerous dispensaries throughout the country ; in 1923 a Pasteur Institute was founded in Tehran, in 1925 a Women's

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Hospital, and in 1939 a veterinary and serum institute. Sanatoria have been erected at Ramsar on the Caspian (where there are valuable mineral springs), at Rudehen, and recently near the ruins of the ancient city of Rayy. The greatest difficulty has been the lack of trained personnel (until recently there were only 2·5 doctors to every 100,000 of the population) ; but strenuous efforts are being made to have doctors and nurses trained abroad, and the Faculty of Medicine in the Tehran University is also beginning to get into its stride. A medical college in Meshhed is training dressers and assistants for work in the villages. All health services fall within the purview of the Ministry of the Interior and are organised by the municipal and local authorities. Many towns now have child welfare and maternity services (fortunately the prejudice against male doctors for women is disappearing), and in Tehran there is a maternity home, a crèche and a nurses' training school. Vaccination and inoculation against typhoid are widespread, and are accepted by the majority even of the more primitive tribes (for the public is not yet familiar with the ethical and sentimental arguments against them). Many towns have special educational medical officers, and all schools are regularly inspected by them or by the local health officer ; in addition the railway department, mines and factories have their own health services. All travellers entering the country are liable to medical examination, and quarantine arrangements exist at the chief ports. The sanitary services are equally active ; streets are kept clean, efforts are being made to provide every town with adequate water supplies, sewage disposal and sanitation, and in Tehran regular inspection of food stocks has been carried out for some time. The problem of malaria (still very prevalent in the south) is being systematically studied by

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local prevention officers, and some improvement has already been seen. Charitable bodies like the Red Lion and Sun raise funds for the construction of hospitals, the relief of flood and earthquake victims, and so on, and other organisations for the care of mothers and babies (founded after the birth of the Shah's granddaughter), and of widows and orphans, help to keep people aware of the importance of health and hygiene, while the Press plays its part with frequent articles on the raising of children, health hints and disease prevention (all inspired from official quarters).

Physical training naturally plays a large part in the schemes for improving the nation's health. Ancient Iran was noted for its prowess at every form of sport, but in more recent times laziness and love of good living had ousted the care of the body, and many outside observers believed that the nation was degenerate. That this was not the case is clear from the history of the past twenty years; nevertheless, outside the hill tribes, the level of physique has been poor, and there is plenty of scope for work here. Like other young nations, in Europe as well as in the East, Iran is rather inclined to concentrate on sport to the exclusion of mental and spiritual advancement, but there is time for the right balance to be found. The drive began with the formation of the Physical Training Council in 1933, under the patronage of the Crown Prince, intensely interested in all forms of sport. This body took charge of all athletic and scouting activities, and is responsible to the Ministry of Education. As a result of its activities there are now over 300 sports clubs in the country, and every school has its teams for football, basketball, volleyball and tennis. Playing fields are ubiquitous, a big stadium has been erected in Tehran, and the results of football and other matches are a regular feature

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of the Press. The Press has in fact played a great part in popularising sport ; nearly every issue contains articles or pictures on some kind of athletic activity. Displays and parades by school-children and athletes are always an important part of any official celebration, and even hikers are beginning to pervade the Iranian countryside.

But the Scout movement has been perhaps the most notable development of the new craze for health and the open air. The first Boy Scout troop was formed in 1925, but little progress was made until the Physical Training Council took it up in 1933 ; by 1940 there were over 21,000 scouts in the country. A regulation of 1939 made membership of the Scout movement compulsory for all school-children in the sixth primary and first secondary classes. Like our own Scouts (to which the Iranian organisation is affiliated) there are three grades—lion-cubs (for wolves are not nearly dignified enough), scouts and rovers, the dividing lines coming at the ages of 12 and 20 respectively. The Girl Guides (founded in 1935 under the patronage of the Shah's eldest daughter) have similar grades, though they are in other respects a distinct organisation ; their younger members are known as eaglets. Camps are held during the summer at Manzariyè on the slopes of the Elborz, and at other places in the provinces—primarily for training of scoutmasters and mistresses. The familiar virtues are inculcated—patriotism, the "daily good deed", bodily fitness and "Be prepared !" The Iranian Scouts have kept in touch with the international movement ; students in France formed a separate troop of the French Scouts in 1935, and a number were sent from Iran to the Jamboree of 1937 in Holland.

When we last looked at the state of education proper in Iran, we saw that up to the end of the last century the

establishment of new and modern schools had been almost entirely in the hands of foreigners. Though most of the progress since that date can be attributed to the enterprise of Reza Shah, yet there were before his time a number of significant steps. We have already mentioned the foundation of the *Dar-al-fonun* in 1852. In 1873 a school of languages was started in Tehran, and in 1876 the second college to be sponsored by the Government was founded in Tabriz with Iranian as well as European teachers ; this was followed by military colleges in Isfahan (1883) and Tehran (1886). In 1897 the first girls' school appeared—at Chalyas in Azarbaijan. But in the following year the first organised development in national education took place—the formation of the Council for National Schools, whose members included many prominent men of the day. Ten schools were started by them during that year, and before long they were spread all over the country. Some of them were free, and a number took boarders. Most of them were organised along similar lines ; a typical one devoted a year each to the study of the alphabet, Persian, Arabic and mathematics, and had a staff of fourteen teachers and a doctor to deal with an average of 250 pupils. We may also note in passing the establishment in 1899 of a College of Political Sciences (under the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and in 1900 of a School of Agriculture (with a Belgian director).

The Revolution of 1906 brought little more in the educational world than an attempt to reorganise what had already been achieved. The Education Acts of 1910 and 1911 distinguished between private schools (which now included the Qur'an schools, the religious colleges, the National Schools and the foreign mission schools) and public schools founded and run directly by the State (a number were

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started during these years). Foreign teachers were henceforth forbidden to teach in primary schools (a measure directed against Russian influence), though of course they continued and still continue to teach in secondary and higher schools. Thirty students were sent to Europe to study education, a secondary curriculum was drawn up, and for the first time an official interest was taken in schooling for girls. Figures for 1911 show that there were 76 boys' schools with 8,344 pupils and 47 girls' schools with 2,187 pupils; in addition there were two secondary schools and three higher colleges with a total of 154 and 157 students respectively. In 1919 the grant for education was doubled, but it was left to the Government of Reza Shah Pahlavi to undertake the fundamental reorganisation of the national system.

The general trend of this reorganisation has been to bring all education under direct State control, and, although the non-State schools have been allowed to remain, they have been subjected to a number of restrictions. Their teachers must have the qualifications required of State teachers, the buildings and equipment must conform to the Ministry's standards, and the curriculum must include all the official subjects, so that the pupils may be qualified to enter for State examinations; these include Persian, Arabic, Iranian history and geography. Since 1932 no foreign school has been allowed to take primary pupils of Iranian nationality, and Persian must be used as the medium of instruction in all the subjects specified above. Attempts to regulate the Qur'an schools have not met with much success, but something has been done to ensure a minimum standard of cleanliness and hygiene. Some of these private schools have been granted State assistance on conditions.

The Ministry of Education, set up in 1911, consists of

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nine departments, the most important of which deal with the primary and secondary schools and with higher education. Another section controls the work of the Physical Training Council, while another is concerned with the nation's historical and archæological treasures. The country is divided into 33 administrative districts, each of which is under the direction of an official of the Ministry, generally appointed from Tehran ; in 1922 a Board of Education was set up, composed of ten members appointed by the Minister from the headmasters and teachers of higher and secondary schools. At present schools are graded into kindergarten, primary (village and town), secondary and higher ; theoretically attendance is compulsory, but even in the towns it cannot be higher than 50 per cent, and in the villages it must be considerably lower. The standard of equipment is remarkably good ; all schools are fitted with modern furniture and apparatus, and have good libraries of books and maps.

Kindergartens were not envisaged in the original Education Acts, and the first actually appeared in 1918 ; a Government kindergarten was founded in Tehran in 1933, and from this date they were officially incorporated in the national system. They cover the period from 4 to 7 years of age and provide three to five hours a day of games, eurhythmics, drill, singing, dancing, recitation, and during the last year the alphabet and simple spelling. At the age of 7 the child comes under the compulsory scheme, and enters the primary school. Throughout the school system the student spends one year in each class, and in the primary stage there are normally six of these classes, lasting six years. The holidays are long ; in the cooler parts of the country the schools are open for about 200 days of the year, while in the south only 170 days are worked. Uniforms were introduced in 1935, the boys

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wearing grey flannel suits with berets, while the girls wear tunics of similar material. Mixed schools are now quite common, though the first was only started in 1935, but the curricula for boys and girls differ slightly. Boys study Persian, scripture, mathematics, history and geography (mainly of Iran) and elementary Arabic ; girls do less of these and include drawing and sewing. The courses are covered by a special series of school books published by the Ministry—an example of the insistence on uniformity which is to be seen throughout the whole system. Promotion from class to class is not automatic, but by the end of six years a normal pupil will have reached the top class and be ready to take the entrance examination into the secondary grade. Without the certificate which this confers, he will be unable to obtain anything above the lower grades of employment, and certainly nothing of a clerical nature.

Secondary education is not compulsory, and many pupils who have obtained their primary certificate pass straight into some form of employment. The secondary course (which was first drawn up in 1921) lasts for six years, after which entrance to the University is possible (in the case of girls the last year is spent in a special University entrance class). The first three years of the course are the same for all students ; both boys and girls study languages, scripture, mathematics, science, history and geography, and in addition boys are taught physics, chemistry and more advanced mathematics, while girls learn domestic science, child welfare and sewing. Leisure time is occupied by games, music and the production of plays. The primary purpose of Iranian education—the turning out of a good member of a corporate society—is clear from these curricula. Secondary education is not free, but the fees are very low, and many exemptions are granted—to the children of teachers and lower-

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grade Government employees, and to those reaching a certain standard in their primary examinations. The lower secondary certificate qualifies the student not only for entrance to the second part of the course, but also for the State technical schools and the first grade of Government service.

In the second three years the student specialises. The immediate purpose of this part of the course is preparation for the University or for one or other of the High Schools, but the full secondary certificate also qualifies for second-grade Government service and is accepted in French, German and some British and American Universities instead of matriculation. The main divisions are Arts and Science, the first covering Persian, Arabic, foreign languages, history, geography and philosophy, while the second includes mathematics, physics, chemistry, science and a foreign language. The Arts student passes on to the University faculties of Arts or Law, the Science student to the Scientific, Technical or Medical faculties ; or they may enter one of the High Schools, whose primary function is the training of teachers. There are a number of other schools within the secondary framework—commercial, technical, economics, industrial, agricultural, painting, and religion and philosophy—all of which may prepare students for the appropriate University faculties as well as for specific occupations. Higher education for girls concentrates mainly on the production of teachers ; they may either specialise in education and psychology and then qualify at once as teachers, or they may go through a more general course and pass on to the entrance class of the University, one of the Teachers' High Schools or various Colleges of Nursing. Recently a more general course, lasting two years, has been instituted for girls who do not propose to go on to higher studies ; besides the usual

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subjects it includes handicrafts, housekeeping, child welfare and health.

The Tehran University Act was passed on May 30, 1934, and on June 25 the first sod was cut. The foundation stone was laid by H.I.M. the Shah on February 5, 1935—a red-letter day in the history of Iranian culture, and one which is celebrated annually as a Festival of Education. The buildings were planned on spacious lines, and included five faculties—Arts, Science, Medicine, Law and Industry. A sixth faculty—that of Divinity—is housed in the Sepahsalar Mosque, built in 1882, and a seventh, Fine Arts, has been added recently. The main part of the Medical building was completed in March 1937, the Law building on March 15, 1941, while the others (including a students' club, restaurant and hostel) are well in hand. All these faculties have libraries of over 15,000 volumes and possess facilities for publishing their own text-books. The University is controlled by a Board composed of the Principal and Vice-Principal, and the head and one professor from each faculty ; each faculty in its turn has a similar board of professors and lecturers, of whom there are twenty grades in all. A few foreign professors are employed, and many of the Iranian teachers have been trained in Europe. Students come from all over Iran, and also from Najaf in Iraq, Istanbul, India and the U.S.S.R. As with the lower grades, many of these students are taken free and there are a large number of boarders. It is hoped in time to institute other universities in the provinces.

Primary importance has been attached to the technical faculties of Medicine and Industry. The former includes a preparatory course lasting one year, followed by the main course of five years ; attached to it are schools of dentistry and dispensing. The industrial course lasts for four years

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and covers chemistry, mechanics, electricity, civil engineering and mining ; the Law course, lasting three years, combines the subjects formerly covered by the Colleges of Political Science (1899), Law (1920) and Commerce (1925). In Science and Arts (which are combined with the Higher Teachers' Colleges) there are ten and seventy subjects respectively ; a pass in three (in Science) or four (in Arts) is necessary for a degree. Fine Arts gives a choice of architecture, drawing and sculpture. Finally there is the three years Divinity course, covering philosophy, religion and literature. A university degree qualifies the holder for Grade III Government Service.

The university now absorbs many of the students who were formerly sent abroad, but this form of training is still regarded as important for many subjects. As we have seen, groups had been sent in a somewhat haphazard way since the middle of the nineteenth century (including even a few girls), but in 1929 Rls. 1,000,000 were voted for this purpose, with a further one million annually for the next six years. A hundred students were sent every year on this fund (apart from those sponsored by the Ministry of War and other Government departments, and a number of private individuals) ; figures published in 1940 showed that from 1922 to 1938 396 students had returned and that there were 452 still studying—the total, including those returned in the meantime and Ministry of War and private students, numbering over 1,500. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has also been responsible for sending a number to England for technical training. Apart from those who went to Europe, quite a number of Iranians now prominent in public life studied at the American University of Beirut—including the Professor of Physics in the University and the Director of the Sabzevar Hospital.

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
But Iran's most pressing need is still for trained teachers. Teachers' Colleges had been founded in Tehran as long ago as 1918—for women as well as men—but little fresh progress was made until the Teachers' Training Act of March 1934. This planned to set up twenty-five Teachers' Colleges in the course of the next five years, and by 1936 nine boys' and two girls' colleges (with a total of 697 students and 62 teachers) had already been started; the aim was passed in 1939, and now there are 36 throughout the country. The same act encouraged would-be teachers by granting special privileges and concessions to the profession. The normal qualification is the full secondary certificate, though the lower one is usually accepted; the course lasts for two years and, provided that the aspirant has reached the age of 20, he may now teach in the primary schools. Nothing less than the full secondary certificate is accepted in the Higher Teachers' College in Tehran, which supplies (or will supply) most of the secondary teachers. This college includes the two University faculties of Arts and Science; it is free, and in 1940 there were eighty boarders. Students, who come from the University as well as the secondary schools, can specialise in one of eight subjects—Persian language and literature, history and geography, archæology, foreign languages, philosophy and educational theory, mathematics, physics and chemistry, and natural science. Women students were admitted on equal terms after the "Emancipation" of 1936 (though they pass through a special entrance class first), and from 1940 domestic science has been added to the subjects that they may study. Regarded as the "corner-stone" of the University, this college is organised on community lines; its fine building stands in six acres of land and has dormitories, laboratories, a library and playing fields. Up to 1940 612 students had graduated, and there were 550 in that year. The qualified

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teacher may pass through ten grades in all, spending two or three years in each, and generally retires at the age of 50.

Technical training has followed rather a line of its own, the most extensive part coming under the direction of the Ministry of Industry. The primary schools ignore the usual curriculum, and instead provide instruction in such things as carpet-weaving, inlay work, hand textiles, agriculture, furniture making and carpentry. In the secondary stage the student enters one of the technical schools, of which the most popular is the Industrial School. Here he spends four years on general theory and practice and two years in training for some particular occupation, to which he may pass on immediately. For the more ambitious there is the Industrial College, where there is a choice of a three year's course in machinery, chemistry, mining or metallurgy, followed by a year in an appropriate factory. There is also a range of schools of arts and crafts, one group covering carpet-making and designing, miniature painting and book illumination, enamel and inlay work, tiles and textiles, the other more modern arts such as drawing, sculpture, industrial carpet-weaving, mosaic, pottery and architecture. These studies may be continued in the Tehran College of Art. Finally mention must be made of the schools of dyeing, which provide recruits for carpet factories, textile and spinning works, and the Girls' Technical School in Tehran, whose building is one of the most striking features of the modern city.

There are other technical colleges directed by other Ministries more closely concerned with them. The Ministry of Education itself is interested in only two of them—the School of Commerce and Economics and the Academy of Music. The former is reckoned as equivalent to the higher part of the secondary grade, and after three years' study the student may pass on to the faculty of Law and Economics.



THE GIRLS' TECHNICAL SCHOOL AT TEHRAN



IRANIAN ATHLETES (FROM AN IRANIAN YEAR-BOOK)

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The Music Academy takes pupils at the primary stage, and for the first six years gives the normal primary course together with a certain amount of musical theory and practice. In the secondary grade specialisation begins in the fourth year, and includes conducting and orchestral work, singing and instruments, and teaching. This is followed by a higher course of four years' duration, with a Diploma at the end of it.

The Ministry of Agriculture runs a Veterinary and an Agricultural College, both at Karaj. Students spend two or three years in them and then go on to one of the experimental stations ; or they may study education and psychology as well, and teach in the agricultural primary schools. The Ministry of War trains officers in the Tehran Military College, whose students are drawn from military secondary schools at Tabriz, Meshed, Isfahan, Shiraz and Kermanshah ; the course lasts for two years and covers infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineering and commissariat—after which the cadet passes out as a lieutenant. The Ministries of Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, and the Interior also have colleges of a similar kind. All these colleges are free, and many of them take boarders and give assistance to needy students.

Some idea of the progress made in the past fifteen or twenty years may be had from the following figures. In 1940 there were 8,237 schools of all kinds (as compared with 612 in 1922) with 496,960 pupils and 13,646 teachers. Of these schools 1,316 were State primary and 200 secondary and higher, the remainder being "private" institutions. There were 2,150 primary and 400 adult schools. 12,847 boys and 4,905 girls passed out of the primary grade, 645 boys and 451 girls from the secondary grade, 506 students from the teachers' colleges and 411 graduates from the

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University (as compared with 15 in 1922). More detailed figures are not available, but the following table for 1936 may serve as a useful comparison.

Type.	Number.	Students.		Teachers.	
		Boys.	Girls.	Men.	Women.
Kindergarten	23	1,555		79	
<i>Maktab</i> s	2,935	41,459	14,186	1,858	1,372
State Primary	982	113,439		3,799	
National Primary . . .	402	64,406		2,347	
Total Primary	1,384	133,480	44,365	4,337	1,809
State Secondary	63	7,620		516	
National and Foreign Secondary	112	7,915		721	
Total Secondary	175	12,595	2,940	957	280
Religious Colleges . . .	353	2,935		305	
Teachers' Schools . . .	11	697		62	
Technical Schools . . .	10	1,216		108	
Higher Schools	5	312		52	
University Faculties . .	5	1,311		151	
Total schools of all kinds .	4,901	257,051		11,370	

The ratio of State to non-State schools is likely to have increased since that date. The total cost of education in 1940, including State expenditure and private and religious endowments, was between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000 (as compared with £100,000 in 1925).

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Education in Iran is an all-embracing affair involving old as well as young ; it plays its part in the general design of bringing public opinion into line. Adult education began to be taken seriously in 1936, when every school was instructed to organise night classes for adult workers. The object was to provide every citizen with the ability to read and write, and with a modicum of knowledge of the world around him. The course lasts for two years, and the passing-out certificate is generally taken as equivalent to that of the fourth primary class. Each student is expected to attend ninety-six classes in each year ; during the first year he learns reading, writing and simple arithmetic, during the second general knowledge, health and hygiene, arithmetic, civic knowledge, Iranian history and geography, and simple prose and poetry selections. At the end of 1940 there were 2,133 classes, each in two parts, and 157,197 students ; no fuller details are available, but the following analysis of the 1939 figures is of interest.

By Age

Under 18	.	.	43,218
18-25	.	.	28,932
25-30	.	.	19,222
30-35	.	.	17,624
35-45	.	.	16,832
45-55	.	.	9,079
Over 55.	.	.	2,796
<hr/>			
Total	.	.	137,703

By Occupations

Police	.	.	3,416	Bakers	.	.	3,315
Civil servants	.	.	9,589	Butchers	.	.	2,578
Traders	.	.	5,600	Baths attendants	.	.	2,491
Builders and labourers	.	.	10,645	Carpenters	.	.	3,419
Porters	.	.	3,135	Drivers and mechanics	.	.	1,180
Hotel workers	.	.	1,444	Iron- and copper-smiths	.	.	4,873
Farmers and peasants	.	.	33,618	Miscellaneous	.	.	52,300
				<hr/>			
				Total	.	.	137,703

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It will have been noticed that comparatively little importance is attached to religious teaching, and a great deal to ethics—particularly of citizenship and patriotism. This is characteristic of the whole attitude of the new regime towards religious questions. Iran is still a predominantly Moslem country—there are some 14,000,000 Shi'ites and 800,000—900,000 Sunnis (mainly the Kordish tribes in the north-west), while the non-Moslems do not number more than 150,000. The tendency has been therefore rather to weaken the hold of Islam upon the people than to make a direct attack on it. At one time the Shah was inclined to follow Turkey in her declaration of a "lay state", but opposition from the *mullas* proved stronger than he had expected, and he was obliged to withdraw. It became clear that the power of the *mullas*, which was founded as much on their monopoly of literacy as on spiritual worth, was likely to prove a serious obstacle to social reform and the unification of the nation. "Undermining" tactics therefore became the order of the day. The religious clause remained in the Constitution, laws were framed so as not to infringe openly the Islamic code, and anti-Islamic propaganda was forbidden; the Shah even visited the shrines at Qum, Kerbela and Najaf. On the other hand, compulsory religious teaching in the schools was dropped before 1930, and the status and dignity of the *mullas* was weakened by the increasing opportunities for education and by certain restrictions on dress and appearance. The recent decision to nationalise the religious endowments (already referred to), though a logical development of the Shah's policy towards religion, is nevertheless most significant, when the one-time strength of these organisations is remembered.

✓ In 1935 the public performance of the annual *ta'ziyè* or passion play was severely controlled and counter-attractions

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provided, and a little later the mosques in Isfahan were thrown open to visitors—Moslem and non-Moslem alike ; it is unusual nowadays to see a man saying his prayers in public. The Sunni-Shi'a alliance in the Crown Prince's marriage was one indication of how little account is taken of sectarian differences where national interests are at stake. The known attitude of the Shah's government towards the question naturally had a considerable effect on public opinion. We have seen throughout her history how Iran's own cultural core has always survived the foreign ideas that have been imposed upon it, and though in the case of Islam the process has taken somewhat longer, we may see it working now. Liberal opinion is turning more and more to the characteristically Iranian doctrines of Zoroastrianism, and extremists even maintain that by the ousting of this ancient faith Islam destroyed the nation's true culture. This new attitude has found expression in co-operation between Moslems and Zoroastrians (for instance one of the Royal Princes gave away the prizes at a Zoroastrian school), and in a tendency to justify social reforms (such as the emancipation of women) by reference to Zoroastrian rather than Islamic principles. Behaism, on the other hand, is discouraged and even persecuted, though it is probable that many adherents still exist in secret.

But this attitude towards religion cannot be judged out of its context in modern Iranian social and political ideas. These combine in a form of "nation-worship" which has its roots in the autocratic rule of the Achæmenids, and which is quite as strong as anything in Europe today. Every opportunity is taken to exalt the State over the individual, and the "interests of the nation" are thrust before him in all his activities. Anything that helps to increase national unity is encouraged, and anything that tends to

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divide is suppressed. So, while unorthodoxy of a nationalist character is welcomed, religions which are neither Islamic nor Iranian fare less well. Armenians, Assyrians and Jews all come in for their share, if not of persecution, at least of unpopularity. Minority clubs and societies are generally forbidden (though their religious organisations are as yet untouched), and, although they do not actually suffer from any disabilities, members of these groups rarely seem to reach high office. Armenians have suffered the most, no doubt because they have held the majority of administrative and clerical positions (as opposed to manual labour) ; they are now banned from Government employment, and have difficulty in finding work elsewhere. They are, rather unreasonably, suspected of Communist leanings and of seditious tendencies generally. At the same time the purpose is not to drive them out, but to make them loyal and conformable units of the community. The same feeling governs the popular attitude towards foreigners. Iran has not suffered much from over-zealous missionaries, who have confined their activities to medical and educational services ; but her political and commercial experience has perhaps been less happy. Army officers and Government officials are discouraged from associating with Europeans (particularly members of the Diplomatic Corps), and the cue has been taken up by many others. At any rate, there is a widespread suspicion (born no doubt of an inferiority complex) that foreigners are laughing at them, and people and press alike are quick to notice and resent anything in the nature of a slight or criticism.

Every possible medium is used to strengthen this nationalist outlook. The introduction of a new flag and a national anthem, the abolition of the flowery titles so beloved of nineteenth-century Iran, and the insistence on the use abroad

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of the correct name "Iran" rather than the more usual "Persia", were all part of this propaganda. But an even more specific attempt to control the "collective mind" of the public was the institution in January 1939 of the Bureau for the Education and Guidance of Public Opinion. This committee, consisting of representatives of the University, adult education, the Scout organisation and the press censorship, was charged with the encouragement of the nationalist spirit through the media of the press, pamphlets, books, public lectures held regularly throughout the country, plays and the cinema, broadcasting, music and national songs—in fact, all the recognised varieties of popular culture. Two typical programmes of lectures in Tehran will give some idea of the propaganda policy :

Monday	—	The duty of Youth in the present age.
Tuesday	—	How to be one's own doctor.
		The war against superstition.
Wednesday	—	Loyalty to the Shah and Patriotism.

Tuesday	—	The duty of the individual in the country's prosperity.
		First aid before the arrival of the doctor.
Wednesday	—	Agriculture.

Admission to all these lectures was free ; over 7,000 were given in 1940/41, attended by 1,500,000 people. It will be realised that while the inculcation of a strong national spirit was the first purpose of all this activity, it was not intended that this should be achieved by keeping the people in ignorance. In fact, this was specifically stated by H.I.M. the Shah in a speech on June 29, 1940, to a gathering of editors and journalists, when he made it clear that it was not possible for Iran to stand aside from the current of events, and that her people must not only be instructed in the facts

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about national and world affairs, but must also be assisted to understand and interpret them.

The press has been striving manfully to comply with this order. But though there has been plenty of original comment on internal matters, and occasional guarded contributions on international affairs, the majority still prefer to play for safety by presenting a bewildering array of foreign agency telegrams, chosen with embarrassing impartiality, and a selection of articles culled (with acknowledgement) from European magazines. All news has in any case to pass through the filter of the official Pars News Agency, so that there is no difficulty over censorship. The way in which the Iranian press has developed is rather unusual; there is an average of over 300 daily and weekly newspapers and magazines throughout the country, and though many of them may be short-lived, their place is quickly taken. Every town of any size has at least one, and there has thus sprung up a provincial press of a prolificacy rare even in Europe. Certainly the circulation of each is small—even the leading papers of Tehran (*Ettela'at* (Information) and *Iran*), which are read throughout the country, do not exceed 15,000 apiece; on the other hand it must be remembered that each copy is passed from hand to hand and read aloud in cafés and market-places. They are not of great bulk; *Iran*, for example, consists of four pages, the first of which is devoted to articles, comment and internal news, the second and most of the third to foreign telegrams, with perhaps a serial story and a few advertisements to fill up, and the back page entirely to advertising. Control of the press consists less in direct censorship than in ensuring that the editor has the right educational qualifications and mental make-up—and sufficient capital; but the press censorship department has the right to inspect and to

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suspend if it thinks fit. A number of the Ministries (Education, War, Agriculture, Industry, etc.) publish their own monthly magazines, and there are several illustrated and cultural periodicals of a more or less popular nature.

Broadcasting is a comparatively new venture in Iran. The Tehran station was opened by the Crown Prince in April 1940, and it is hoped by the erection of a network of transmitters in the provinces to cover the whole country ; some of these have already been completed. The programmes follow very much the line of the newspapers, with of course the addition of periods of music (European as well as Iranian), which are thought to be popular. But instruction is the keynote, and much of the time is devoted to talks on economic, cultural and industrial affairs. Iranian listeners had no opportunity up to the beginning of the war of hearing broadcasts in their own language, and for this reason the number of set-owners is few (5,000-6,000, according to a recent estimate) ; but the Government is now doing all it can to encourage the import and sale of sets suitable for local reception, and also erects loud-speakers in public places to relay the Tehran programme to the general public.

Cinemas have long been popular, and are to some extent ousting the cafés. Tehran possesses a dozen, and they are to be found even in comparatively small towns ; they appear to be fed mainly by American and German films, though before the war British and French productions were also popular. "Popular" is a comparative word, for the cinemas never seem to be packed ; possibly the language difficulty is a handicap (in spite of the use of Persian captions), but Iran has not yet managed to produce any films of her own. By regulations of July 1939, children

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under 7 were barred entirely, while children between 7 and 16 might be admitted to special daytime performances of educational and other films approved by the local police and educational authorities. But the cinema is never likely completely to take the place of the café, or rather tea-house, which is the "public bar" of Iran. In the villages and outlying districts in particular the tea-house is the centre for the distribution of news, for it is here that the taxi and lorry drivers repair during their frequent stops on the road. Sweetened tea (without milk) in little glasses is the usual beverage, though *arak* (a powerful liquor distilled from a variety of substances) is also available. In Tehran the cafés and restaurants are more on Western lines, and sometimes even run to cabarets performed by Central European artistes; these are exceedingly popular among the official and military classes, to say nothing of the very cosmopolitan foreign community. Public dancing by Iranians is still frowned upon, though licences are freely granted to clubs and societies. There are several clubs in Tehran for Iranians—the Iran Club, presided over by the Prime Minister, the Military Club, the Young Iran Club and the Armenian Club—as well as a number for the various foreign communities, Scandinavian, Russian, and so on; regulations of a few years ago, however, laid it down that a club must either be restricted rigidly to one nationality, or thrown open to all (the motive behind this was possibly to protect Government officials and army officers from too much foreign influence). Most of the better-class Tehranis live in the suburb of Shemiran, which is also a favourite rendezvous on holidays and during the hot summer months. For those who can afford to go away, there are the new holiday resorts at Ramsar, Chalus, Babol and Mashhadsar along the Caspian coast—the last-named possesses a casino

as well as the usual super-hotel ; Hamadan is another popular hot-weather retreat.

In the literary world there has been something of a revival¹ though it has taken the form rather of histories and editions of the classics and of poetry ; a few novels have been written, but for the most part activity is limited to the translation of European works, generally French. An anthology of modern Iranian poetry published in Calcutta gives examples of the work of eighty-three poets of note, though several of these have incurred the displeasure of the Government and are exiles. The poems are usually didactic and often naïve, but there are many of real merit ; while some are based on the classical models, there are other poets who have tried out new techniques, and all of them are concerned with modern subjects and the burning questions of the day. One charming little poem on "Autumn" by Hadi is significant of the trend of modern Iranian literature, for it is composed entirely of words of Persian origin (one might compare this with an English poem which contained no words of Latin or Greek origin). The purification of the language from foreign and especially Arabic words (which form something like 70 per cent) is the function of the Iranian Academy, formed in March 1935 to prepare a dictionary of modern words. The first slim volume of these appeared in 1938, and additions are made annually. The work is being done with discretion ; no attempt is being made at a sudden eradication of all Arabic and foreign words, and some have even been accepted permanently. Generally the policy is to eliminate redundant words and phrases, and to provide new terms for legal, technical, commercial and scientific use ; as a rule they soon find currency (their use in the press is compulsory), though in popular

¹ Some 4,000 books have appeared during the past ten years.

speech the old forms are likely to remain for some time. Imagination is often shown ; for instance, the word for a torpedo is *ezhdar*—a mythical fire-breathing dragon in the *Shahname* of Ferdosi. The policy over the alphabet has diverged rather from that of Turkey ; for a time the introduction of Roman letters in place of Arabic was discussed as a possibility, but later it was dropped and the process was reversed. In 1938 their use was discouraged even for European words, and shopkeepers, signwriters and so on were forbidden to display them in public ; now even posters advertising foreign films must have the Roman lettering removed and the Perso-Arabic alphabet substituted. It is possible that the original idea may be revived in the future, for the Arabic alphabet, while very suitable for Arabic itself, is not easily adaptable to Persian (any more than to Turkish).

There has been little development in art, except in the matter of architecture (and sculpture in so far as it serves as ornament for buildings). In conformity with the nationalist spirit, the new design in building is modelled, not on the Islamic tradition, but on the pillars and carvings of the Achæmenid palaces at Persepolis and the Sasanid Arch of Ctesiphon in Iraq ; the Police Headquarters and the National Bank in Tehran are good examples. This heritage is considered to be of the greatest value in strengthening the national tradition, and every effort is being made to preserve for the nation the relics of the past. The Antiquities Act of 1930 brought all excavation under the control of the Government (thus cancelling the monopoly that had for years been in French hands) ; there are now several expeditions in the country, including those at Persepolis and Rayy from Chicago University. No remains may be taken out of the country, but must be handed over to the Archæo-

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logical Museum in Tehran, set up by the same Act. Provision was also made for the repair and maintenance of ancient monuments, and up to the end of 1932 247 buildings were scheduled as historical, of which 82 were pre-Islamic ; it is significant that non-Moslem places of worship (as well as mosques) are included among the buildings to be preserved. The National Museum contains a library which possesses a number of valuable manuscripts. Music is the other branch of art that has received encouragement. Mention has already been made of the College of Music, and in 1939 a special department was set up, with a number of European professors, which publishes a monthly review, collects old songs and folk tunes and encourages modern composers ; so far there has hardly been time for any noteworthy developments, though there are a number of talented songwriters. There is a significant change of outlook here ; orthodox Islam banned the use of music, and although this no longer holds in any but the more primitive Moslem countries, and the gramophone is ubiquitous, yet it is only rarely that official interest and patronage has been given. The attitude of the Iranian Government is that music can be an instrument both of propaganda and of popular education.

CHAPTER VIII

FOREIGN RELATIONS

AFTER her experiences with the major Western powers, it was perhaps not surprising that Iran should have adopted a somewhat uncompromising attitude towards them as soon as she found herself able to follow an independent course. At the same time she was not in a position and had no desire to pursue a policy of aggression, and her international activities took rather the form of co-operating with the smaller nations, especially her neighbours, and of encouraging any form of international activity that promised to make for greater stability and security. Thus she became a member of the League of Nations at the end of 1919, and was also appointed a non-permanent member of the Council in 1937, her representative presiding over the hundredth session in January 1938 ; she signed the " Optional Clause " (accepting the authority of the Permanent Court of International Justice) in 1932, the Eight-Power Pact in 1933, and the London Naval Agreement in 1938. She concluded Pacts of Friendship with Switzerland (1934), Mexico and Argentina (1938) and Japan (1939) and maintains diplomatic representatives in several other small and remote nations, including Rumania and Spain. The Scandinavian countries, Belgium and Holland, whose motives might be supposed to be above suspicion, have all been allowed to provide her with railway and industrial technicians, and a firm in the last-named country (the *Algemeine Exploratie Maatschappij*) was negotiating in 1939 for a three years' mineral concession in Azerbaijan. The cultural relationship

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with France (in spite of an unfortunate interlude at the beginning of 1939) was maintained until her collapse. Italian technicians were engaged in railway and road construction, and the navy came from Italian shipyards ; the Italian Penal Code provided a model for the Iranian, and Italy even tried to mediate in the Iraq-Iran frontier dispute in 1936. More recently Italian propaganda has been trying to gain Iran's sympathy, but her characteristic tactlessness (for instance a suggestion that the Italian planes that bombed Bahrain in March 1941 might have been used against Abadan) has not helped her cause. The United States of America, as the best market for Iranian luxury goods, has also come in for a certain amount of flattering attention, though some resentment was aroused by journalistic *gaffes* and a diplomatic incident. During the period 1921-4 there were various unfruitful negotiations over oil concessions, and again in 1937 a concession in the north-east was granted to the Amiranian Oil Company ; this was, however, abandoned in the following year when transport difficulties and market conditions proved too much for the backers. During 1940 trade between Iran and the U.S.A. was almost doubled (imports rose from \$4,400,000 to \$6,500,000, while exports to America increased from \$4,300,000 to \$8,600,000).

But her relations with the three great Western powers—Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and Germany—and with her immediate neighbours are more likely to throw light on her international position than are these friendly exchanges with distant acquaintances. Great Britain had a bad start ; the failure of her statesmen and representatives in the Near East to gauge the real strength of Iranian nationalist feeling led her to take the wrong side, and branded her in Iranian eyes as the traditional enemy (with Russia) of Iran. This

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sentiment was aggravated by a number of minor incidents. In the dispute with Sheikh Khaz'al of Mohammerah in 1925, Britain stood aside until her former ally had fallen, then rather foolishly demanded his restoration—and even added a request for payment for the services of the South Persia Rifles during the war ! In 1927 Iran renewed her claim to the Island of Bahrain, on the western shore of the Persian Gulf. This island had been in Iranian hands up to 1783, when it was seized by Arabs from the mainland ; in 1906 their sheikh signed a Treaty of Protection with Great Britain, and this so far as Britain is concerned has held good ever since. Iran, however, has never recognized the position, and again in 1929, 1930, 1934, and 1936 made protests to Great Britain, the League of Nations and the U.S.A. (who has an oil concession there). The dispute remains unsettled, for Britain clearly could not surrender a naval base of such importance—particularly as she had already abandoned all those she possessed on the Iranian side of the Gulf, and had handed over the control of the Gulf lights along that coast. In 1928 Britain waived her rights under the Capitulations (somewhat reluctantly), and in 1932 the Indo-European Telegraph Company renounced its concession ; but the better relations that these actions presaged were unfortunately once more postponed by the quarrel with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

The Iranian Government had never been satisfied with the terms of the original D'Arcy Concession, which had been signed by a Shah more concerned with his own comforts than with the interests of his country. It was perhaps unfortunate that the Company should have adopted an uncompromising attitude towards any suggestion of a revision of terms which were undoubtedly too favourable to them ; but the British Government, owning a controlling

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share,¹ cannot altogether be absolved from blame. A provisional agreement was made in December 1920 with the Government then in power, which purported to settle all outstanding accounts ; but this was never accepted or ratified by the succeeding Government. In 1928 fresh proposals were put forward by the Government, and in the following year Sir John Cadman, Chairman of the Company, visited Tehran to discuss them. Negotiations dragged on ; but when the royalties offered for 1931 proved to be only a quarter of those paid for 1930, the Shah and his Government took the bull by the horns and on November 27, 1932, notified the cancellation of the Concession. The occasion was celebrated by a two days' holiday throughout the country.

The main grievance of the Iranian Government was the (to their mind) inadequacy of the royalties ; they held that there had been not only considerable " cooking " of the accounts, but also a definite policy of restriction of production, dictated by the Company's outside interests (for example, in Iraq and South America) and the state of world markets. They were also dissatisfied with the proportion of Iranian staff employed by the Company, which they maintained was less even than that visualised in the original concession. Although the note of cancellation offered to consider a new agreement, the Company refused to accept it, and referred it to the British Government, who sent an intimidating Note, accompanied by a show of naval force in the Gulf—a, characteristically clumsy method of dealing with what might have developed into a very serious situation. When

¹ The British Government holds £11,250,000 Ordinary Shares (out of £20,137,500—worth two votes each), and £1,000 8 per cent Preference Shares (out of a total of £7,232,838 at 8 per cent and £5,473,414 at 9 per cent—five shares carrying one vote). In other words, the Government controls 52·55 per cent of the votes. The Burmah Oil Co. owns another £5,342,985 of the Ordinary Shares.

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the Iranian Government remained firm, Britain thought better of her rather hasty action, and reported the dispute to the Council of the League of Nations. Iran objected to this move on the ground that the dispute was a purely internal one between the Iranian Government and the Company, and that the British Government and the League of Nations were not concerned in it ; she reiterated her willingness to sign a new concession, offered as evidence of goodwill the fact that she had not so far interfered with the Company's operations, and expressed her desire to reach an amicable agreement. At the meeting of the League of Nations Council in January 1933 the Iranian Minister of Justice put up a good showing against the redoubtable Sir John Simon, maintaining that the Company was not fulfilling the spirit of the D'Arcy Concession, that the Government was therefore entitled to cancel it, and that, if the Company considered that they were carrying out their obligation, they could have had recourse to the Iranian courts. To this Sir John replied that the Company had spent vast sums on developing the fields in the most profitable way possible, that the profits they had made were far less than the figures given by the Iranian spokesman, and that the Iranian Government, in cancelling the concession, had acted while negotiations were still in progress and over the heads of the local courts ; however, Britain too was ready for a peaceful settlement. In this atmosphere of mutual goodwill and affection it was decided to settle the matter out of court, and after further discussions a new concession was signed and ratified in May 1933, valid for sixty years.

The new concession was of course much more advantageous to Iran. The financial arrangements were considerably modified. Instead of the former rate of 16 per cent on net profits, an annual sum is now paid equal to

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20 per cent of the dividends on ordinary shares in excess of £671,250. The royalties were fixed at 4s. per ton sold and exported, and in lieu of taxes, a tariff of 9d. a ton for the first 6,000,000 tons and 6d. a ton thereafter is to be paid for the first fifteen years of the concession, after which it will be increased to 1s. and 9d. respectively; it is stipulated that the total of these annual payments shall not be less than £1,050,000. A sum of £1,000,000 was paid in settlement of outstanding claims, and a Government representative is maintained at the A.I.O.C.'s expense to keep a watch on the accounts and check the method of calculation. The Company was required to delimit by the end of 1938 an area of 100,000 square miles, within which its operations were henceforth to be confined. It was to place its transport services and communications at the disposal of the Government if it required them, and it undertook to reduce progressively the number of its non-Iranian employees, and to train a number of Iranian students annually in Great Britain. Since then the royalties paid have been in the neighbourhood of £3,500,000, though in 1939 they fell to £2,770,814; the Iranian Government claimed that this drop was due (as it probably was) to the loss of the German and Italian markets—a development which they challenged on the ground that it was motivated by political rather than economic considerations, and was therefore a breach of the Concession. The Company eventually accepted this point of view, and agreed in August 1940 to make up the payments for 1938 and 1939 to the level of 1937 (£3,545,313), and to guarantee a minimum payment of £4,000,000 for 1940 and 1941.

Britain has not given much other practical assistance to Iranian commerce; the 1939 credit of £5,000,000 had to be withdrawn, and the blockade instituted at the beginning

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of the war hit Iranian traders—though the extension of the “Navicert” system to Iran in May 1941 did something to relieve this. The policy of friendship was symbolised on Britain’s part by the attendance at the Crown Prince’s wedding in March 1939 of the Earl of Athlone and Princess Alice—just as in 1930 it was symbolised by the Persian Art Exhibition at Burlington House; and the inauguration of broadcasts in Persian from the B.B.C. in December 1940 was greeted throughout Iran with great satisfaction.¹ It is a pity that individual Britons both in Great Britain and in Iran have not done as much as they might to strengthen this friendship. The latter especially have contributed greatly to such ill-feeling as still exists, both by their supercilious and snobbish attitude towards the members of an “Oriental” race and by their unwillingness to take a sympathetic interest in the “growing pains” of a young and progressive nation. It is characteristic that such people were the first to complain when they found that German propaganda—far more efficient in expressing the sentiments of friendship and goodwill, yet with far less genuine foundation—was making headway against the traditional British connection.

Russia had rather more success at first. By tradition she was, of course, a partner in crime with Great Britain, but the Revolution gave promise of a change of heart. Russia’s problem after the 1914-18 war was to find a gap in the cordon of hostile powers which had been drawn around her. Iran, like Turkey and Afghanistan—young countries with no particular love for the Western capitalist nations—was obviously suitable as an ally, even if she were not ready for absorption. During the next few years five treaties were signed linking these four countries. The

¹ Of the recent crisis we shall speak in the next chapter.

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corner-stone of these was the Russo-Iranian Treaty of 1921 (renewed in 1926), to which reference has already been made. In this treaty certain territorial restorations were made to Iran (to which the port of Enzeli (now Pahlavi) was added in 1928); all debts owed to or concessions held by the Imperial Russian Government were revoked, and reparations for damage done by Soviet troops were arranged. Russian rights under the Capitulations were abolished, Soviet citizens in Iran becoming subject to Iranian law (though naturally exempt from military service); Russian religious organisations in Iran were disbanded and their property handed over to the Iranian Government. Economic problems were left to be discussed at a later date (the only stipulation being that both countries should enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment); navigation and fisheries rights in the Caspian were, in theory, to be equally divided. But perhaps the most important clauses were those which obliged the U.S.S.R. to protect Iran from invasion through Armenia or Azarbaijan, and in return allowed her to use Iranian territory to repel an invasion from the south (if that country proved unable to defend itself) and to demand the expulsion of foreign officials who abused their position to indulge in hostile activities against the U.S.S.R. Diplomatic relations were resumed, and Russia was granted the privilege (later shared by Turkey, Afghanistan and Egypt) of representation in Tehran by an ambassador.

The projected customs agreement gave some trouble—so much so that in 1926 an embargo was actually placed on Iranian goods. In the next year a provisional agreement was reached (a trade treaty had already been signed in 1924), and in October 1927 a definitive treaty was arrived at regulating the volume of Iranian trade with Russia,

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and dealing tentatively with the question of the Caspian fisheries. A further trade agreement was ratified in 1931, and again in 1935, when it was placed on a barter basis, amounting to some £5,000,000 annually; Iran was to exchange wool, leather, cotton, fish and caviare for iron, steel and machinery. In the meantime, however, there had been other developments. In 1924 there was an attempt to revive two Concessions of 1878 and 1916 covering mining rights in the northern provinces; the new company, at first purely Iranian, was later joined by French and Russian groups. In 1932 the U.S.S.R. was granted a sugar monopoly, and though in the following year there was a temporary boycott of Russian goods, agreement was reached in August 1933—particularly over the vexed question of the fisheries (a joint Russo-Iranian Company was formed); at the same time Russia won some sympathy by her tacit support of Iran during the A.I.O.C. crisis. From this date Russian penetration began to increase. The U.S.S.R. soon regained her lead in trade; by 1936 she was taking 28 per cent of Iran's exports (as against 12·8 per cent for Germany) and providing her with 30 per cent of her imports (whereas Germany only provided 14·8 per cent). Russian engineers and technicians began to pour into the country; contracts were obtained for flour mills and bakeries, granaries and workshops, Russian surveyors were employed on new road projects, and Russian pilots, aero and tank experts began to appear in unusually large numbers. Not that all this activity inspired Iran with any particular confidence in Russia's motives; she probably realised that a country's foreign policy is determined largely by its geographical and strategical position, and is not likely to be much affected by any change in its internal political system. Russia has always needed and aimed at a warm-

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water outlet and, as the only possible one could be in the Persian Gulf, this presupposes domination of or at least a considerable degree of control over Iran. It is some motive of this kind that Iranians suspect in every new Russian move.

Nevertheless, Soviet economic penetration continued steadily. During 1939 there were further disputes, and trade between the two countries ceased almost entirely; but on March 25, 1940, a new commercial treaty was signed covering agriculture, industry and sea and railway traffic, and arranging for Iranian delegates to discuss details in Moscow. Two delegations duly left in July; the first, headed by a high official of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, produced an agreement in October permitting trains and trucks of both countries to pass over the frontier without unloading (though the difference of gauge will make this rather academic). Moreover, Iranian goods could now be transported duty-free across Russian territory—a concession of great value to Iran, whose trade with Germany as well as Russia was thereby greatly facilitated. The other delegates visited the Agricultural Exhibition, and apparently discussed mutual agricultural problems, for in December a return delegation arrived in Tehran to confer on plant diseases. Russian blandishments have taken many other forms; the U.S.S.R. has just begun broadcasting in Persian, and her films have recently penetrated the Iranian market with some success. Russian Orientalists attended the Ferdosi celebrations of 1935, and the 800th anniversary of the poet Nezami's death was celebrated in Moscow; in return Iran sent congratulations on the 23rd anniversary of the October revolution. There are of course a number of inhabitants in Russian territory of Iranian origin—in the neighbourhood of Bukhara and Samarkand and in the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, north of Afghanistan. In

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1937 and 1938 Iranians living round the Caspian were offered the choice of Soviet nationality or expulsion—a step which aroused considerable indignation in Iran. Moscow's references on various occasions to these cultural bonds have been thought to carry with them a veiled suggestion of future absorption in a greater Soviet Union—an idea which would probably not be welcomed by Iran !

Unlike Britain and Russia, Germany's relations with Iran have perforce been non-political—at any rate until very recently. On the other hand, German financial advisers were in Iran as early as 1925. The first commercial treaty (February 18, 1929) gave most-favoured-nation treatment and equal rights to both countries, and German imports and exports steadily increased, until in 1935 (when a currency clearing agreement was reached giving German merchants considerable advantages) they had reached the third place in Iranian foreign trade. Schacht (Governor of the Reichsbank) visited Iran during his tour of the Near East in 1936, and was rather coldly received (owing in part, it is thought, to the fact that Iranians had not at that date been officially exempted from the Nuremberg anti-Semitic laws) ; however, he succeeded in negotiating another agreement, by which total imports and exports were fixed at £3,000,000 a year, and electrical and textile machinery, motor vehicles, cement, haberdashery and house furnishings were to be exchanged for cotton, silver, gold, rice, caviare and skins. Germany at this time was visualising a trade route along the Rhine and Danube, through the Black Sea to Trabzon, and thence by road to connect with the Transiranian railway. Her commercial dealings with the East were becoming increasingly important to her ; in 1938 3·8 per cent of her imports came from the East and 5·4 per cent of her exports went there, but already as much as 20 per

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cent of her cotton supplies came from Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. During 1938-9 Irano-German trade increased by £1,200,000, and began to rival that with the U.S.S.R. The most important item imported into Iran was iron ; Germany used to send 65,000-70,000 tons annually, but the total for the year March 1939 to March 1940 was only 39,000, owing to the embargo placed on iron exports by Germany at the outbreak of war. However, as the result of conversations, the embargo was removed, and during the period March 1940 to September 1940, 51,000 tons were imported—a most important contribution to Iranian economy. The official German figure for 1940 was M.41,300,000, as against M.15,700,000 in 1939 and only M.10,800,000 in 1938 ; it was thought that the 1941 total might be 50 per cent higher, but subsequent events will have modified this calculation. The new route was through the U.S.S.R., and the German invasion of Russia naturally affected this considerably. In exchange for this iron and machinery, Iran sent Germany, in addition to the articles already mentioned, wool, silk, dried fruits and possibly oil. In September 1940 a commission set out for Berlin, as a result of whose deliberations an agreement was signed in December placing trade between the two countries on a barter basis ; and in April 1941 another delegation was sent, this time headed by the Minister of Commerce. In the same month a Nazi mission was sent from Ankara (no doubt to try and secure co-operation in the Iraqi rising) ; it does not seem to have met with a very warm welcome. Apart from these specific contacts, Germany gave general financial aid to Iranian trade and industry—a gesture which met with more appreciation than no doubt it deserved. The German share in the construction of the railway and the Junkers airline concession in 1928

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has already been mentioned. In March 1938 the German Government obtained permission for the Luft-Hansa to land at Tehran on their way from Berlin to Tokyo—a move that brought a vigorous protest from the Soviet Government, who accused Iran also of granting Germany rights on the military aerodrome at Meshed; this, however, was denied. While the Iranian air force has been using British machines, the army has been supplied with German lorries and artillery, and the powder factory near Tehran uses German machinery. The radio station was built with Telefunken machinery; various firms, including Tiefbau Berger, Ferrostaal, Krupp, Duisburg and Skoda, were entrusted with the erection of textile, glass and hardware factories, chemical and agricultural machinery plants, throughout the country (and in particular the iron foundries at Ghaniabad, and shipyards and dry docks at Pahlavi and Aminabad on the Caspian and Lingeh on the Persian Gulf). The Hansa shipping company had headquarters at Khorramshahr, Ahwaz and Bandar Shahpur, and there were several chemical firms in the country including Bayer and Merck. In June 1938 a German firm obtained a concession to work mines near Tehran, though it was stipulated that it should be under the supervision of the Government and should employ Iranian capital; in October a German oil-prospecting mission arrived in the country. Perhaps even more significant was the extent to which German specialists and technicians were filling key posts; whenever German machinery was imported, it was accompanied by German engineers on low salaries to install and work it. For instance, most of the factories in Tabriz were managed by Germans, and they were in charge of various hydro-electric plants, ports, telephone and telegraph stations and railway centres. On the other hand, many of

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the German shopkeepers were probably Jews. In 1939-40 four German lecturers were engaged for the University ; a German directed the Press of the National Assembly, and the Agricultural and Veterinary Colleges were headed by Germans. Teutonic penetration, indeed, reached such a pitch that even Russia, who had been practising the art undisturbed for some years, felt moved in August 1938 to protest. But it is questionable whether German infiltration had even then exceeded Russian, although there is no doubt that large numbers of Germans, in the guise of tourists, commercial travellers, specialists, technicians and diplomatic officials, were passing into Iran through Turkey and the U.S.S.R. during the past few months. An official of the Nazi organisation for Germans living abroad stated in June that the Tehran section numbered 900, including communities in Isfahan, Shiraz, Meshed and Tabriz and German sailors in ships lying at Bandar Shahpur—the actual number was probably more than twice that.

Germany has not hesitated to engage in more direct propaganda in Iran—in fact the process has hardly been interrupted since the last war. A Persian magazine was started in Berlin in 1916, and continued after 1919, though its character was somewhat changed ; the same Press also published literary and scientific works. As early as 1922 Iranian students were being sent to Germany, and they have gone annually in increasing numbers. Full-scale propaganda began with the advent of Hitler. It followed lines which might be expected to meet with some response in Iran, for Iranians are not only fond of authoritarian government, but also like to think of themselves as the original Aryans ; so a Persian magazine sponsored by Germans between 1933 and 1937 was called *Iran-e-Bastan* (*Ancient Iran*) and bore a swastika at the head of its front

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page. In 1937 Baldur von Schirach, leader of the Hitler Youth Movement, visited Tehran during a tour of the Near East, and, it was rumoured, brought an invitation to the Shah to visit Germany—though this was denied. Apart from material in the Persian language, many magazines and pamphlets in German were made available without payment ; propaganda films were provided free of charge, and even before the war were believed to be 40 per cent of the total films shown in Iran. Attempts were made to create a favourable impression by lavish official contributions to charity. Less successful have been Germany's broadcasts in Persian, which were started at the beginning of the war ; they carried some weight at first, but their abusive tone gave offence, and their obvious exaggerations are likely to have made them suspect. The official German News Agency was assiduous in providing the Press and radio with items from Axis sources, but, though at first they had some success in monopolising the foreign pages of Iranian papers, the latter are now following a policy of complete impartiality (which consists in devoting roughly equal space to news from both sides—without comment).

It seems fairly clear that all this was the work of an extensive organisation based on Tehran—though its existence was strenuously denied by Iranian official spokesmen. Before the war, Germany's Near Eastern propaganda campaign was concerned less with Iran than with the Arab world, which it covered from its centre at Baghdad. The chief figures here were Dr. Jordan, of the Department of Antiquities, and Dr. Grobba, a conscientious official who had been German Minister since 1932 ; he had gained some influence and popularity as the result of his long connection with the country and his flair for petty intrigue. When Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Germany,

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at the beginning of the war, Grobba and his staff retired to Tehran, but continued to maintain contact with the Arabs through the Italian and, more recently, Japanese Legations in Baghdad. They returned to Iraq after Rashid Ali's *coup d'état*, and subsequently are believed to have fled to Syria. However, the Tehran centre still remained, headed by the German Minister, Ettel, and a Dr. Meyer ; and, as the scene of the war moved nearer, German efforts to influence Iranian policy were intensified. The Legation had, as usual, a remarkably overgrown staff, and presumably made full use of the many Germans resident throughout the country ; no doubt, too, they were in touch with Rashid Ali and the Mufti of Jerusalem during their stay in Iran.

Iranian policy towards these Western Powers has been a combination of "a plague on all three of your houses" with misgivings as to the possible consequences. But with her neighbours she has been able to play a more positive and even a leading part. Past differences were most easily forgotten in the case of Afghanistan, on her north-eastern frontier ; a treaty was signed as early as 1923 (partly at the instigation of Russia), and two years later the boundary was finally delimited. King Amanullah and his Queen visited Iran in 1929, the latter causing some excitement by appearing unveiled. Both from this ruler and from the dictator of Turkey, Kemal Ataturk, the Shah derived many of his Westernising ideas ; the latter especially he had admired from his early days. Old differences with Turkey were partly settled by a treaty negotiated in 1926, but difficulties still existed over the frontier (never really settled in 1914) and the Kordish tribes, spread in roughly equal parts over Iran, Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Frontier agreements were, however, reached in January 1932, May 1937

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and June 1939, as a result of which Lesser Mt. Ararat and the Aghri Range were definitely-allotted to Turkey, while Iran received Qotur, the Bacirge Pass and Lake Reza'iyè. In November 1932 a Treaty of Friendship was signed and in 1934 the Shah paid a successful visit to Atatürk. In 1937 negotiations were completed over judicial and extradition questions, trade, customs and veterinary problems, and the operation of telegraphic and aviation services and the Trabzon-Tehran road.

Relations with Iraq were more complicated. While on the one hand the presence of Shi'a holy places in Iraq (at Najaf, Kerbela, Samarra and Kazimain) constituted a religious link, at the same time reactionary *mojtaheds* and *mullas* tended to use them as a safe base for propaganda against the reforms of the new regime ; here too the Kordish question was a constant source of trouble. When Iraq was detached from the Ottoman Empire after the last war the Iranian Government refused to recognise the new position, and claimed capitulatory privileges for her nationals in common with those that Britons and other Europeans enjoyed. This bone of contention disappeared with the abolition of the Capitulations in Iran in 1928 and in Iraq the following year, after which Iran acceded to Britain's request for recognition of Iraq's status. King Feisal of Iraq paid a friendly visit to the Shah in 1932 (when Iraq had become an independent kingdom), and relations began to improve ; certain difficulties were smoothed out in 1935, when restrictions were imposed on the interchange of labour between the two countries. But the frontier still remained the greatest problem, the particular object of dispute being the Shatt-el-Arab (the common channel through which the Tigris and the Euphrates drain into the Persian Gulf). The Treaty of Erzerum in 1847

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had allocated the whole channel to the Ottoman Empire, and it was assumed that Iraq, as their successor, was entitled to the same rights ; but Iran was now reluctant to accept this position, since it meant that her navy was bottled up at Khorramshahr and dependent on Iraqi goodwill for an outlet to the sea. In an unsuccessful hearing before the League Council in January 1935, Iran requested, not unreasonably, that the border should run down the centre of the waterway ; Iraq however remained firm in her claim to the eastern low water limit (confirmed by the Frontier Commission of 1913-14). Later the development of the new port of Bandar Shalipur in purely Iranian waters made Iran more amenable to compromise, and on July 4, 1937, an agreement was reached satisfactory to both parties. This recognised the 1913-14 frontier, except opposite the port of Abadan, where the new line runs down the middle of the river, giving the anchorage to Iran. The Shatt-el-Arab is to remain open to all commercial vessels (only charges for upkeep being made) and to warships of both parties ; furthermore either party may give leave of entry to the warships of a third power, provided prior notice is given to the other signatory.

This agreement was the preliminary to two treaties of some importance in Near Eastern politics. That of July 12, 1937, with Iraq provided legal mechanism for the settlement of disputes within the framework of the League of Nations Covenant. The other (the Saadabad Treaty of July 8, 1937, signed in the Shah's Palace of Saadabad, ten miles north of Tehran) brought together the four neighbours—Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan—in a mutual pact of friendship and non-aggression (see the text in Appendix IV). This has been variously hailed or condemned as a triumph for British or Russian diplomacy ; but it is just as likely that

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it was an expression of the determination of these Middle Eastern countries to work out their own destiny rather than to depend on the ambitions of Western powers. The four parties conferred in Ankara at the time of the crisis in Iraq, but no statement was issued, and there has been nothing to indicate their probable attitude in the event of aggression against any one of them ; it is only known that Iran refused to assist Rashid Ali. Turkey and Afghanistan criticised unfavourably the recent Anglo-Russian action, but no further steps were taken. But whatever its motives, the treaty at least added considerably to the prestige of H.I.M. the Shah and Kemal Ataturk. It was followed by several other minor negotiations—postal, wireless and telegraphic agreements with Afghanistan in July 1938 and January 1939, and a Commercial Transit Pact with Turkey in August 1938. In May 1941 Turkey and Iran decided to implement an understanding of the previous December by fortifying their common frontier—a step, it was explained, designed only as a measure against unruly Kordish tribes (though no doubt possible Russian or German moves were borne in mind). Trade relations between Iran, Turkey and Iraq developed considerably during 1940—the Persian Gulf being the natural outlet for Turkish commerce after the closing of the Mediterranean ; railway representatives met in Ankara in October for discussions, and in May 1941 the Turkish Government appropriated £60,000,000 for railway communications with Iran and Iraq.

Of the other Arab countries, Egypt has come in for the largest share of attention, no doubt because she is the most progressive. The marriage of the Crown Prince to King Faruq's sister, Fawziah, in March 1939, was perhaps a symbol of Iran's desire to see closer co-operation between the various Middle Eastern nations ; possibly she would

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like both Egypt and Saudi Arabia (with whom she signed a Pact of Friendship in 1929) to join the Saadabad alliance. There are various psychological difficulties and not much common ground ; pan-Islam is not a good line in Iran (it has indeed little strength anywhere), and both Arabs and Iranians suffer from long-standing dislike of one another. But no doubt this is largely due to old grievances that are now being gradually eliminated and, given the removal of aggressive designs on the part of European powers, the solution of economic problems and a readiness on both sides to forget the past, one can see no reason why there should not be common interests and a common policy throughout the Near and Middle East.

CHAPTER IX

IRAN'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

AT the time of writing the British and Russian forces are consolidating their occupation of Iran ; for the duration of the war Iran's foreign policy (and inevitably to some extent her internal affairs) will be under alien control. It is the tragedy of this war that no nation can remain aloof from it, and Iran can at least be thankful that in future her fortunes are to be linked with those of Britain and Russia rather than of Germany. Nevertheless, the situation marks the end of an epoch in Iranian history, and it is a good point at which to pause and take stock, not only of the past, but also of the future.

The position of Iran cannot be seen except in the framework of German plans for world domination. The Rosenberg Plan, which began modestly with a continuation of the *Drang nach Osten*—German control of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, soon blossomed into a scheme for the hegemony of the whole of Europe. Thence came a natural extension through the Balkans to the Near East and the Arab world, with the Ukraine thrown in. It must be realised that these plans were not merely inspired by the successes of the present war, but were conceived almost before Hitler came to power in Germany. *The Times* last May published a document prepared in 1934 by a group of German experts under Dr. Eilers, for some years Director of the German School of Archæology in Tehran. This made no secret of the fact that Germany was aiming even then at the conquest of the Eastern world as far as the Persian Gulf,

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and it showed how this might be achieved by cultural propaganda followed by economic infiltration and finally political domination. The two areas described as of special importance were Turkey/Egypt and Iran. It is particularly interesting to note that military campaigns play no basic part in this programme ; it is obvious from the course of the war up to date that the *blitzkrieg* only comes into play when the ground has been so thoroughly prepared as to make success a certainty.

As the penultimate step towards German domination of the world, Nazi strategy seems to visualise a triple division of the globe ; Germany is to take Europe and Africa, and Japan Asia¹—while America is apparently to be allowed to hold on to the Western Hemisphere for the time being. Britain's position in all this is to be a subordinate one ; it seems that she is to be "encircled" by Germany on one side and America on the other, and finally to be attached as an annex to one of them. Needless to say, this partition is not intended to be final ; just as Russia, once a partner in the scheme, has now faded out of the picture, so it is obvious from the less guarded statements of Nazi propagandists that the turn of Japan and the U.S.A. would come in due course.

Here, however, we are only concerned with the Near Eastern aspect—that is to say, the plans that involve Germany and Russia. Before the outbreak of the Russo-German war there was considerable evidence to show that the two powers had planned a demarcation of "spheres of influence" in the Eastern world. Germany, after obtaining control of the Dardanelles and Turkey, was to seize the Iraqi and Iranian oilfields by a "pincers movement" operating from

¹ A recent article in a Japanese newspaper suggested that Japan ought to have full liberty of action in India, Oceania, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Siberia and the Ural district.

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the Caucasus and Egypt, while Russia might at the same time occupy Eastern Iran and Afghanistan and thence launch an attack on India (the resemblance to the Potsdam agreement of 1911 may be noted).

Certainly, the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Russia has modified this situation ; nevertheless, it is likely that the Germans have not abandoned their original plan, and hope that at the most Russia is being recalcitrant, and that if the German forces thrust farther into her territory, she may be forced to fall back into line. It is clear that if Germany were able to take over the Ukraine, she could then push on to the Caucasian oilfields without touching the rest of the U.S.S.R. These would be no mean acquisition, for the two fields at Baku and Grozny (both linked to the Black Sea by pipe-line and railway) produce between them more than 75 per cent of Russia's oil ; but, quite apart from a natural desire to " clean up " the fields farther south at the same time, the vital strategic necessity of interposing a protective belt of territory would compel the Germans to attempt the further occupation of Iran and Iraq. They would, moreover, thus obtain an outlet on the Persian Gulf, and possibly even split the Allied forces in the Middle East from those in India—and, of course, Russia (the same plan was aimed at by Germany when she occupied the Ukraine in 1918). A twofold drive from the Caucasian frontier (through Iran and Turkey to Mosul, and farther east towards Qazvin and Tehran) would certainly present fewer physical difficulties than an attack from the west over the central ranges ; and it would depend on circumstances whether the Germans would find it necessary to launch at the same time a campaign through Turkey, Syria and Egypt (for they might think that the turning movement from the north would be sufficient to break down our Middle Eastern



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centre of resistance). At the same time a defeated Russia would presumably be given the thankless task (under German direction) of invading India over the eastern Iranian deserts and the mountains of Afghanistan—possibly the recent short-lived appearance in Tehran of Amanullah, ex-King of that country, from his retirement in Rome may have had some connection with this part of the scheme.

These are grandiose plans, though none the less feasible for that. It is true that the offensive against Great Britain is the keystone of German plans (to which these others are only subsidiary), and it is possible that, whether the present campaign results in a defeat for Russia or a stalemate, the attack on this island may come next. It could take the form either of a military and air invasion or—equally probable—of a new peace drive; in both cases the attitude of America will play the deciding part in the outcome. Nevertheless, we cannot afford to ignore the Near East, for it forms a vital link in the strategic lay-out of the British Empire.

It is hardly necessary to emphasise the importance of the oil supplies. There seem to be great petroleum potentialities throughout the Middle East, though the total production before the war (including Iran, the Caucasus and the Arab countries) was less than 40,000,000 tons out of a world total of 280,000,000; its importance, however, is enhanced when it is realised that of the remainder nearly 220,000,000 tons comes from the American continent. Before the war Britain derived 20 per cent of her oil imports from Iran, 3 per cent from Russia and 4 per cent from Iraq. The Iraq fields (with the exception of a small area round Khaniqin, which fell originally within the Iranian frontier and so is part of the A.I.O.C. concession) are exploited by the Iraq Petroleum Co., owned jointly by the A.I.O.C.

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(23·75 per cent), Standard Oil (American—23·75 per cent), Royal Dutch Shell (Anglo-Dutch—23·75 per cent), the Cie. Française des Pétroles (French—23·75 per cent) and the financier M. Gulbenkian (5 per cent) ; annual production is at present 4,000,000 tons, and the Company has rights over all future discoveries of oil. The Standard Oil field on the island of Bahrain was before the war producing 1,000,000 tons a year, and new wells have recently been started on the mainland of Saudi Arabia ; Kowait also contributes a handsome quota. In Egypt there are important fields at Hurgkada and Ras Gharib, and the Turks have recently opened up new deposits in S.E. Anatolia which it is hoped will supply all their domestic needs. Prospecting is going on all round the coasts of Arabia, as well as in Palestine, Transjordan and Syria.

But perhaps even more essential is the safe-guarding of the sea, land and air routes to India, the Far East and Australia. The only through sea route is provided by the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, but from the Black Sea there is a connection from the Turkish ports of Eregli, Samsun and (shortly) Trabzon with the Baghdad Railway and its branches, and from Batum with the Russian line to Tabriz ; while the Persian Gulf acts as a continuation of the Baghdad-Basra Railway. The most important arteries, however, are still the railways. The two halves of the Baghdad Railway were finally linked up in the summer of 1940—after nearly forty years ; running from Istanbul via Ankara and Adana, it crosses into Syria to connect with Aleppo, then back into Turkey, again into Syria from Nisibin to Tel Kotchek, and so finally into Iraq and on to Baghdad—a journey of 1,636 miles lasting three days. There it links with a metre-gauge track to Basra on the Persian Gulf. A new branch from Ankara via Sivas and Diyarbekir will eventually reach

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Nisibin, and so obviate the use of Syrian territory. From Aleppo the standard-gauge line continues as far as Rayak, where it connects with a metre-gauge line from Beirut to Damascus, and on to Haifa ; the disused Hejaz railway is a branch of this line. From Haifa there is a standard-gauge line to Suez. In Turkey there are branches from Ankara to Eregli, from Sivas to Samsun, and via Erzerum to Kars and thence through the U.S.S.R. to Tabriz, where it will eventually join the Iranian system. Erzerum will also soon be linked with the sea at Trabzon, while another branch is to go from Elaziz, north of Diyarbekir, past Lake Van to the Iranian frontier. The general effect is that there are through routes from the Dardanelles and the Black Sea to Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Russia ; moreover, should the Qum-Yezd branch of the Transiranian Railway ever be extended as far as Zahedan, there will be a continuation into India and the Far East. At the same time, the difficulties introduced by differences of gauge, shortage of rolling stock and so on should not be forgotten. Air routes are less permanent in their nature, but before the war Egypt and Iraq were essential links in British, French, Dutch, Italian and German routes to India and Australia, French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and Japan ; British and Italian planes also used the route from Egypt down the Red Sea.

The map makes it clear that the strategic points are Cairo and Baghdad, the first commanding the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, the second the Baghdad railway and the Persian Gulf ; and the defence of these points (under the terms of our treaties with Egypt and Iraq) has to be a guiding principle in British policy. The formation of a solid block of friendly countries stretching across southern Asia became essential as a barrier to Hitler's progress towards the Indian Ocean ;

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we already had the makings of this in the Egypt/Syria/Iraq nucleus and farther east in India—linked with Iraq under the one command of General Wavell.

The one weak link was Iran ; for if the Germans once succeeded in crossing the Caucasus, the remainder would be easy. Germany too saw this, and the infiltration of her nationals into Iran was an indication of the way she was looking. The British Government had been viewing the situation with alarm since the summer of 1940, and, after a number of friendly warnings, had even gone so far as to suggest to the Iranian authorities that they should take steps to expel these unwelcome visitors. The proposal met with a poor reception. In the first place Iran was quite unable to provide replacements for them—particularly as many of them occupied key posts of importance. But apart from that she felt (not without some justification) that such an act could only be regarded by Germany as a breach of her policy of neutrality. She had originally, on September 4, 1939, declared her neutrality in the European War, and on June 26, 1941, she made a similar declaration in respect of the Russo-German conflict. Since the outbreak of hostilities two years ago she had repeatedly re-affirmed her desire for peace with the world, and had been quick to resent any suggestion that she had diverged from the path of neutrality, or that there was any tension or ill-feeling with her neighbours, Russia and Turkey. At the same time she expressed her determination to resist any aggression or any attempt to use her territory as a base for military operations. The official position was summed up by M. Mogaddam, the Iranian Minister in London, in a letter to *The Times* on July 15, 1941, as follows :

(1) The Government of Iran have declared the country's strict neutrality. Since the outbreak of war the Government

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of Iran have demonstrated by deeds their neutrality and are now determined more than ever to preserve it in whatever set of circumstances or combination of circumstances may arise. (2) No pressure or inducement of any kind has been brought to bear upon or offered to Iran by any foreign Government. The exercise of any such pressure or inducement will not be permitted by the Iranian Government, who are strong enough not to tolerate it, and such reports are mere illusions which reflect a lack of knowledge and insight of the true position of Iran. (3) The question of the residence of all foreign nationals in Iran is governed by the laws and regulations in force in the country, and no foreigners, irrespective of their nationality, are permitted, or are in a position to infringe, such laws or to act in any way detrimental to the safety or the strict neutrality of Iran.

There is no reason to suppose that these sentiments were not entirely sincere ; Iran would certainly prefer to be left alone to establish and to develop the social progress she has already made. It was with a feeling almost of frustration that she saw the tentacles of the European conflict stretching farther and farther in her direction. Nevertheless the Shah was sufficiently realistic to see the weakness of his country's position at a time when the ambitions of great powers are world-wide and do not stop at national frontiers. No doubt he hoped that they might all be engaged elsewhere until they had exhausted themselves ; but he was fully aware that he could not resist unaided a direct attack by a powerfully armed enemy. Faced with the attentions of the various belligerents, he was bound at least to avoid giving offence to the one that appeared to him to have the best chance of winning ; the long-term effect of such a victory on the position of Iran had to be a secondary consideration, for he naturally felt that nothing could be more disastrous than to be on the losing side.

Most Iranians, looking at the records of each of the belligerents up to date, had come to the conclusion that Ger-

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many was going to win ; but they certainly had no idea of what Nazi domination would mean, or even that the Germans were aiming at world domination. They have therefore been easily impressed by the new Nazi claim that they are fighting a " holy war " against Communism, and even more by the suggestion that Germany would save Iran from her old enemies, Britain and Russia, by occupying them elsewhere. Both these points were obviously difficult for the latter to counter-attack. In particular, the new collaboration between the two countries lent colour to the suggestion (assiduously put about by Nazi propagandists) that they were once again plotting against the independence of Iran, and were trying to open up a new war front there—the fact that such motives should really be attributed to Germany herself had not yet been impressed upon Iranian consciousness. The result was that German influence grew rapidly, and the Government was apparently prepared to tolerate the presence of German officials and technicians in large numbers and in key positions. Yet it is probable that Iranian leanings towards Germany were inspired as much by fear as by sympathy with Nazi political and racial theories.

As against this Iran's attitude towards Britain has for some time (as we have seen) been one of suspicion. It is possible that, had we made her a definite offer of a full military alliance, we might have persuaded her to join the Allied bloc of her own free will ; we might have stressed even more our strength in the Middle East, and the fact that no small nation can hope to remain neutral in face of war as waged by Hitler. But the urgency of the situation did not become apparent until Germany and Russia came into conflict with one another. Not that this made our task any easier ; for Iranian suspicions of Russia

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exceed even her suspicions of Great Britain, and Russian activities of the past year or two had done nothing to alleviate them. Russian troops had been concentrated on the Caucasian, Khorasan and Afghanistan frontiers since the end of 1939, the Caspian fleet was in the habit of practising troop landings, and there were persistent rumours of Russian requests for air bases and railway concessions in Northern Iran. In the summer of 1940 the Germans published a White Book alleging an Allied plot to bomb the Baku oilfields, and M. Molotov, speaking on August 1, was at pains to connect Turkey and Iran with this—referring to the appearance of two foreign planes from the south over Batum and Baku the previous March. The statement called forth a pained denial from the Iranian Government, but tension with her northern neighbour was the subject of continual rumour since that date ; and up to June 22 it had seemed that Russia was going to get the powerful backing of Germany.

The invasion of Russia by Germany and the subsequent Anglo-Russian alliance only increased the Soviet's interest in Iran. Her strategic problem was of course the same as Germany's would be, if she reached the Caucasus—that is to say, the protection of the Baku oilfields, and the opening up of a channel to the Persian Gulf. In Russia's case the particular value of the latter was that it was the only route for aid from Britain and her Empire. Moreover, she was entitled in virtue of the 1921 treaty to use Iranian territory under certain circumstances for military operations. It was not surprising therefore that (although the idea was first publicised in Axis broadcasts) Russia should very soon have urged Great Britain to join with her in a military occupation of Iran before it became too late. The first Russian note was sent to the Iranian Government as early as June 26, and

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it was followed by a joint note on July 19 ; both these were framed as friendly warnings against the danger of harbouring German agents and of allowing them to occupy key positions. There was at the time some evidence to show that the Nazis were in touch with various dissident elements in the country, and were even planning a *coup d'état*—though the strength of the Pahlavi regime would have made its chances of success somewhat uncertain. The Iranian response (for reasons we have already seen) was rather half-hearted, and on August 16 a further, more strongly-worded warning was despatched. Iran's next reply was subtle (though scarcely likely to satisfy) ; she offered progressively to expel all foreigners in the country (a project she had long cherished in the case of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company). She probably realised that this was not what the two allies wanted, but she was not yet convinced of their strength, and was encouraged by the Germans to take up a belligerent attitude (no doubt in the expectation of German aid). When the British and Russian troops marched in on August 25, this aid was naturally not forthcoming, and, after a three-days' token resistance, the Government resigned and its successors ordered the cessation of all opposition. ✓ Russian troops thereupon occupied Azarbaijan, the Caspian provinces and Northern Khorasan, while Britain took charge of the oil areas in the south and southwest ; both before and after, however, it was emphasised that the occupation was purely military, and that the forces would be withdrawn immediately on the conclusion of the war.

On the face of it, it would seem that this new Allied move has closed up the gap in the Southern Asia line of defence ; nevertheless its effectiveness will depend on two factors of some importance. The first is the strength of the Russian

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defence ; for if the Germans were to pierce through to the Caucasus, and thereby to deprive the U.S.S.R. of her vital oil resources and so of her power to resist, what had appeared to be a bulwark might well turn out to be a trap. But even if things should not come to this pass, we should still have to reckon with the attitude of Turkey. Since the failure of the Greek campaign, Turkey has been leaning more and more towards Germany—out of fear of her strength rather than through any love of her principles ; and she cannot get used to the idea that the Russian move into Iran is not another step in Axis plans for her encirclement. German propaganda has of course exploited to the full all over the Near East the distress that all Muslim nations must have felt at the apparently unprovoked attack on one of their neighbours, and we might find ourselves in a very difficult position if Turkey were to succumb so far to Axis demands as to allow their troops to pass through in a combined attack on our Middle Eastern centre of resistance. Our best hope seems to lie in an aggressive propaganda-diplomacy that will make abundantly clear our intentions and our ideals.

This is also of the greatest importance in the case of Iran. Our military occupation may seem to be effective in itself, but our task will be much easier if we can persuade the people to accept the situation willingly and confidently ; however friendly they may appear at the moment, they are probably moved as much as anything by curiosity as to our motives—but later they will begin to blame us (as they blamed their Government) for the hardships they will have to suffer. The psychological effect on the Shah's position is also of importance, for he is bound to lose some of his popularity now that his policy of a strongly defended neutrality has apparently failed. Clearly the Allies will

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insist upon a more liberal policy of government ; this should be possible now that Reza Shah's work of construction has become firmly established, and the presence of British advice and assistance will be invaluable.

Since her diplomatic defeat after the last war, Britain has taken little more than a friendly interest in Iran's progress (apart from one or two blunders) ; and, when we have removed the bad taste that military action must inevitably leave, we will be able to meet her once again with a clear conscience—provided we make a radical change in our method. Apart from convincing them that we have the strength to win (and are therefore worth supporting), we must also show that Iran's interests and ours run parallel ; that Germany's aims definitely include the whole of the Middle East, and that, while we hope to keep her out of the war, an Allied victory would also be Iran's victory. Part of the job is to show what the Nazi " New Order " really means—how it would spell loss of independence, enslavement to German interests and the end of all efforts at modernisation and progress (just as it has in the subjugated countries of Europe). But we can do more than that, for we should now be able to enunciate a genuine policy of friendship towards the rest of the world. We have abandoned once and for all the old imperialist idea of the domination of those countries whose raw materials or strategic positions we need ; though we intend to keep open the world's trade routes, they will exist not only for ourselves but for all nations. Our foreign trade will be developed on the principle of the fair exchange of goods and services, and we shall pursue the policy of the " good neighbour " in our dealings with other countries ; the kind of " order " that we visualise will not only ensure the security and independence of small nations, but will also assist them to achieve their own national aims.

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The advantage of a policy of this kind is that it does not involve us in discussions or disputes over forms of government, but commits us to practical principles which would find acceptance anywhere.

What then are the national aims of Iran, and how could we assist her to achieve them? Primarily, they are the same as those of any other proud nation—the maintenance of her independence and unity. Iran is entitled to believe that she has already secured these in the political sphere. But she has also decided that she can best justify her place in the world by modernising herself and developing her resources to the full—by making the land “blossom as the rose”, and it is here that our technical and cultural achievements can be of value. We already obtain from Iran one of the most essential of our raw materials, and if we are to continue to do so, it is only fair that we should offer her in exchange something of more permanent value than a financial rignmarole. The world of the future is bound to be based on the interchange of realities rather than of fictitious debt—a development which will be welcomed by none more heartily than by the Iranians, with their memories of nineteenth-century concession-hunting. After the war we shall obviously have a large surplus of engineers and technicians, and we could very well offer to place some of them at the disposal of the Iranian Government to work out and put into effect schemes of irrigation, electrical power, industrial mechanisation and so on. The men we sent out would have to regard themselves, not as pioneers of Empire, but as ambassadors of goodwill. They could not therefore enjoy the privileges and favours that Britons in the East apparently expect now, and it is not right that they should do so; on the contrary they would have to associate on equal terms with their Iranian colleagues, and abandon

altogether the exclusive and snobbish habits of their predecessors. Much would of course depend on the type of man chosen and the training he was given ; apart from his technical qualifications, he would have to have a genuine sympathy with the Iranian people and a thorough grounding in their language, history and culture. We have produced men of this type in the past—the explorer Richard Burton, E. G. Browne, who took the part of the Constitutionalists in the revolutions of 1906-7, T. E. Lawrence, who played a key rôle in the Bedouin revolt against the Ottomans during the last war, and many others ; women too, like Gertude Bell and Freya Stark, have done much to show the East the better side of our nature. Men with this background would find no difficulty in understanding that they had to plan and work for the benefit of Iran, and not of a foreign power ; the schemes they carried out, the buildings and plant they erected, would become the property of the Iranian Government, and it might well be stipulated as one of their duties that they should train young Iranians against the day when they would take over and operate these works themselves.

Some policy of this kind is likely to govern our future relations, not only with Iran, but also with the other countries of the Near and Middle East. Looking still farther ahead, it is permissible to hope for a drawing together of all these countries into a form of federation or commonwealth. Any such development would have to begin with the unification of the Arab world proper—a project passionately desired by the majority of its inhabitants, in spite of the many difficulties. Some of these arise from political divisions imposed by foreign interests, others from economic backwardness, others again from the presence of minorities and sectarian differences. The first two can be removed or alleviated by the goodwill and aid of the West, while any

new social-economic structure must of course enable and encourage groups like the Kords in Syria and Iraq, the Jews in Palestine and the Christians in the Lebanon to co-operate and live in peace with their Moslem Arab neighbours. Certain areas are even now perhaps ready for federation ; Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan (with 9,000,000 inhabitants) form a geographical and economic unit—the “ fertile crescent ”, while farther south there are Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, and the Aden, Hadhramaut and Gulf States now under British protection* (with a population in all of 9,000,000). These two blocs might eventually work in co-operation with a group composed of Egypt, Sudan and Cyrenaica (20,000,000), another formed by Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco (16,000,000), and, on the other side, Turkey and Iran. These ideals are still perhaps visionary, and there are many problems that it is not appropriate to discuss here, yet already we can see tendencies in that direction ; the Saadabad Pact of 1937 links together four of the countries mentioned, while Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen have a common treaty signed in 1936 and 1937, and Egypt is linked to Saudi Arabia by treaty and to Iran by royal ties. The following extract from an article which appeared in a Tehran paper last year is indicative of the trend of thought among the more progressive thinkers :

We feel that those common interests that have always existed in the past between the nations of the Near East, in religion, beliefs, opinions and way of thought, in moral and spiritual outlook, in education and customs and even in language and literature, constitute a propitious ground on which they may co-operate more closely, and through solidarity and reciprocal guarantees form a solid, unbreakable and unshakable mass.

It is true that the nations of the East are not equal in economic strength, moral power, culture and other respects ; but that certainly does not prevent them from co-operating

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and progressing in the closest reciprocity, so strengthening their common solidarity and mutual collaboration. If each of them acts in conformity with its own position and feels more and more the necessity of unity, and if as far as possible they respect the position of the others and do not deny them cultural, moral and spiritual aid, and if they agree as a fundamental principle to help one another as far as they can when needed and to work together in the future, then certainly the bitter past will not be repeated, and the Near East will live in peace and tranquillity and thus steadily increase its progress and well-being.

The Near East is ready to play its part in a world in which economic security and freedom is the guiding principle ; the lead, however, must come from the great industrialised nations of the West. The next year or two will show whether we are to slide back into barbarism and mass-slavery, or, inspired by the dynamic vision of a debt-free world, to drive forward to the final victory of the individual.

APPENDIX I

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF DECEMBER 30, 1906 (Amended)

I.—THE National Consultative Assembly (*Majles*) is established and constituted in accordance with the order of August 6, 1906.

2.—The National Assembly represents all the inhabitants of the kingdom of Iran associated in the political and economic affairs of their country.

3.—The National Assembly is composed of members elected at Tehran and in the provinces ; it meets in Tehran.

4.—The number of deputies to be elected in accordance with a special law is at present 136 for Tehran and the provinces ; if necessary, this number can be increased to 200.¹

5.—The deputies are elected for two years ; this period begins when all the deputies from the provinces are assembled in Tehran. New elections must be held at the end of the period of two years ; the electors may, if they are satisfied with the retiring deputies, re-elect them.

6.—The Tehran deputies, as soon as they are assembled, may form the National Assembly and begin discussions. The vote of a majority of them shall be valid during the absence of the provincial deputies.

7.—The presence in the Assembly of at least two-thirds of the members is necessary at the beginning of a debate ; when the vote is taken, three-quarters must be present ; the majority is determined by the vote of more than half.

8.—The duration of the vacations and sessions of the National Assembly shall be decided by an internal ruling of its own ; after the summer vacation the National Assembly shall be re-

¹ The electoral law of September 17, 1906, divided the electors into six classes—princes and members of the royal family, professors and students, nobles, officials, merchants and farmers. These classes were abolished by the electoral law of July 1, 1909, which substituted two-degree election.

opened and resume its work on October 6 (the anniversary of its first opening).

9.—During vacations the National Assembly may be recalled under exceptional circumstances.

10.—At its opening the National Assembly shall present an address to His Imperial Majesty the Shah, and shall have the honour of hearing the reply of His Imperial Majesty.

11.—The members of the National Assembly, when they enter the Assembly for the first time, must give the following oath :—" We, the undersigned, invoke God as our witness, and swear on the Qur'an that, as long as the rights of Parliament and its members are respected and carried out in accordance with this law, we shall fulfil to the utmost of our powers the duties which have been conferred upon us, and that we shall remain loyal to our just, obeyed and honoured Majesty, the King of Kings ; that we will not betray the institution of his kingdom and the rights of the people, and that we will consider nothing that is inconsistent with the interests of the Government and the Iranian people."

12.—No one may sue a member of Parliament on any ground without the consent of Parliament ; and if by chance a member shall have openly committed a crime or a felony and shall have been arrested for it, no penalty can be inflicted upon him without the Assembly having been advised.

13.—In order to be put into effect, the discussions of the Assembly must be public ; journalists and visitors have the right to attend debates and to follow them in accordance with the internal regulations of the Assembly, but not the right to take part. All discussions of the National Assembly may be published in the Press, on condition that they are not modified in form or meaning, so that all may know the discussions and the course of events. Whoever thinks he can give a useful opinion may publish it in the Press, so that nothing shall remain hidden or unknown. Thus the Press, so long as their contents are not contrary to any of the fundamental principles of the State or the nation, shall be at liberty to print useful subjects of public interest, parliamentary debates and the opinions of citizens on these discussions ; at the same time, anyone who publishes something in the Press or other publication contrary to the foregoing and from personal motives, or is guilty of libel, shall be liable to prosecution and shall be punished in accordance with the law.

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14.—The National Assembly, by a special regulation entitled "Internal Regulation", shall regulate its own affairs, such as the election of its president and vice-presidents, secretaries and other employees, the procedure for discussions, the formation of committees, etc.

The Duties and Rights of the National Assembly

15.—The National Assembly shall have the right loyally to examine and discuss, ruling by the majority, in complete security and confidence, all questions that it considers related to the interests of the country and the nation ; after they have been approved by the Assembly, decisions must be referred to the Sovereign by the head of the Government and put into effect after receiving his approval.

16.—All laws necessary for the consolidation of the foundations of the State and of the kingdom, for the regulation of the affairs of the country and for the establishment of ministries, must be approved by the National Assembly.

17.—Bills (when necessary) for the creation, modification, amendment or repeal of existing laws shall be drawn up by the National Assembly. They will come into force when they have been approved by the Senate and passed by his Majesty.

18.—The regulation of financial questions, discussion of the budget, changes in taxation, the acceptance or rejection of taxation instituted by the Government, must be voted on by the National Assembly.

19.—The National Assembly, after approval by the Senate, shall have the right to request the Government to put into effect any decisions taken to regulate and amend fiscal matters and to facilitate relations with the Government authorities in the provinces.

20.—The budget of each ministry must be prepared during the second half of the following year and be ready a fortnight before New Year's Day.¹

21.—Whenever a new law is necessary to supplement the basic laws of the ministries or to amend or repeal existing laws, this law shall be made with the approval of the National Assembly, whether the need for it shall have been suggested by the Assembly, or shall have emanated from the ministry responsible.

¹ The Iranian New Year, corresponding to March 21 or 22.

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22.—The approval of the National Assembly is necessary for all transfers or sales of the revenues or properties of the State or the country, and for all modifications of the frontiers of the country.

23.—The State cannot grant any concession for the creation of any kind of corporation or public company without asking authorisation from the Assembly.

24.—The conclusion of treaties and agreements, the concession of commercial, industrial, agricultural or other monopolies, whether the concessionaire is a national or a foreigner, must be authorised by the National Assembly, except for treaties whose secrecy is essential in the interests of the State and the nation.

25.—No public loan at home or abroad may be raised without the approval of the National Assembly.

26.—The construction of railways and roads at the expense of the State, or the establishment of national or foreign companies, requires the authorisation of the Assembly.

27.—Whenever the Assembly observes a violation or non-application of the law, it shall notify it to the Minister responsible, who shall provide the necessary explanation.

28.—Should any Minister, contrary to the laws in force as promulgated by His Majesty, fraudulently issue written or verbal orders on His Majesty's authority, and plead error or negligence, he shall be responsible to His Majesty according to the law.

29.—Should a Minister be unable to justify his actions according to the laws promulgated by His Majesty, and should it be agreed that he has acted contrary to the law, the Assembly shall request His Majesty to dismiss him ; and if his offence shall be proved before the tribunal, he shall no longer be eligible for public office.

30.—The Assembly has the right, whenever it considers it necessary, to present a petition to His Majesty, through the medium of a commission composed of the President and six members chosen by the deputies. His Majesty shall be requested through the Minister of Court to notify the day when he consents to see the commission.

31.—The Ministers have the right to attend the sessions of the Assembly, to occupy places reserved for them, to listen to the debates, and if necessary, after asking permission from the President, to give any explanations relevant to the examination of the questions discussed.

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On the Presentation of Proposals to the Assembly

32.—Anyone may address in writing his requests, complaints or criticisms to the petitions office of the Assembly ; if the matter concerns the Assembly, it shall itself make the necessary reply ; if it concerns one of the Ministers, the Assembly shall forward it to him for his examination and reply.

33.—New laws that appear necessary shall be prepared and examined in the Ministries responsible and shall be presented to the Assembly by the Minister concerned or by the Prime Minister. After having been voted by the Assembly and having received the Royal signature, they shall be put into force.

34.—The President of the Assembly may, if necessary, personally or at the request of ten members of the Assembly or of one of the Ministers, summon a secret meeting from which reporters and members of the public shall be excluded, or may hold a secret conference composed of a certain number of members, to which the other members shall not be admitted. The decisions of the conference shall not be effective unless three-quarters of the members elected to take part in it are present and unless the decision shall have been taken by a majority of the deputies taking part. If the proposal is not accepted by the secret conference, it cannot be presented to the Assembly and must be abandoned.

35.—If the secret meeting takes place at the request of the President of the Assembly, the conference may publish such parts of the debate as it may think fit ; but if it is held at the request of a Minister, publication shall not take place without his authority.

36.—Any Minister may withdraw from the Assembly a proposal put forward by him, at any stage of the discussions, unless the proposal shall have been made at the request of the Assembly ; in that case the withdrawal of the proposal requires the assent of the Assembly.

37.—If the proposal of a Minister is not accepted by the Assembly, it shall be returned to the Minister with the Assembly's observations. The Minister concerned may accept or reject the Assembly's observations and present the proposal again to the Assembly.

38.—The members of the Assembly must plainly declare their rejection or acceptance of the proposals, and no one may influence their vote by promises or threats ; the rejection or acceptance

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must be made in such a way as to be visible to reporters and spectators, that is to say, shown by white and red voting papers, or by some other means.

Presentation of Proposals Emanating from the Assembly

39.—If a proposal is presented by a member of the Assembly, it may only be debated if at least fifteen members approve its discussion. In that case, it shall be presented in writing to the President, who may submit it to a Committee for examination.

40.—If the proposal in question concerns one of the Ministers, the Assembly must notify this Minister so that he may be represented in person or by a deputy and may take part in the debate. A copy of the proposal and any supplements must be forwarded to the Minister concerned ten days to a month before the beginning of the debate (except in the case of urgent matters); in the same way the date of the debate must be fixed in advance. After the proposal has been examined in the presence of the Minister concerned, and if it is adopted by a majority of the Assembly, it shall be forwarded in an official form to the Minister for action.

41.—Whenever the Minister concerned does not agree with the proposal made by the Assembly, he must explain his reasons and convince the Assembly.

42.—When the Assembly demands an explanation of any matter, the Minister concerned is bound to reply. This reply must not be delayed unreasonably, except in the case of matters whose secrecy for a certain period is demanded by the national interest; after this period, however, the Minister must furnish the necessary explanations to the Assembly.

The Formation of the Senate

43.—Another National Assembly called the Senate and composed of sixty members shall be formed; after formation, its sessions shall take place at the same time as those of the Assembly.

44.—The constitution of the Senate must be approved by the Assembly.

45.—The members of the Senate shall be elected from experienced, respected and devout persons. Thirty members shall be nominated by His Majesty, fifteen from Tehran and fifteen from the provinces.

Thirty members shall be elected by the people, fifteen from Tehran, and fifteen from the provinces.

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46.—After the formation of the Senate, all proposals shall be voted on by the two assemblies ; if the proposals emanate from the Senate or from the Cabinet, they must first be examined in the Senate and approved by a majority ; they shall then be submitted for the approval of the Assembly.

On the other hand, proposals emanating from the Assembly shall be discussed there in the first place and then submitted to the Senate—except for financial questions, which are reserved to the Assembly.

The decision of the Assembly on these questions shall* be brought to the notice of the Senate so that they may make their observations on them to the Assembly ; but the latter is free, after examination, to accept or reject these observations.

47.—As long as the Senate is not in session, proposals shall be voted on by the Assembly alone ; after receiving the Royal signature, they shall be put into effect.

48.—Whenever a proposal emanating from a Minister shall, after examination by the Senate, be submitted to the Assembly and rejected by them, if it is of sufficient importance, a third assembly shall be formed by members of the Senate and the Assembly, elected by their colleagues in equal numbers, to study the question. The recommendation of this third assembly shall be read in the National Assembly.

If an agreement is not reached, the matter shall be submitted for the consideration of His Majesty. If he approves the vote of the Assembly, the proposal shall be put into effect ; if he does not approve it, he shall order a fresh discussion and examination. Should once again no agreement be reached, if the Senate, by a majority of two-thirds of its members, approves the dissolution of the Assembly, and if the Cabinet separately confirms this dissolution, a Royal decree shall dissolve the Assembly, and His Majesty shall in the same decree order new elections ; the people shall have the right to re-elect the former deputies.

49.—The new deputies from Tehran must assemble within one month and the provincial deputies within three months. When the deputies from the capital are assembled, the Assembly shall be considered open and shall commence its work, but without discussing the question under dispute before the arrival of the provincial deputies. If, with all its members present, the New Assembly confirms the previous decision by an absolute majority, His Majesty shall approve the decision of the Assembly and shall order it to be put into force.

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50.—The renewal of the deputics cannot be ordered more than once during the period of the legislature, which is for two years.

51.—It is laid down that the kings, our successors and descendants, shall regard as a duty of their reign the observance of these principles which we have laid down and formulated to consolidate the foundations of the State, strengthen the basis of the Throne and protect the institutions of justice and the welfare of the people.

APPENDIX II

SUPPLEMENTARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF OCTOBER 8, 1907

(As amended, December 12, 1925)

IN the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful !
These clauses complete the fundamental law of the Constitution of the State of Iran, according to the fundamental law ratified on August 6, 1906, by the late Shah Mozaffar-ed-Din (may the light of God shine upon his grave !)

General Principles

1.—The official religion of Iran is Islam, and the true sect is the Ja'fariya (recognising twelve Imams). The Shah of Iran must profess and propagate this faith.

2.—The sacred Assembly, constituted with the aid and favour of the Imam of the Age (may God hasten his appearance !) and under the supervision of the learned doctors of theology (may God increase their numbers !) and by the whole Iranian people may not at any time contravene by its laws the holy principles of Islam and the laws formulated by the Prophet (may the blessings of God rest upon him and his descendants !)

It is confirmed that the doctors of theology (may God prolong their beneficent lives !) are charged with the duty of determining any contradiction between the laws made by the Assembly and the principles of Islam.

It is, therefore, laid down that at all times there shall be constituted as follows a body of at least five doctors of religious sentiments who shall at the same time be conversant with the needs of their age :¹

The theologians and doctors of the religion of Islam who are recognised by the Shi'ites shall nominate to the Assembly twenty doctors possessing the above qualifications ; the Assembly shall choose five of them or a greater number, according to circumstances, by a unanimous vote or by drawing lots, and shall recognise them as members of the Assembly with the right

¹ In point of fact this body has ceased to exist for some years.

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to discuss and deliberate the laws proposed by the Assembly, and to set aside any that contravene the holy principles of Islam, so that they shall not become law ; the decisions of this body of doctors on this point shall be final and binding.

This clause may not be modified until the Advent of the Imam of the Age (may God hasten his appearance !).

3.—The frontiers of Iran and the boundaries of the provinces cannot be changed except by law.

4.—The capital of Iran is Tehran.

5.—The official colours of the flag of Iran are green, white and red. The emblem is a Lion and Sun.

6.—The persons and property of foreigners resident in Iranian territory are safe and protected, except as subject to the laws of the country.

7.—The principles of the Constitution may not be suspended either wholly or in part.

The Rights of the Iranian People

8.—The inhabitants of the Empire of Iran shall enjoy equal rights before the law.

9.—Individuals are protected and guaranteed against offences of any kind against their persons, their property, their homes and their honour. No one may be molested, except in accordance with the laws of the land.

10.—Except in the case of serious crimes and misdemeanours, no one may be arrested on the spot, without an order signed by the President of the Court of Justice in conformity with the law ; even in this case the accused must be informed, within twenty-four hours, of the charge against him.

11.—No one may be removed from the court by which he has the right to be judged.

12.—No penalty may be inflicted or carried out except in accordance with the law.

13.—Everyone's house and dwelling is protected. No one may enter forcibly into any dwelling except by order of and in conformity with the law.

14.—No Iranian may be exiled, or forbidden or compelled to reside in any particular place, except in specific cases laid down by law.

15.—No one may be deprived of the right to dispose freely

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of his property, except in cases authorised by law, and in cases of confiscation, after the payment of a reasonable indemnity.

16.—The confiscation of the goods and chattels of individuals as a legal penalty is forbidden except in conformity with the law.

17.—The dispossession on any grounds whatever of property-owners of their goods and possessions is forbidden except on express orders of the law.

18.—The study and teaching of science, education and art are free, except as prohibited by religious law.

19.—The institution of schools at the expense of the State and the nation and compulsory education shall take place according to the law (as relating to the Ministry of Public Education). All higher and primary schools are placed under the general direction and supervision of the Ministry of Public Education.

20.—All publications are free, except those liable to harm public morals and those contrary to religion. The censorship of publications is forbidden.

If, however, anything is found contrary to the Press law, the publisher or author shall be punished in conformity with that law. If the author is known and living in Iran, the publisher, printer and distributor cannot be touched.

21.—Associations and clubs which do not give rise to religious or civil disorders and are not prejudicial to public order are permitted throughout the country. At the same their members may not bear arms, and they must conform to the regulations on that subject. Meetings in streets and public places must conform to police regulations.

22.—Postal correspondence is inviolable; it may not be confiscated or opened except in accordance with the law.

23.—The divulging of the contents of telegrams or their confiscation, without the permission of the owner, is forbidden, except in the cases provided for by the law.

24.—Foreign nationals may acquire Iranian nationality. The acceptance, continuation or withdrawal of their naturalisation are the subject of a special law.

25.—Authorisation is necessary for the prosecution of State officials on account of faults in the exercise of their duties, except those that concern the ministers, for whom there are special regulations.

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Powers of the State

26.—The powers of the State derive from the nation. The method of exercising these powers is regulated by the constitutional law.

27.—The powers of the State are divided into three parts :

(1) The legislative power, whose special function is to make and modify the laws. This power is exercised by His Majesty the King of Kings, by the National Assembly and by the Senate. Each of these organs has the right of initiation ; but the form of the law depends on its conforming with religious principles, on the approval of the two Assemblies and on the affixing of the Royal Seal. Nevertheless, the discussion of and voting on laws concerning the revenue and expenditure of the country are especially reserved to the National Assembly.

The explanation and interpretation of the laws are one of the special functions of the Assembly.

(2) The judicial power, whose function is to determine the right, is reserved to the religious courts for religious matters, and to the ordinary courts for civil matters.

(3) The executive power is reserved to the King, that is to say, the laws and decrees shall be carried out by the ministers and State officials in the name of His Majesty, in conformity with the provisions of the law.

28.—The three above-mentioned powers shall always remain separate and distinct from one another.

29.—Matters concerning each province or county, after having been voted by the provincial or county councils, shall be regulated in accordance with the relevant laws.

Rights of the Members of the Two Assemblies

30.—The deputies and Senators represent the whole nation and not only the sections of the people or the provinces which have elected them.

31.—No one may be a member of both Assemblies at the same time.

32.—If one of the members of one or the other Assembly is nominated as an official in one of the State departments, he shall cease to be a member of the Assembly. To return to the Assembly, he must resign his post and be re-elected.

33.—Each of the two Assemblies has the right to study and examine any national problem.

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34.—The discussions of the Senate shall not be valid during the dissolution of the National Assembly.

Rights of the Kingdom of Iran

35.—The sovereignty is a trust confided, by the Grace of God, to the King by the nation.

36.—The constitutional sovereignty of Iran is entrusted by the people through the National Assembly to the person of His Majesty the King of Kings Reza Shah Pahlavi.

37.—The inheritance of the throne shall vest in the eldest son of the King, whose mother must be of Iranian origin. If the King has no male child, the nomination of the Crown Prince shall be made at the suggestion of the King and with the approval of the Assembly, on condition that this Crown Prince shall not be a member of the Qajar family; but at any time, if a son is born to the King, he shall be Crown Prince by right.

38.—When the sovereignty is handed on, the Crown Prince shall personally perform the functions of royalty when he has reached twenty years of age. If he has not reached that age, a regent, who shall not be of the Qajar family, shall be elected by the Assembly.

39.—No King may ascend the throne unless he has, before his coronation, been presented to the Assembly, and has, in the presence of the members of the Assembly, the Senate and the Cabinet, taken the following oath:

“I call upon God Almighty as witness, and I swear upon the Koran and upon all that is respected by God to use the best of my powers for the preservation of the independence of Iran and to defend the frontiers of the country and the rights of the nation, to be the guardian of the constitutional law of Iran and to rule according to it and to the established laws, and to endeavour to protect the Ja’fariya religion, and in all that I do to remember God, and not to consider anything but the happiness and greatness of the State and the Nation of Iran. And I seek the aid of God, who helps mankind, to serve the progress of Iran! I seek the help of the souls of the great masters of Islam!”

40.—No one chosen as Regent may exercise his functions until he has taken the above oath.

41.—In the event of the decease of the King, the two Assemblies shall meet with full authority; the meeting of the two

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Assemblies shall not take place more than ten days after the death of the King.

42.—If the term of office of the members of the two Assemblies or of one of them expires during the life of the King and if the new deputies have not yet been elected at the time of the King's decease, the old deputies shall reassemble, and the two Assemblies shall meet again.

43.—The King shall not concern himself with the affairs of another country without the consent of the Assembly and the Senate.

44.—The King is free of responsibility. The Ministers of State are responsible for all matters to the two Assemblies.

45.—No laws and decrees of the King relating to the affairs of the country shall be put into effect until they have been signed by the Minister responsible for the correctness of the contents of the decree.

46.—The Ministers are nominated and dismissed by decree of the King.

47.—The King has the power to confer military ranks, decorations and titles in conformity with the law.

48.—The nomination of the heads of Government Departments, internal or foreign, is a function of the King with the approval of the Minister concerned, except where the law provides otherwise. The nomination of other officials is not a concern of the King, except as expressly provided by the law.

49.—The King makes decrees and gives orders for the carrying out of laws emanating from the King, without ever having the power to hinder or delay their enforcement.

50.—The commander-in-chief of all the land and sea forces is the King.

51.—The declaration of war and the conclusion of peace is a function of the King.

52.—Treaties whose secrecy is essential as provided by Clause 24 of the Constitutional Law of December 30, 1906, must, as soon as the interests and security of the country allow, be brought by the King to the notice of the National Assembly and the Senate with all necessary explanations.

53.—The secret clauses of a treaty may not contravene those made public.

54.—The King may order an extraordinary meeting of the two Assemblies.

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55.—Money is coined in the name of the King, in conformity with the law.

56.—The costs and expenses of the Royal Court shall be determined by law.

57.—The prerogatives and powers of the King consist only of those expressly mentioned in this constitutional law.

The Ministers

58.—No one may be nominated Minister unless he is a Moslem of Iranian origin or an Iranian subject.

59.—The Princes of the first degree—that is to say, the sons, brothers and paternal uncles of the reigning King—may not be nominated as Ministers.

60.—The Ministers are responsible to the two Assemblies; whenever they are summoned by one of the Assemblies, they must present themselves before it. In matters concerning them they must observe the limits of their own authority.

61.—Apart from the responsibility incurred by each individually in the affairs of their own Ministry, the Ministers are jointly responsible for general matters before the two Assemblies, and they act collectively.

62.—The number of Ministers is fixed by law according to need.

63.—The title of honorary Minister is strictly forbidden.

64.—The Ministers may not invoke written or verbal orders of the King in order to escape their responsibilities.

65.—The National Assembly and the Senate can summon Ministers and bring them to trial.

66.—The responsibility of Ministers and the penalties which may be inflicted on them shall be determined by a subsequent law.

67.—When the National Assembly or the Senate expresses, by an absolute majority of votes, a lack of confidence in the Cabinet or a Minister, the Cabinet or the Minister must resign.

68.—The Ministers may not assume any salaried office other than that of Minister.

69.—The National Assembly or the Senate shall denounce to the Court of Appeal offences committed by Ministers. The Court of Appeal shall, when all its members are present, judge the matter, except when the charge and the particulars of the

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case do not refer to questions relating to Government departments, but concern the Minister as a private individual.

Note—If the Court of Appeal is not in session, it shall be replaced by a body elected from the members of the two Assemblies in equal numbers.

70.—When a Minister is charged by the National Assembly or the Senate, or is prosecuted on charges relating to the operation of his department, the determination of the offences and penalties shall be regulated by a special law.

Powers of the Courts

71.—The High Court of Justice and the ordinary courts are the official places for the hearing of public grievances; the hearing of religious matters is the function of doctors of theology possessing the necessary qualifications.

72.—Lawsuits concerning political rights come within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, except as provided by the law.

73.—The establishment of the judicial courts is carried out in accordance with the law; no one, under any name or on any pretext, may set up a court contrary to the provisions of the law.

74.—No court may be summoned contrary to the provisions of the law.

75.—There shall be only one Court of Appeal in the whole country for ordinary matters; it shall sit in the capital; it shall not deal with any cases of first instance, except suits concerning Ministers.

76.—The hearings of all the courts shall be public, except where publicity would be prejudicial to public order or morality. In such a case the court shall declare the necessity of a hearing *in camera*.

77.—In cases concerning politics or the Press, where secrecy is necessary, it shall only be decided on with the agreement of all the members.

78.—The judgements given by the courts must be reasoned and must be read in public.

79.—In political and Press matters, a jury must be present in the courts.

80.—The presidents and members of the ordinary courts shall be chosen in conformity with the judicial laws and shall be nominated by Royal decree.

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81.—No judge of the ordinary courts may be deprived of his office provisionally or finally, without his case being tried and his offence proved, unless he resigns.

82.—A judge of the ordinary courts may not be transferred without his consent.

83.—The appointment of the Public Prosecutor is made by the King with the approval of the religious judge.

84.—The payment of members of the ordinary courts is fixed by law.

85.—The presidents of the ordinary courts may not hold salaried State offices, unless they agree to fill them without salary and provided such agreement is in accordance with the law.

86.—A Court of Appeal shall be instituted in the capital of each province for judicial affairs as provided for by the judicial laws.

87.—Military courts shall be organised throughout the country in accordance with special laws.

88.—Suits concerning the administration and functions of the State shall be heard before the Court of Appeal in accordance with the law.

89.—The Minister of Justice and the courts shall enforce the public decrees and regulations, and the provincial and municipal regulations when they are in conformity with the law.

The Provincial and County Councils

90.—Areas under the jurisdiction of provincial and county councils shall be demarcated in accordance with a special law. The fundamental regulations affecting these councils are as follows.

91.—The members of the provincial and county councils shall be elected directly by the inhabitants in accordance with the regulations for these councils.

92.—The provincial and county councils have complete power to carry out reforms in the public interest, subject to the provisions of the laws for the time being in force.

93.—The account of the receipts and expenses of all kinds in the provinces and counties shall be printed and published by the councils.

Finance

94.—No tax may be imposed except in accordance with the law.

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95.—The law shall specify cases of exemption from taxation.

96.—The scale of taxation shall be fixed and approved annually by the National Assembly by a majority of votes.

97.—In matters of taxation there shall be no privilege or distinction between members of the nation.

98.—Exemption from or reduction of taxation shall be the subject of a special law.

99.—Apart from cases specified by the law, no payment may be exacted from the inhabitants on any ground, except those decreed as state, provincial, county or municipal taxes.

100.—No appropriation or gratuity may be made from the National Treasury except in accordance with the law.

101.—The members of the Financial Commission shall be elected by the National Assembly for a term fixed by law.

102.—The Financial Commission is responsible for verifying and controlling the accounts of the Ministry of Finance, and for settling the accounts of all creditors and debtors of the Treasury. It shall take particular care to see that no section of the expenditure shown in the budget shall exceed the fixed limits or undergo any change or alteration, and that each sum shall be expended on the object for which it was allocated. At the same time it shall verify and control the various accounts of all the State departments and shall collect the documentary evidence of the items of all the accounts. It shall submit to the National Assembly a list of all the accounts of the country with its comments appended.

103.—The constitution and procedure of the Commission shall be established by law.

The Army

104.—The method of recruitment for the army and the duties and rights of soldiers shall be fixed by law ; promotion shall be regulated by law.

105.—Military expenditure shall be voted annually by the National Assembly.

106.—No foreign armed force may be admitted into the service of the State or reside in or pass through any part of its territory except in accordance with the law.

107.—Soldiers may not be deprived of their pay, ranks and duties except in accordance with the law.

APPENDIX III

REGULATIONS RELATING TO FACTORIES AND INDUSTRIAL CONCERNS

IN accordance with the proposals of the Department of Industries and Mines, the Cabinet approved at their meeting of August 10, 1936, the following regulations (comprising 69 clauses) relating to factories and industrial concerns.

I. Conditions regulating the Establishment of Factories

1.—A company or individual intending to establish a factory or industrial concern is required to draw up beforehand a written application detailing the amount of capital invested in the enterprise, the site of the plant and machinery, the estimated cost of construction, the nature of the undertaking, the cost of transport, the output of the plant and the plans for ordering the machinery, and submit it to the Department of Industries and Mines, together with certain plans as described hereunder :

(a) A plan showing the site and the structural features of the factory with an indication of the four cardinal points. (This plan should be prepared on a minimum scale of 1 : 1000).

(b) Plans of the various factory buildings, with indications of their respective uses, of the dining- and dressing-rooms, and of the washhouses, lavatories and baths.

(c) Elevation drawings of the buildings, together with any necessary cross-sections and profiles.

(d) In cases where only alterations to existing buildings are proposed, the plans of these buildings should accompany those of the proposed alterations.

N.B. The plans required under (b) and (c) above should be prepared on a scale of 1 : 50 or 1 : 100 ; figures of elevation should also be given. The same rules apply to cases where factories are reconstructed for the purpose of changing their products.

2.—The Department of Industries and Mines may accept or reject the proposals on technical or economic grounds and after consideration of local conditions. If necessary, the Cabinet may also be consulted in regard to the proposals.

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3.—The authorised operators will be required to import new and modern machinery manufactured in the year in which it was ordered (except in special cases where the Government may consider it advisable to import machinery of another kind).

4.—The construction of the factory and the installation of the machinery must conform to the plans approved by the Department of Industries and Mines.

5.—The date of opening of the factory and the commencement of operations should be notified to the Department of Industries and Mines.

II. Conditions regulating the Construction of Factories and Industrial Concerns

6.—The following specifications should be observed in the construction of all industrial works :

(a) No building shall be less than 3 metres high except for technical reasons.

N.B. By "height" is meant the distance between the floor and the ceiling.

(b) An air space of 10 cubic metres per workman should be provided (allowance being made for machinery and equipment). The space taken into account shall not exceed 4 metres from the surface of the floor.

(c) Walls and ceilings must be plastered with lime and plaster, and steps taken to prevent damp and heat absorption.

(d) Doors and windows must be adequate for ventilation and lighting, and equivalent in total area to one-sixth of the floor space. They must open outwards and must be placed so that the sun cannot shine on the workmen's faces, and so that there is no possibility of draughts inside the room.

(e) The factory must be built so as to permit the entry of sunlight into each building during the day, in order to avoid the use of artificial light. If necessary, glazed windows should be provided in or near the ceilings in buildings of more than one storey, so as to admit light into all the rooms. The height of a room should be proportionate to the area of its floor, the following proportions being observed :

Height.	Floor Space.
3.00 metres	Up to 100 sq. metres
3.25 "	100-150 "
3.50 "	150-200 "
3.75 "	200-250 "
4.00 "	250 " and over

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Furthermore, the ceilings and walls should be painted white or yellow in order to lighten the rooms.

7.—In factories where the floor is below the ground level, the walls and floor should be made of cement or mortar as a protection against damp.

8.—In each factory and industrial concern lavatories shall be provided in the proportion of one to every 26 employees. Drains should be so constructed as to eliminate bad smells, and lavatories should be placed at a distance from the workmen's quarters, so that any bad smells produced do not reach them.

9.—If the district in which the factory is located and in which the workmen are obliged to live possesses no baths, a number of baths should be constructed proportionate to the number of employees, and in conformity with technical and hygienic requirements.

10.—In each factory adequate fire-fighting equipment must be provided.

III. Regulations relating to Hygiene

11.—The employer is required to ensure that hygienic conditions are maintained in the factory as a whole, both as regards the installation of the machinery and in the works premises, so as to safeguard the health of the workmen and the factory staff.

12.—The works premises must be cleaned after working hours while the workmen are away. If it becomes necessary to clean the factory during working hours, care should be taken to lay the dust by sprinkling or other means.

13. The factory should be ventilated at least once a day after working hours, that is to say, the doors and windows should be kept open for some time so that the stale air inside and the fresh air outside may be exchanged. If it is not possible to secure adequate ventilation in this way, artificial ventilation should be provided by means of devices installed in the factory for this purpose.

14.—If artificial light is needed in the factory, it should be arranged so as to prevent eyestrain, and the lamps should be placed in such a position as to minimise the shadow cast in the room. The intensity of the artificial light should be consistent with the nature of the work done in each room, that is, the more detailed the work the stronger should be the light.

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Furthermore, if the use of strong light is essential, lamp shades should be used to protect the eyes of the employees.

15.—In winter the factory should be heated by stoves which should not be placed too near the workmen. The temperature of the rooms should be regulated in the following manner :

- (a) for work done in a sitting position . 15°–18° C.
- (b) for work requiring slight movement . 12°–15° C.
- (c) for work requiring much movement . 10°–12° C.

N.B. Thermometers should always be kept in the rooms to indicate the temperature.

16.—Fresh and cool water should be made available for the workmen at all times in sufficient quantities. To ensure this, a number of tanks with taps should be provided in the factory, and each workman should be supplied with a cup for his own exclusive use.

N.B. Adequate water and vessels should also be available for washing and lavatory purposes.

17.—Where smoke and harmful gases are inevitable, special devices should be used to prevent their diffusion throughout the factory. Before commencing work, doors and windows should be opened to allow gas and smoke to escape, and even during working hours some of them should be kept open for the same purpose.

18.—Stokers should be protected against the harmful effects of the heat and fumes from the fuel. Shifts must be arranged as necessary for the stokers, who should be provided with special glasses and shoes to protect their eyes and feet from excessive heat.

19.—In factories where excessive noise is caused, measures should be taken to reduce the intensity of the noise, in order to prevent deafness amongst the employees and others living near the factory.

20.—The employer must subject an applicant for employment to medical examination, and, if the latter is found to be suffering from a contagious disease or to be physically unfit for that particular work, he should not be engaged in that factory.

21.—The employer should release pregnant women from work on full pay for the whole period of their confinement, subject to medical certificate.

22.—Crèches should be provided in factories where there are not less than fifty female workers aged 16 and over. These

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crèches should be fitted out in conformity with hygienic requirements.

N.B. Nursing mothers should be allowed to nurse their infants as often during the day as necessary, the time so taken up to be reckoned as part of working hours.

23.—Measures should be taken to prevent the entry into the factory of flies, mosquitos and dust. Similarly if traces of moths, bugs, ants, or other insects are noticed in the factory, they should be destroyed as far as possible.

24.—The workmen should be provided as far as possible with special working clothes, which they must exchange on their arrival at the factory with their ordinary clothes (these they will keep in specially prepared wardrobes).

25.—In each factory the employer should provide wash-stands, soap and towels for his employees.

26.—Sufficient chairs and stools must be available for the comfort of the workmen. The chairs should as far as possible be provided with backs.

27.—The employer must provide enamelled or copper spittoons in the various parts of the factory.

28.—Lavatory drains should be kept clean, free from smells and disinfected. Moreover, the temperature in the lavatories should not differ greatly from that of the workrooms.

29.—The use of alcoholic drinks is prohibited in all factories and industrial concerns.

30.—The employers must establish dispensaries at the discretion of the Department of Industry and Mines, and provide in each dispensary one or two rooms with adequate medical supplies, bandages, etc., so that workmen who contract diseases or are injured during the performance of their duties can be given medical treatment at once.

31.—Infringements of the regulations of this section render the employer liable to two to five days' imprisonment or to a fine of Rs.20-50, or both.

IV. Regulations governing Employers' Liabilities

32.—The employer is required to appoint his employees to such duties as fall within their capacity, intelligence and aptitude, with a view to training them for the various operations of the factory. The imposition on an employee of a duty beyond his physical capacity is prohibited.

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33.—The employer must post up the regulations of this Act in their full and original form on several placards in the factory, so that all the employees may become acquainted with them. He is required to observe fully such parts of the regulations as affect his own duties.

34.—The employer is required to open special classes in the factory for the education of employees under the age of eighteen, under the direction and at the expense of the Ministry of Education. He should make these young employees study for four hours during holidays (which hours shall be made up to them out of working hours during the week).

N.B. If the Ministry of Education designates another place outside the factory for the purpose in question, the trainees should be sent to that place.

35.—The employer is required to keep books and registers indicating the raw materials used by the factory, the number of daily wage employees and their wages, the daily operations and their cost, the amount of the factory's output, and other general information about the factory or firm. At the end of each year summaries of the above data should be sent to the Department of Industries and Mines.

36.—If an employee falls sick or is injured in such a way that he is unable to work, the employer should reduce the working hours of such an employee in proportion to his state of health. If necessary, the employee may, on production of a medical certificate, be granted leave until such time as he is cured.

37.—In the case of the death or dismissal of an employee, the employer must pay any sums outstanding to the employee or to his heirs as the case may be. Similarly the employer should restore any money or articles deposited by the employee in the factory.

38.—The employer is required to display the health regulations prescribed by the authorities on special placards, so that the employees may at any time acquaint themselves with the current regulations.

39.—The employer must keep records of the identity, history and conduct of each employee.

40.—The owner of the factory is required to maintain and clean his plant and equipment in accordance with the manufacturers' instructions, and local and other circumstances.

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41.—The employer must observe the instructions of the Department of Industries and Mines in regard to the maintenance of plant and equipment.

42.—The employer must observe all regulations and instructions issued by the competent authorities (Ministry of the Interior—Department of Industries and Mines—etc.) regarding sanitation, discipline and technical operations.

43.—Infringement of Clauses 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, and 41 renders the employer liable to three to seven days' imprisonment, or to a fine of Rs.30-50, or both.

V. Obligations of Employees

44. The employees must at all times observe the sanitary, technical and disciplinary instructions of the competent authorities, otherwise they will become liable to one to five days' imprisonment, or to a fine of Rs.5-50.

45.—Neglect of duty on the part of an employee renders him liable to a proportionate deduction from his wages, which deduction may be levied by the owner of the factory.

46.—If the neglect and carelessness of an employee involves the employer in loss, the latter may claim the equivalent of such loss from the employee through the competent courts.

N.B. If such negligence on the part of an employee be held to be an offence, the employee will also be prosecuted.

47.—The employee is forbidden to form or take part in any union or association prejudicial to the interests of the factory. If it is found that the employee has broken this rule and that the employer has suffered pecuniary loss on this account, the offender will not only be required to make good the damage, but he will also become liable to five to seven days' imprisonment or to a fine of Rs.40-50, or both. If, moreover, the employee's action is held to be a criminal offence, he will be liable also to the punishment prescribed for such offences.

VI. Compensation of Employees

48.—The employer must deduct from the wages of labourers a sum of Drs.5 per day, and from those of other employees, including artisans and experts engaged by contract, a sum equal to 2 per cent of their salary, and deposit each month the amount so obtained with the National Bank of Iran in a special account opened in the name of the factory. This account shall be called "Savings and Provident Fund".

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N.B. The employees may also deposit their individual savings in this account, in which case they are entitled to interest, and may make withdrawals at any time.

49.—The sums derived from deductions in accordance with Clause 48 (excluding those mentioned in the note) must be expended exclusively as follows :

(a) For the protection of the employees' health and the treatment of such as fall sick or are injured during the performance of their duties.

(b) Compensation for the permanent loss of a limb or for total disability incurred in the performance of duty.

(c) Compensation to the heirs of employees dying during the performance of their duties.

50.—The compensation referred to in Para. (b) of Clause 49 shall be assessed as follows :

(1) For permanent total disablement—a sum equivalent to two years' wages at his current rate of pay, but not exceeding Rs 20,000.

(2) For the permanent loss or disablement of various parts of the body as described hereunder, in addition to free medical treatment :

(a) both arms, both legs, or both eyes—a sum equivalent to 50 per cent of the salary for the past two years.

(b) the right upper arm 35 per cent do.

(c) the left upper arm, right forearm,
right or left leg above the knee 30 per cent do.

(d) the left forearm, right or left leg
below the knee, total deafness 25 per cent do.

(e) all the fingers of both hands 25 per cent do.

(f) one eye 15 per cent do.

(g) a thumb 12 per cent do.

(h) an ear 7 per cent do.

(i) all toes 10 per cent do.

(j) one joint of the index finger or of
the big toe 5 per cent do.

(k) any finger other than the index 2½ per cent do.

N.B. In all the eleven cases mentioned above, the computation of salary for the past two years shall not exceed Rs.20,000, nor be less than Rs 5,000. In cases where an employee's service is of less than two years' duration, compensation should be calculated on the basis of two years' service at the rate of pay in force at the time of the accident.

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51.—For the purposes of Clause 49, an employee who falls sick as the result of the performance of his duties, and who requires medical treatment and a period of convalescence shall be entitled to receive half salary, for the period he is under treatment, out of the Provident Fund in accordance with a report of enquiry to be drawn up in conformity with Clause 55 below. The maximum period allowable for this purpose shall be two months.

52.—For the purposes of Clause 49, an employee falling sick or receiving an injury in the performance of his duty, but being able to remain at work, shall be entitled to free medical treatment at the expense of the Provident Fund.

53.—If an employee is killed or fatally injured during the performance of his duties, a sum equivalent to his salary for the past two years shall be paid to his dependants.

54.—For the purposes of Clause 49, paras. (a) and (b), employees shall not be entitled to benefit from the provisions of Clause 50 in the following circumstances :

(a) When the injury received is attributable to the use of alcoholic drinks or narcotic drugs.

(b) When the injury is incurred through the infringement of regulations and instructions designed to safeguard the employees.

(c) When the employee has wilfully failed to make use of the facilities provided for his protection, or has intentionally tampered with such facilities, or otherwise rendered them useless.

55.—In order to establish the employee's title to benefit from the compensations referred to in the foregoing Clauses, a report of enquiry should be drawn up, and certified by the foreman of the employees, supervisor of the section, owner of the factory or firm, medical officer, and a reputable local doctor. The report so prepared on each case shall be submitted to the Department of Industries and Mines in Tehran, or to the Municipality or local Governor in each province. The report in question shall contain all particulars affecting the case and shall explicitly state that the accident took place during the performance of duty.

56.—Reports drawn up in accordance with the foregoing clause shall be submitted for examination to a committee of three constituted as under and empowered to decide whether compensation is payable or not :

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(a) In Tehran the committee shall consist of a representative of the Department of Industries and Mines, of the employer, and of a workman chosen by the Department of Industries and Mines.

(b) In other provinces and towns, the committee shall consist of a representative of the Municipality, of the employer, and of a workman chosen by the Municipality.

After examination of the report and any other relevant documents produced by the applicants for compensation, the committee will, if they consider the applicant entitled to compensation, determine the amount payable in conformity with the regulations given above. Payments shall then be made out of the Provident Fund deposited with the National Bank on a certificate signed by the factory manager and the representative of the Department of Industries and Mines.

VII. Control and Inspection of Factories by the Department of Industries and Mines

57.—The Department of Industries and Mines is responsible for the orderly progress of industry in factories, and for the maintenance of machinery.

58.—The Department of Industries and Mines is entitled to inspect factories and industrial concerns at its own convenience.

59.—If the Department of Industries and Mines observes that the operations of a factory or firm are contrary to technical, hygienic, or disciplinary requirements, or that the current regulations are being contravened, it will issue a warning to the responsible party, binding the latter to observe the regulations, and to correct the deficiencies of the factory or firm. If, within the period allowed for this purpose, appropriate action is not taken, or if the contravention is such that it requires the immediate closing down of the factory and/or its operations without respite to the responsible party, the Department of Industries and Mines will close down the works at its discretion for any period of time.

60.—If the operations of a factory or firm involve dangers serious enough to warrant its being closed down, the Department of Industries and Mines will issue a closing-down order for a definite period.

61.—If the operations of a factory or firm are found to be injurious to the health of the employees or of those living in the neighbourhood, the Department of Industries and Mines

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will permit their continuance only on condition that the nuisance is abated.

62.—The Department of Industries and Mines is empowered to limit or prohibit the employment of aliens in industrial concerns or training centres.

63.—The Department of Industries and Mines will conduct regular inspections, to ensure the due execution of promises made regarding the maintenance and cleaning of machinery, and will compel employers who have failed to observe the regulations to do the work themselves.

VIII. Sundry Regulations

64.—In each province a register called the Register of Industrial Organisations should be kept giving the following particulars :

- (a) To what extent an organisation is subject to or exempt from these regulations.
- (b) Name of the company or the owner of the factory.
- (c) Site of the factory.
- (d) Number of employees (labourers, artisans, experts).
- (e) Nature of the operations.
- (f) Capacity of motor power.
- (g) Kinds, types, and make of machinery.
- (h) What other work the factory is capable of doing.
- (i) Register of annual output.
- (j) Maximum annual output possible.
- (k) Type of fuel, and annual consumption.
- (l) Whether or not the products bear a registered trade mark.

65.—The register mentioned in the preceding clause will be kept—

- (1) In the Department of Industries and Mines for the whole country.
- (2) In the Governor's office for each province.

66.—Any alterations in the factories or concerns which would exempt them to any extent, and any changes affecting the partners of a company, the owner of a factory, the nature of the operations, or the site of the factory should be recorded in the above-noted Register and communicated to the Department of Industries and Mines.

67.—The Provincial Municipalities are required to keep an

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employment register in which to record applications and demands for the mutual benefit of employers and employees.

IX. Scope of the Present Regulations

68.—These regulations shall apply to

(a) all factories and industrial concerns not using motor power, but employing not less than 10 employees of whom at least one is under the age of 18.

(b) all factories and industrial concerns using motor power and employing 5 men or more.

(c) all factories and industrial concerns not using motor power nor employing minors, but with at least 11 employees.

(d) all factories and industrial concerns in which the number of employees is less than those mentioned above, but whose operations involve special dangers to the health and life of the employees.

N.B. Steam boilers used in the generation of electricity are included in the term "motor power" as used above.

69.—These regulations do not apply to agricultural undertakings.

APPENDIX IV

THE ŞAADABAD PACT

TREATY concluded on July 8, 1937, between Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey.

Preamble

H.I.M. the Shahinshah of Iran

H.M. the King of Afghanistan

H.M. the King of Iraq

The President of the Turkish Republic

wishing to contribute by all means in their power to the maintenance of friendly relations between one another ;

animated by the desire to ensure peace and security in the Near East by means of additional guarantees within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations and so to contribute to general peace ;

mindful of their obligations under the Treaty renouncing war signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, and under the other Treaties to which they are party, all of which are in accord with the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty renouncing war ;

have decided to conclude the present Treaty and for this purpose have nominated

(H.I.M. the Shahinshah of Iran)

H.E. Enayatollah Sami, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Iran

(H.M. the King of Afghanistan)

H.E.M. Feiz Mohammad Khan, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Afghanistan.

(H.M. the King of Iraq)

H.E. Dr. Naji al-Asil, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Iraq

(The President of the Turkish Republic)

H.E. Dr. Tefvik Rushtu Aras, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Turkey

who, having exchanged their credentials and these having been found to be in order, have arrived at the following agreements :

THE SAADABAD PACT

Clause I

The High Contracting Parties agree to pursue a policy of complete non-intervention in their internal affairs.

Clause II

The High Contracting Parties agree expressly to respect the inviolability of their common frontiers.

Clause III

The High Contracting Parties agree to consult one another in all international conflicts affecting their common interests.

Clause IV

Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees with one another to have recourse under no circumstances, either alone or in conjunction with one or more third powers, to any act of aggression directed against the other.

The following will be considered as acts of aggression :

1. Declaration of war.
2. The invasion, by the armed forces of any State, even without declaration of war, of the territory of another State.
3. An attack by the land, naval or air forces of any State, even without a declaration of war, on the territory, fleet or air force of another State.
4. Direct or indirect aid or assistance to the aggressor.

The following will not be considered acts of aggression :

1. The exercise of the right of self-defence, that is to say, resistance to an act of aggression as defined above.
2. Action on or application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
3. Action resulting from a decision taken by the Assembly or Council of the League of Nations, or from application of Article 15, paragraph 7 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that in the last case this action is taken against the State which was the first to attack.
4. Action in aid of a State which is the victim of attack, invasion, or recourse to war on the part of another of the High Contracting Parties contrary to the Treaty renouncing war signed at Paris on August 27, 1928.

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Clause V

If one of the High Contracting Parties considers that a violation of Clause IV of the present Treaty has been or is about to be committed, it will immediately bring the question before the Council of the League of Nations. This provision shall in no way prejudice the right of the High Contracting Party to take any measures which it may consider necessary under the circumstances.

Clause VI

If one of the High Contracting Parties commits an act of aggression against a third power, the other High Contracting Party can, without warning, denounce the present Treaty as far as the aggressor is concerned.

Clause VII

Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to take measures within its own sphere, against the formation or activities of armed bands, associations or organisations for the subversion of established institutions with a view to the disturbance of the order or security of any part, frontier or otherwise, of the territory of the other Party, or with a view to the disturbance of the authority of the Government of that other Party.

Clause VIII

The High Contracting Parties having already recognised in the general Pact renouncing war of August 27, 1928, that the regulation or solution of all differences or disputes, whatever their nature or origin, that might arise between them, should never be sought except by peaceful means, hereby confirm that agreement and declare that they will have recourse to the procedures laid down or to be laid down for that purpose between the High Contracting Parties.

Clause IX

None of the clauses of the present Treaty shall be considered as in any way diminishing the obligations assumed by each of the High Contracting Parties in virtue of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Clause X

The present Treaty, drawn up in French, and signed in quadruplicate, each of the High Contracting Parties certifying

THE SAADABAD PACT

that they have received a copy, is concluded for a period of five years.

At the expiration of this term, unless one of the High Contracting Parties shall have given six months' notice of its withdrawal, the Treaty shall be considered as having been renewed for a fresh period of five years, and so on from time to time, until one or more of the High Contracting Parties shall have given six months' notice of its withdrawal. The Treaty, although denounced by one of the Parties, shall continue to exist between the others.

The present Treaty shall be ratified by each of the High Contracting Parties in conformity with its constitution and registered with the League of Nations by the Secretary General, who shall be requested to bring it to the notice of the other members of the League.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited by each of the High Contracting Parties with the Iranian Government.

As soon as the instruments of ratification shall have been deposited by two of the High Contracting Parties, the present Treaty shall come into force between the two Parties. It will come into force with the third when that Party shall have deposited its instrument of ratification and so with the fourth.

Each deposit of instruments of ratification shall be immediately notified by the Government of Iran to all the signatories of the present Treaty.

Drawn up at the Saadabad Palace, July 8, 1937.

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